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Abstract

This thesis is a study of public policy issues relating to multinational geological
repositories for high�level radioactive waste disposal (HLW).

Nuclear states have attempted for decades to implement effective radioactive waste
policies, though with limited success. The safe disposal of

HLW has proven

particularly troublesome and, thus far, a solution has eluded all states. A review of
radioactive waste policy in the UK, the US and Switzerland reveals some of the
underlying themes behind community opposition to repository siting and the reasons
for a broader global search. The failure to achieve

HLW repositories at a national

level has led to much research into the technical, social and political obstacles to site
selection, and into international collaboration.

In 1999 Pangea Resources International (PRI) concentrated its efforts in secUJ.ing a
multinational

HLW repository in the Australian outback, with its two main

arguments being economic incentives for Australia and safety and security benefits
for a broader range of nation states. The tproposal' failed to gain public or political
acceptance. An examination of the Pangea multinational project is undertaken to
detel1l1ine why the proponents were unable to adequately make their case for the
shared repository's benefits. The study finds that the arguments presented to
Australia were rejected because the public perceived the risks from hosting the
repository to be much greater than the associated benefits.

The thesis then examines the multinational repository concept in a broader context.
Many of the smaller nuclear states have great difficulty providing, and may be
unable to provide, a national solution for their

HLW. Some lack suitable geology and

most are constrained by the expense of constructing a deep repository to store small
quanties of

HLW. The waste does need to be safeguarded to protect humans and the

environment. There is now also a much greater awareness of the heightened risk of
terrorist acts on nuclear facilities, compared with that perceived during the Pangea
debate in Australia. A failure to better safeguard

HLW may well have national,

regional or global security implications. Thus the multinational repository concept

iv

can be seen as a'public good' offering economies of scale for some nuclear states and
enhancing security from terrorism for all states. For many nuclear states, the safe
storage ofHLW is a global or regional public goods problem, solvable only by their
collective action.
By applying public goods theory and drawing on the dual perspectives of
international law and international relations theory, the rationale for multinational
repositories becomes clearer. The set of circumstances most likely to achieve
interstate collaboration, to secure a multinational repository, are explored. and the
means for gaining public accepta'1
. ce is discussed To maximise security. the
multinational repository concept needs to include the participation of any nuclear
state without the means to adequately safeguard itsHLW.

This thesis advances the current research by examining how effective the existing
international regulatoryframeworks are to facilitate such a policy shift. The research
discovers significant gaps in the existing law and demonstrates the advantage of a
specific multilateral treaty to manage a multinational HLW repository. The treaty
would need to include durable long-term liability provisions to alleviate the public's
perception of risk with the repository concept. The international law concept of 'state
responsibility' is the only legal instrument available to manage long-term liability
issues. but it would need specific adaptation before inclusion in a treaty designed to
cover either a regional repository or a global network of multinational repositories. A
specifically designed treaty would facilitate inter-state cooperation and assist with
achieving overall public acceptance of the need for shared repositories.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO STUDY
One of the most intractable problems currently facing the international community is
the problem of finding acceptabl e solutions for the safe disposal of long lived, high
level radioactive waste (HLW). As of September 2004, there are 439 operating
commercial nuclear reactors in 30 states with a further 26 under construction. 1 The
total amount of spent fuel cumulatively generated worldwide, in 2004, was around
255,000 metric tons.2 It is estimated that by 2020, the time when many of the
currently operating reactors will be close to the end of their licensed operating
period, the total quantity of spent fuel generated will be approximately 455,000
metric tons.3 As the quantity increases, so too does the pressure to find a more
pennanent solution for storing both long-lived intermediate level waste and HLW.
Presently, the waste is stored in containers close to the site of production, which is
considered by the nuclear industry as only an interim solution.4 There is now the
additional safety concern with surface storage following the terrorist attacks in New
York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and other such attacks. High-level
waste remains dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years and therefore should be
isolated from the biosphere until such time as radionuclides decay to safe accepted
levels.5
The preferred solution within the nuclear energy industry is to dispose of the HLW
deep underground in geologically stable repositories. This concept was first proposed
in the l 950s6 and in recent years has enjoyed strong support from a number of states
I

IAEA. Power Reactor Information System, online edition, Vienna, 2004,
Currently there is no comprehensive data source availa ble that provides a complete worldwide
inventory of radioactive waste, regardless ofthe particular class of waste.
3 W. Danker, "Curre nt Status ofIAEA Activities in Spent Fuel Management." Paper presented at the
7th International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety, Tokai-mura, Japan, 20-24 October 2003.
4 C. McCombie, "Proposed Global Solution for the Disposal of Unwanted Nuclear Materials." Paper
presented at the ICEM Conference on Radioactive Waste Management an d Environmental
Rem�diation. Nagoya, Japan 1999 p2.
5
S. Keeny, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group.
Cambridge Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977 p245.
6
See National Research Council. "The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on Land." Publication 519.
Washington: National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, September 1957.
2
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including Sweden, the US and Switzerland. While some states, including France,7
Sweden8 and the US,9 have provided at least semipennanent sites for low and
intermediate level waste, a solution to HLW disposal is proving much more
difficult. 10 There are a number of reasons for this failure. Predominant among such
reasons is the content of radioactive waste, which stems from both nuclear energy
generation and atomic weapons. The association of nuclear energ� with atomic
weapons carries a negative connotation that leads to yublic resistance and helps to
explain overall social attitudes to the use of nuClear pow�r. 11 This is despite the fact
that a number of nation states and some of the global population rely on nuclear
energy for economic growth and wellbeing. From its inception, nuclear technology
was used by individual states to achieve and maintain international military and thus
global dominance -over competing nation states. Initially the management of
radioactive was£e was considered to be a mere technical problem and was placed way
below the priority of acquiring: the necessary knowledge in nuclear technology to
become a dominant world power. The race to achieve this status and the absolute
secrecy surrounding nuclear activities over a number of decades created considerable
mistrust amongst the wider community.
When the nuclear industry ultimately sought solutions to the back end of the nuclear
fuel-cycle, it was constrained by considerable lack oftrust 12 and the associated public
perception of risk13 to achieve its preferred option of underground repositories for the

7

See L. Tombs, (Chair). "House ofLords Select Committee on Science and Technology:
Management of Nuclear Waste," Chapter Three: Some options and their advocates: recent
international experience, London, 10 March 1999.
8
Ibid.
9
For a detailed analysis of the technical and political complexities surrounding the US search for an
effective radioactive waste management policy, from the initial years up to 1986, see L. Carter,
Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trost. Washington: Resources For The Future, 1987. [hereinafter,
Carter, 1987].
1
° C. Walker, L. Gould & E. Woodhouse, Too Hot to Handle?: Social and Policy Issues i11 the
Management ofRadioactive Wastes. New Haven: Yale University, 1983 pl. (hereinafter, Walker,
Gould & Woodhouse, 1983].
11
M. Longstaff, Unlocking the Atom: A Hundred Years ofNuclear Energy. London: Frederick Muller,
1980 p22.
11
T. Porte & D. Metlay, "Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit ofTrust." Public
Administratio11 Review 56 (1996) pp341-347.
IJ P. Slovic, M. Layman & J. Flynn, "Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics ofNuclear Waste."
Science 254 (1991) pp1603-07.
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long�tenn disposal of radioactive waste. 14 This lack of trust, combined with the rise
of environmentalism since the early 1970s, have significantly exacerbated public
opposition to building national nuclear waste disposal facilities. 1 s Such social
attitudes have to a large extent become institutionalised throughout government,
industry and the wider community, in Western societies, and as such remain a
significant barrier to the implementation of new ideas and new technologies. The
overall failure to overcome pu blic opposition at a national level has led to efforts to
end a global solution to HLW disposal.
A collaborative global solution to the problematic issue of HLW storage or disposal
involves considerable complexity. Yet there may be benefits under certain
circumstances that outweigh any disadvantage or the challenges facing proponents of
a multinational solution. In 1998, the IAEA recognised that consensus in developing
a multinational repository would "most likely result from a stepwise approach11
starting with incentives and issues of safety, followed by the more complex legal,
institutional, and liability arrangements. 16 The multinational repository concept has
evolved from theoretical foundations to more concerted attempts to secure a global
or regional repository. Between 1998 and 2002 an international consortium, Pangea
Resources International (PRI), focused its attention on outback Australia for a
potential site. Although that attempt failed it did raise the awareness of the
multinational option in the international arena. There is now an organisation, the
Association for Regional and International Underground Storage (ARIUS),
committed to advancing the shared repository option in Europe. 17
In light of the recent developments this thesis seeks to uncf1ver the most likely set of
circumstances that would motivate the nuclear states to cooperate to provide a
solution to the HLW problem at either a regional or a global level. The main problem
facing the proponents will be to create the right incentives to enable a host state to
For the more technical aspects of geological repositories, See N, Chapman & I. McKinley, The
Geological Disposal ofNuclear Waste. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987.
15
D. Easterling & H. Kunreuther, The Dilemma ofSiting a High-level Nuclear Waste Repository.
14

Boston: Kluwer, 1995 p3. [hereinafter, Easterling & Kunreuther, 1995].
16
IAEA. "Technical, Institutional and Economic Factors Important for Developing a Multinational
Radioactive Waste Repository." Austria: IAEA-TECDOC-1021, 1998, p8. [hereinafter, IAEA
TECDOC-1021, 1998].
1 7 See http://www.arius-world.org
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come forward and volunteer a site for the multinational repository. This thesis does
not purport to provide the ultimate solut:on to the 'not in my backyard' (NIMBY)
syndrome. 13 It does. however, expand on some of the issues raised by the IAEA in
both its 1998 19 and 200420 reports into the possibilities of achieving multinational
repositories. This thesis explores the incentives for state collaboration by examining
the economic, environmental, and global safety and security issues through the lens
of a global public good. An examination as to how international law can help achieve
the regional or global public good of enhanced safety and security follows. :Finally, a
reconunendation for monitored retrievable underground repositories (MRUR) is
advanced.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Waste
While this is not a technical paper, it is appropriate to examine the nuclear fuel-cycle
to provide a greater understanding of the process involved in the creation of nuclear
waste. The various steps that give rise to the production of fuel for nuclear energy or
weapons production and the l'esu1 ting accumulation of radioactive waste are known
as the nuclear fuel cycle. First, uranium ore is mined in a method similar to that for
othtr minerals such as gold, nickel and zinc.21 The ore is milled to obtain uranium
concentrate and is converted into a chemical form suitable for enrichment where the
concentration of uranium 235 is increased. This is then reconverted into an
appropriate format and manufactured into fuel elements. The process to this point,
which is often referred to as the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, produces
relatively small amounts of low activity waste.22 Finally, the fuel is used for power
generation, whereby enormous amounts of energy, in the fonn of heat, are released
when uranium 235 atoms are bombarded with neutrons.23 This causes the uranium
atom to split, releasing other neutrons that produce a chain reaction. The process of
18

For an interesting discussion on the 'Reverse Dutch Auction' as a means of overcoming NIMBY,
see H. Inhaber, Slaying the NIMBYDragon. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998.
19
Supra n 16 IAEA�TECDOC-1021, 1998.
20
IAEA. Developing Multinational Radioactive Waste Repositories: lnfrastuctural Framework and
Scenarios of Cooperation. IAEAwTECDOC�1413. 2004.
21
R. Warner, "The Australian Uranium Industry." In Nuclear Papers, edited by The State Energy
Conunission of Western Australia, Perth: State Energy Conunission, 1976 p26.
22 F. Berkhout, Radioar.tive Waste: Politics and Technology. New York: Routledge, 1991 p8.
R1ereinafter, Berkhout, 1991].
K. ShraderwFrechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy: The Socia( and Ethical Problems of
Fission Technology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980p12.

4

splitting the atom is known as nuclear fission, which is the energy source for nuclear
power plants and weapons production. During the next stage the spent fuel is
removed from the reactor, and, depending on the particular cycle chosen, is either
sent for reprocessing to recover the fissile materials or placed in temporary storage
for eventual disposal. 24
While radioactive wastes are produced a t each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, the
level of radioactivity increases significantly towards the latter or back end of the
cycle. For reasons of identification and management, the waste is divided into three

categories; namely, low-level waste (LLW), intennediate level waste (ILW) and
highwlevel waste (HLW). 25 These labels relate to the levels of radioactivity and the
timewspan needed for the waste to decay to safe levels. HLW remains radioactive for
hundreds of thousands of years and is approximately a thousand times more
radioactive than ILW, which in turn is a thousand times more radioactive than
LLW. 26 It should be noted, however, that these classifications are somewhat
arbitrary, with some ILW manifestly similar to other HLW. For example, the waste
from the reactor at Lucas Heights, which is contracted to return to Australia
following reprocessing, is classified as ILW, yet such waste with this level of
radioactivity would be classified as HLW in Europe.27
The fuel operating within a nuclear reactor lasts approximately three to five years
until such time as U-235 becomes depleted and is discharged as 'spent' fuel. These
spent fuel rods are irradiated with a number of radioactive by-products such as
strontiumw90, iodine-129, cesium-137 and plutonium w239.28 Following removal from
the reactor the spent fuel rods are at their hottest and most radioactive. At this point
they are placed in cooling ponds to reduce the heat and allow for the short-lived

24

D. Lochbaum, Nuclear Waste Disposal Crisis. Oklahoma: Pennwell Publishing, 1996 p31.
ll1ereinafter, Lochbaum, 1996].
IAEA. Safety Series: Classification ofRadioactive Waste, a Safety Guide. Vienna: International
Atomic Energy Agency, No 111-G-1.1, 1994 p8.
25
E. Reid, Rock Solid: The Geology ofNuclear Waste Disposal. Glasgow; The Tarragon Press, 1990

7
g3.
Nuclear Energy Agency. "The Disposal ofHighwLevel Radioactive Waste." NEA Issue Brief3

(1989) pl. [hereinafter, NEA, 1989]. See also The Honourable Sandra Knack. Australian Democrats
Deputy Leader. South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 19 November, 1999.
28
Supra n 22 Berkhout, 1991 p9.
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fission products to decay.29 Initially, it was widely expected that spent fuel would be
reprocessed and the uranium and plutonium removed and recycled to fonn new fuel
assemblies. The option of reprocessing as a viable solution to spent fuel management
failed to live up to expectations in the US.30 The two plants desi gned and constructed
in the US to achieve this were unsuccessful because they had safety and technical
difficulties and proved expensive to run. In addition, in 1977 President Carter's
administration decided to discontinue commercial spent fuel reprocessing because of
concerns that the separated plutonium could be diverted and utilised to manufacture
atomic weapons.31 The reprocessing option largely survived in the UK and France,
due to massive government subsidies and the willingness by some foreign nuclear
states to pay a premium price to have their spent fuel reprocessed.
The Significance of the Study
The overall failure to provide sufficient reprocessing facilities worldwide has
resulted in the accumulation over a number of decades of spent fuel rods in
temporary storage ponds. This has become a critical issue for the nuclear industry,
because in many instances the ponds are reaching capacity, and the industry is faced
with the additional problem that spent fuel in the US and elsewhere is no longer
considered as a resource but as a high level waste product.32 Where reprocessing
occurs there is the primary concern of safeguarding the plutonium extract and
enriched uranium from theft and diversion where it could be used to manufacture
hannful weapons. 33 To add to the complexity and expense is the need to solidify the
highly active liquor waste by-product from the reprocessing process. The waste
management problem is complicated by the fact that the HLW contains long-lived
radionuclides, which ideally should be isolated from the community for tens of
thousands ofyears.34 There appears to be increasing demand within the industry for a

19
30

Jbidp9.

J. Holdren, "Radioactive-Waste Management in the United States: Evolving Policy Prospects and
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more pennanent s olution to both the open and closed nuclear fuel cycles and the
increasing amount ofHLW.35
Stan Albrecht, cites five main factors accounting for overall nuclear waste policy
failures at the national level:
1. a history ofbenign neglect of th e waste end c.fthe nuclear cycle;
2.

a general failure of both the public polic y sec:ur and private industry to
anticipate the volatility of public response to proposals for nuclear waste
disposal;

3. overriding public fear of things nuclear;
4,

a track record among nuclear managers that has failed to nurture bust; and

5. strong, effective opposition from the larger environmental community and
more recently from civil.rights organisations.36

He contends that these combined factors have provided a fonnidable challenge to
those charged with finding a solution to the HLW disposal issue. 37 Moreover, in
expanding the search to the international domain these factors will still have to be
overcome, while a variety of other considerations will significantly add to the
complexity of the challenge. These include increased shipments of radioactive waste
on the high seas and territorial waters, prohibition treaties for exporting hazardous
materials between certain states, issues of safety, issues o!' legal liability, and the
necessary strategic arrangements for effective emergency responses in various
locations should an accident occur.
Following the lack of success in securing HLW repository sites at the national It..vel,
an international c onsortium, Pangea Resources International (PRI),38 was formed in
March 1997 to examine the feasibility of building a geologic repository for the
disposal of radioactive waste in a voluntary host state. The companies behind PRI
were British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), NAGRA (a Swiss Cooperative for
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nuclear waste management) and a US engineering finn, Golder Associates.39 PRI
actively sought a multinational solution to the HLW policy failure for a number of
nuclear states. The proposal was designed to isolate around 20 per cent of the world's
nuclear waste in an underground 1stable' environment. According to PRI, the ideal
site would provide geologic stability and dryness to minimise both movement and
erosion, have low relief topography, contain no valuable minerals and be remote
from centres of population. 4° Furthennore, the country chosen would have a
democratic permanent system of government. In PRI's view, Australia provided the
perfect requirements for storing HLW, and they focused on two potential sites, one in
Western Australia and one in South Australia. PRI registered a subsidiary company
in Australia on 28 November 1997 known as Pangea Resources Pty Ltd. (PRA).
One of the main failings of the nuclear waste site selection process in a number of
nation states has been the inability to merge concerns and expertise across
disciplines.41 The search for a global HLW disposal site incorporates scientific,
technical, legal, political, environmental, economic, ethical and safety issues at both
national and international levels. The PRA proposal for Australia was the first
commercial attempt to locate a multinational radioactive waste repository.42
Although PRA advocated the environmental, safety and economic benefits of the
multinational repository, their arguments were somewhat weakened in the absence of
a comprehensive conceptualisation of the problem. The significance of the research
in this thesis resides in the fact that it partially addresses the above criticism, by
adopting an interdisciplinary approach encompassing international relations,
international law and the phik,sor,hy of public goods theory, to examine why the
PRA proposal failed, and to explore how a future proposal could be improved. Such
analysis is important because the prospect of achieving the public good of a
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multinational repository depends upon significant conceptual improvement on the
PRA proposal for Australia.
Problem under Investigation
Some nuclear states will possess suitable geological conditions, the required level of
expertise, adequate financial means and the desire to provide a national solution to
their HLW disposal problem. Others may have only some elements of the above
combination. Some for example may have the appropriate geology but la.ck the
relevant expertise. Others nuclear states, regardless of geology or expertise, will find
the cost of constructing an underground repository simply beyond their means. For
many of the smaller nuclear states, it is not feasible to construct an expensive
underground repository to store relatively small quantities of accumulated
radioactive waste. Those small states may have no alternative, and would likely
benefit by embarking on a collaborative solution to their HLW problem. There is
also the possibility of the medium or larger nuclear states participating in a
multinational collaborative effort to secure a common or shared repository. The
shared solution requires a host state coming forward with the offer of a site to
construct and operate the multinational repository and provide the service.
An analysis of the multinational repository concept through the lens of a global
public good is provided in chapter four. Public ur collective goods can be best
understood by contrasting them with private goods.43 The marketplace is the most
efficient way of producing private goods that have clear property rights, and owners
may decide whether to preserve, consume, trade or lease such goods. Public goods,
by contrast, are goods in the public domain available for all to consume.44 The
private market relies on public goods that it is unable to produce, such as safety,
security ancl, the rule of law to provide stability. In their purest fonn, public goods
have two cemral characteristics not found in private goods: nonrivalry in
consumption and non-excludability. 45 Nonrivalry means that consumption of a public
43

I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulver. & R. Mendoza, "Why Do Global Public Goods Matter
Today?" In Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, edit�d by I. Kaul, P.
Conceicao, K. Le Goulven, R. Mendoza. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 p3.
44
Ibid.
45
T. Sandler, "Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action." Fiscal Studies
19 (1998) p222.

9

good by one user does not reduce its availability for others. A traffic signal light
provides a good example: a pedestrian's use of the traffic light (combined with the
accepted norm of drivers to stop at a red signal) enables a person to safely cross the
road, but in no way reduces the light's utility for other persons. 46 It would also be
unfeasiblc and impractical to reserve usage of the light for a single person or group
of persons to the exclusion of others. Thus, traffic lights are non-excludable, meaning
that someone who does not contribute to the production of the public good cannot be
prevented from using it.47 In reality few goods are purely public or purely private;
most are a combination of both.
The issue of the provision of public goods and bads has extended to the global arena
because of integrated markets and increased travel and transfer of knowledge and
information. A lighthouse to guide international shipping would be a global public
good somewhat comparable to the traffic signal light at the national level.48
Examples of pure global goods are clean air, peace and security, and public health
practices such as the prevention of the spread of disease.49 The latter goods virould be
considered universaily beneficial, but due to the problem of resource allocation the
provision of a range of various global public goods involves political decisions.
Clearly if only one nation benefits from a public good it could not be considered a
regional or global public good, yet one nation could provide a good which benefits
many.50 Arguably, nation states have now entered a new era of public policy wherein
a range of problems that traverse national borders require cooperative solutions. A
HLW repository could be provided by one or more nations to the benefit of a much
greater number of nuclear states. Yet the problem of 'free riding' would have to be
resolved before a host state would con,e forward to volunteer a site. It is highly
unlikely that a regional or global multinational repository could ever be achieved
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unless the beneficiaries share the full cost of constructing, operating, monitoring and
managing the repository over the long-term.
The purpose of this study is to uncover the most likely set of circumstances that
would motivate the nuclear states to find a collaborative solution to safely secure the
growing inventory of HLW. 51 The repository concept is assessed through the lens of
public goods theory to determine its viability. By applying public goods theory the
primary research question is: Under what set of circumstances would the nuclear
states be expected to collaborate to secure a multinational repository for the shared
storage/disposal of HLW? Once the multinational repository concept is assessed
through the lens of a global public good, and the incentives most likely to gain
political commitment arc identified, the thesis turns its attention to the mechanisms
available under international law. Because of the extended time frame for the
radioactive material in the HLW to decay to safe limits, issues of liability and safe
responsible management are most important. In the case of the Pangea proposal for
Australia, the operator was to set aside approximately $US 400 million for
compensation for potential future damages. 52 After 40 years, the site would have
become the responsibility of the Australian Government, and the question arises as to
whether this is an adequate amount or are there valid reasons for securing
multilateral agreements with long-term liability arrangements to protect the host state
under international law?
Supplying global public goods requires two separate yet intertwined processes, the
politica: and the production process itself. The first involves political commitment
reliant upon the necessary incentives for cooperative action. The incentives are
largely determined by the net costs of providing the goods or service and the extent
of benefits received. The second, producing the good, involves a range of factors
including negotiations among and between state and non-state actors, institutional
arrangements, and compliance measures if binding agreements are chosen to manage
the complex issue. Kaul, Grunberg and Stem make the point that final public goods
51
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are outcomes rather than 'goods' in the standard sense. They state that "there is
nothing intrinsically good about agreeing to reduce chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's)" but
the desired outcome is of course an intact ozone shield.53
The 1997 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer54 (commonly known
as the Montreal Protocol) is often cited as perhaps the most successful international
regime, because it was instrumental in helping to achieve the overall CFC reduction
targets. Marco Ferroni maintains that international regimes such as the Montreal
Protocol are 11 intennediate public goods" because of their capacity to include
measures and procedures that can help achieve the desired outcomes.55 International
agreements typically include statements of commitment and policy priorities; they
identify or set norms and standards; they facilitate consultation and negotiations; and
they outline obligations and detail compliance mechanisms which all help to achieve
the desired outcome. By integrating regime theory and international law, the last
question this study seeks to resolw; is: Can a specifically designed multilateral treaty
facilitate interstate cooperation and advance the necessary public acceptance to help
achieve a regional or a global multinational repository?
Theoretical Framework
Given that the search for a multinational HLW repository is of global significance
and requires the involvement of a number of states, as well as being subject to
international regulatory considerations, the appropriate theoretical framework for this
analysis is grounded in the dual perspective of international law and international
relations theory. Until the last decade or so, such a combined analytical approach was
rare because the two disciplines had confined themselves to their respective areas of
expertise.56 These distinctly separate lines of inquiry stem from the RealistMLiberalist
divide in international relations, with intematior.,al law aligned closely to the
Liberalist perspective. Realist theory contends that each state will act in its best
interest, and the constant strives to maximise power will achieve a balance that
sJ Supra n 46 Kaul, Grunberg & Stem, 1999 p13.
4
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results in stability and order. 57 In such anarchical5 8 societies relations between states
revolve around the pursuit of relative power.59 Political Realism gained ascendancy
in the unsettling period leading up to and following World War Two and became the
main driving force in international relations theory. Realism's central principle is the
notion of self-help and absolute reliance on the state's own resources to promote its
interests and protect itself. This was the paradigm used by Hans Morgenthau60 and
others to explain how order is achieved in a world of sovereign autonomous states.
The interwar Realists observers reacted to and completely rejected the Wilsonian
liberal internationalist approach. The Liberalist perspective rose to prominence with
great optir.1.ism following World War One but received a shattering blow on
aspirations for a hannonious world with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich.
Woodrow Wilson and his followers held the conviction that global peaceful order
could be maintained with a combination of democratic and international
institutions.61

As

Slaughter contends, the political Realists 11believed instead in the

polarity of law and power", which resulted in the Realist-Liberalist divide
dominating international relations theory for at least forty years. 62 The theory of
Realism can best account for the protracted arms race, struggles for hegemony,
obsession with military security and certain acts of aggression against nation states. It
may still be the best theoretical perspective within international relations to explain
certain issues of interstate conflict such as that which occurred in Iraq in 2003. Yet it
is impossible for one perspective to provide an explanation for all situations. Realism
lacks the capacity to account for disannament program.mes, increased global
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cooperation between states in specific issue areas, or trends towards economic
integration and interdependence. 63
Commencing in the late 1960s, a number of writings from international relations
theorists emerged to significantly challenge the dominant Realist paradigm. In one
study, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye64 proposed an alternative model, which
contends that nation states engage in transnational relations to promote shared
benefits. Their initial analytical emphasis was primarily in the area of international
political economics. 65 The authors expanded their theory in Power ar.d
Jndependence66 by introducing the notion of 'complex interdependence'. As the term
indicates, nation states are regularly involved in multiple issue areas of no specific
hierarchical67 order. These include issues of trade, telecommunications, aviation,
human rights and the environment. Their study made a significant contribution to
the debate and provided an alternative explanation for cooperation among nation
states. The authors defined "sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships
of interdependence as international regimes".68 These regimes or institutions can
help shape behaviour and have a direct impact on national policy. Two early
examples of regimes were the Bretton Woods international monetary arrangements
agreed to in 1944 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) laid
down in 1947.69
The concept of international regimes in international relations stemmed from the
desire to understand why nation states cooperate in specific issue areas. It appears
from the examples of Bretton Woods and GAIT that the practice of regimes
preceded much of the theoretical deliberations on the definitional, functional and
analytical aspects of regimes. In contemporary international relations scholarship the
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most widely accepted definition of international regimes is the one agreed on by
Stephen Krasner and colleagues70 during an exploration of the concept in 1980,
whereby
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, nonns, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area
of international relations.11

Oran Young provides a similar but firmer definition of regimes as:
social institutions that consist of agreed upon principles, nonns, rules, decision-making
procedures, and programmes that govern the interac tion of actors in specific issue
areas.12

An important inclusion in Young's definition is the additional key words, "social
institutions" and "govern", which are based on the clear distinction between
governance and govenunent. Governance is the establishment of social institutions,
sets of rules, and/or decision making procedures and activities that serve to define
social practices and guide the interactions of the actors involved.73 While nation
states play a prominent role as actors, the governance arrangements of regimes
allows for the involvement of various NGOs, while avoiding any need or suggestion
for particular forms of 'world government'. Such regimes or institutional
arrangements can address social conflicts, foster cooperation and help resolve
collective action problems among interdependent actors.
Despite its wide acceptance, there are some variations and some direct disproval of
the regime concept among international relations , theorists. 74 Yet the analytical
contribution of regime theory in providing an alternative explanation for interstate
cooperation in specific issue areas has been valuable. The above definitions provide a
70
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good starting point, but (as its critics correctly contend) they are somewhat broad and
imprecise and can be applied equally to fonnal or informal agreements. Krasner 1s
defit,ition has been compared both critically75 and more favourably76 to the
interpretation and w1derstanding of the term 'regime' as used in international law.
Neither definition is as rigid or as legalistic as that provided by Eckart Klein, whose
version of regimes is grounded in a traditional legal sense. Klein states that regimes
refer to treaty-based settlements which are intended, by defining the status of a

11

certain area, to form part of the international order11, the purpose of which provides
some form of formal regulation. 77 A specific reliance on a conventional treaty from
the outset can counteract or directly impede negotiations and thus consensus building
at the important initial stage. Hence criticism has also been directed towards
international law for its positivistic inflexible approach and incapacity to quickly
adjust to an ever-changing world. Moreover, Hurrell and Kingsbury highlight the
omission of political considerations among some international law theorists.
Theoretical accowits of international environmental law have often paid rather little
explicit attention to the political bargaining processes that underpin the emerg ence of
new norms of intemational·eovironmental law, to the role of p ower and interest in inter
state negotiations, and to the range of political factors that explain whether states will or
will not co mply with rules.78

It has become clearer in recent times that neither discipline can ignore the other. As
Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood contend, 11political scientists and international
lawyers have been reading and drawing on one another's work with increasing
frequency and for a wide range of purposes". 79 While the two disciplines have still
some way to go to catch up with the practical realities of interstate relafions in a
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range of specific issue areas, significant improvement in widerstanding the benefits
ofinterdisciplinary collaboration has been achieved.

International Law and Overview of Nuclear Regulation
International law is primarily the body of law that governs conduct and relationships
between states.80 It also includes rules of law that regulate the functioning of
international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the International
Labour Organization (ILO). Since 1945, the UN has played a significant role in the
development of international law. Yet the driving force behind the creation,
implementatio n and enforcement of international law is the collective will of the
sovereign states. Unlike municipal law, which usually has a hierarchical legal
structure with the sovereign at the apex, the international system is horizontal,
consisting of equal independent sovereign states,81 of which there are now 191.
International regimes do modify the nonns and practices of sovereign states but
states agree to collaborate for a range of common interests and for the greater global
good.82
Shaw identifies the main sources of international Jaw as twofold: "the formulation of
international agreements, which create rules binding upon the signatories, and
customary rules, which are basically state practices recognised by the community at
large as laying down patterns of conduct that have to be complied with". 83 Hence two
important sources of international law are Treaty Law and Customary International
Law, the latter based on accepted state practice over time combined with expected
legal behaviour. The proliferation of international agreements over recent decades
has resulted in fonnal agreements or treaties on a wide range of issues, including
security, human rights, Law of the Sea, envirorunental law, extradition and trade.
Treaties can be described as law making in the sense that they seek to codify legal
80
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rules between and among states.84 When a state agrees to formally abide by the tenns
of a treaty, it enters into a process of ratification whereby it passes national
legislation endorsing the objects of the treat)'.85 Multinational agreements can also
establish significant guiding principles and objectives that are not legally binding but
may gain acceptance and ascendancy over time through customary international
law.86 These guiding principles and objectives are sometimes referred to as 'soft law•,
but much debate surrounds the legal extent of such principles. Philippe Sands
explains the difficulty in detennining the legal status of principles in this way:
Some principles may be considered to reflect a rule of customary law; others may
reflect only an emerging rule; and yet others might be considered to have an even less
well developed legal status. 87

The particular values and geo-political priorities pertaining to events in time largely
detennine international regulation of any activity. International nuclear law is no
exception and was influenced by the atomic era and the euphoria of the 1950s
surrounding nuclear energy development. Molodstova88 contends that initially only
the military uses of nuclear activities were considered dangerous, which explains
why attention was focused on law for nuclear weapons disannament and non
proliferation of weapons grade material. In January 1946, the first General Assembly
of the United Nations (UN) began to seek a solution to the international concerns
raised by the discovery of atomic energy. 89 At that first session the members
established a UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) under the guid ance of the
Security Council. Among the main issues for consideration was the pro�osed
Lilienthal-Baruch plan, the intent of which was to exercise control over nuclear
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plants engaged in 11 potentially dangerous atomic energy activities". 90 Yet significant
contention existed between the US, who sought an international body to control
atomic energy, and the USSR, who demanded a complete prohibition of atomic
weapons.91 In essence, this first attempt at international regulation of atomic energy
failed because of mistrust between the two major powers.
Bertrand Goldschmidt92 maintains that, in the absence of an international agreement
on non-proliferation, the US assumed responsibility for inspecting and thus policing
the application of nuclear materials in foreign states. A number of states were
extremely concerned with such a role being adopted by the US, and argued for a
broader international solution. A concerted effort followed with President
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal, and, after considerable negotiation,
consensus was reached on an international regulatory agency under the auspices of
the UN.93 In 1957, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created but
it had no substantial safeguard duties unless specifically requested by the major
nuclear states. Upon creation, the IAEA was responsible for the dual roles of
promotion and regulation, tasks that Sands argues were mutually incompatible.94
Other important 'nuclear' institutions established in 1957 were the European Atomic
Energy Agency (EURATOM) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. The
IAEA, as the body responsible for the nuclear states, was criticised during the initial
years of nuclear energy development for its failure to secure more effective regimes
for all forms of nuclear activities.
Although public health and safety concerns were not neglected throughout the push
for nuclear energy, the emphasis was heavily skewed in favour of safeguarding
weapons grade material. This was demonstrated by treaties on atmospheric and
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nuclear testing,95 the placement of nuclear weapons,96 and by a significant
improvement in US and Soviet Union relations, which culminated in the signing of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 15168. 97 The NPT is the pivotal legally
binding regime that seeks to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons while enabling
the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The NPT also instructs the nuclear weapons
states to engage in efforts on nuclear disannarnent. The NPT is an important
international institutional regime. Safety concerns about the peaceful use of nuclear
energy were addressed to some extent with the Paris 98 (1960) and Vienna99 (1963)
liability Conventions. However, Lee100 highlights the inherent weakness of both
agreements, which on the one hand recognised the potential for harm caused by
nuclear accidents, while on the other sought to encourage the infant nuclear industry
with protection mechanisms. Sands101 is even more critical of the two conventions,
which he states inter alia failed to provide in express terms for environmental
damage and allowed absurdly low ceilings of financial liability. Indeed, he cites the
example of non-nuclear states such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and Austria who chose
to remain outside of the treaty arrangements, preferring to rely on the liability
provisions of private and public international law. McMillan supports these views
and provides the strongest critique of the existing international regulatory framework
for nuclear energy, labelling the entire regime "inadequate". 102 While this criticism
may or may not be warranted, international regulation of radioactive waste
management appears even less rigorous.
The importance of promoting safe and environmentally sound practices for
radioactive waste management was reaffinned by the United Nations Conference on
95
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Environment and Development, htld in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992. 103 Agenda 21 is one
of the key documents produced at the Earth Summit in Rio and is a statement of
intent and commitment for sustainable development into the 21 st century. There are
40 chapters contained in Agenda 21 covering a broad range of issues. Chapter 22
specifically refers to the necessity for states to 11 support efforts within IAEA to
develop and promulgate radioactive waste safety standards or guidelines and rodes
of practice as an internationally accepted basis for the safe and environmentally
sound management and disposal of radioactive wastes". De K.ageneck and Pinet 104
maintain that that specific political statement, within Agenda 21, was probably the
first important step in the process that led to the adoption, in September 1997, of the
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management. !05 The Joint Convention refers to Chapter 22 of
Agenda 21 in its preamble. 106
Specific international regulation of radioactive wastes has been avoided in preference
for national controls. Where international controls are applied, the nuclear states have
relied on the non-obligatory IAEA codes of conduct or soft law provisions to guide
the safe management of nuclear waste. !07 Notably, tougher restrictions and
prohibition of radioactive waste materials have been achieved outside the influences
of the IAEA. A number of treaties have express provisions for regulating radioactive
wastes at sea, including the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 108 the 1972
Oslo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and

Aircraft, !09 and the 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine

Environment of the North-East Atlantic. 110 In London, in 1972, the Convention on
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the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter was
established and gained widespread ratification to restrict hazardous waste dumping at
sea. 111 The London Dumping Convention was strengthened further with various
amendments, the most notable being in 1993, 112 which completely prohibited the

disposal of all radioactive wastes at sea. Those amendments not only protected the
marine environment but also compelled the nuclear industry to find a land-based
solution to the problem of radioactive waste disposal. Although outside of the IAEA,
this is a good example of a multinational regime having a direct influence on
domestic nuclear waste policy.
The significance of the IAEA as the leading organisation in the area of radioactive

wastes,113 while most important, also presents some problems. Reliance on their
expertise and safety codes, which are non-binding, can have the effect of weakening
international agreements. Kummer, for example, highlights the point that radioactive
wastes were excluded from the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, because such

wastes are subject to control by the IAEA. 114 Consequently, the transboundary
movement of most radioactive waste comes under the non-binding Code of Practice
on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste. 115 Sands
emphasises the ambiguity surrounding the two instruments and the different

definitions ofradioactive waste contained in each one. 116 Moreover, the exclusion of

radioactive waste from the 1989 Basel Convention may now be more significant,
because that Convention has since banned the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes between developed and developing nations.
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Methodology
The thesis undertakes a qualitative documentary analysis of primary and secondary
sources related to the problem under investigation. The findings will be subjected to
cross-validation from a number of diverging experts in the field. This process is
known as triangulation, which increases the accuracy and reliability of reported
disclosures. 117 As stated previously, the thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach
involving international law and international relations theory. The intended primary
sources will include Treaty Law, Case Law, Domestic Legislation, Parliamentary
Debates, Committee Reports and the Pangea Project documents. Secondary sources
shall comprise books, journal articles, conference papers, newspaper articles and,
where appropriate, reputable Internet sites. The modus operandi involves both a legal
institutionalist evaluation and a political contextual analysis underpinned by the
theoretical framework outlined above.
This first chapter provides a brief introduction to the topic and problem under
investigation. It contains a summary of the nuclear fuel cycle and a review of
existing international law on nuclear activities. A brief explanation of public goods is
provided, as well as the rationale for utilising the dual theoretical framework of
international law and international relations theory. It is contended that this is the
most likely approach to find an integrated solution to collective action problems in
contemporary times.
Chapter Two conducts an analysis of radioactive waste policy in a number of nations
with particular emphasis on the UK, the US and Switzerland. It seeks to identify the
obstacles and underlying themes behind the failure to locate acceptable HLW sites
and hence the reasons for a global search. The public perception of risk associated
with radioactive waste repositories is a constant theme throughout the nuclear waste
literature, and the need for genuine public participation to counter that problem is
highlighted.
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Chapter Three examines the failed Pangea Resources Australia (PRA) proposal to
locate a multinational high-level radioactive waste (HLW) repository in Australia.
This was the first significant attempt to find an international 'voluntary host' nation,
and thus led to the first political response to the multinational concept. The study
finds that PRA placed too much emphasis on the economic arguments and failed to
provide convincing social arguments or indeed to adequately communicate the
repository benefits over the perceived risks.
Chapter Four applies public goods theory to the multinational repository concept to
ascertain its strengths and weaknesses. It seeks to identify the most likely incentives
required to encourage interstate cooperation and bring about the necessary political
commitment to the shared repository concept. There are two separate yet
complementary types of interstate collaboration to secure a multinational repository:
'regional' and 'global'. Both involve economic, environmental, safety and security
considerations, but the smaller nuclear states would likely choose a regional
repository because of economies of scale. By contrast, a set of global multinational
repositories, designed to safeguard all remaining HLW, would require the most
comprehensive security incentives.
Chapter Five explores the international legal principle of state responsibility, to
ascertain how well suited the concept is to manage the complex long-term safety
requirements for radioactive waste decay over unprecedented timeframes. The
chapter also explores the potential for the concept to alleviate the pub1ic perception
of risk associated with multinational repositories, and advances the case for a
multilateral treaty. The important issue of responsibility for the HL W during
transportation, with associated liability in the event of an accident during shipment,
is beyond the scope of this study. Transboundary movement of the HLW may get a
mention from time to time but it is not discussed to any great extent.
Chapter Six puts forward additional arguments for securing a specific and detailed
binding multilateral treaty for multinational repositories. These include the capacity
to facilitate cooperation between the states during the negotiation phase, and the
treaty's propensity to alleviate perceptions of risk and assist with building public trust
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in order to achieve legitimacy. The multilateral treaty would also provide the
necessary framework for governing the negotiated outcomes associated with a
multinational regional or global repository.
The conclusion is contained in Chapter Seven, which draws the thesis together and
presents the main conclusions of the study. It briefly restates some of the reasons
why a multinational repository may be necessary, and why HLW storage/disposal
should be conceived as a global public goods problem. It reiterates the main finding
that a multinational geological repository for storing HLW is achievable, if the
repository provides more comprehensive benefits to a larger number of states.
Finally, it demonstrates how a specifically designed multilateral treaty can help
alleviate public perceptions of risk, as well as providing the mechanisms for
governing some of the complex issues in operating a multinational repository.
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CHAPTER TWO

AN ANALYSIS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY IN
SPECIFIC NATION STATES
Attempts to site high�level radioactive waste (HLW) repositories have encountered
great difficulty and outright opposition in many nation states. This has led to an
abundance of research into the scientific, technical, political and to a lesser extent the
social aspects of site selection to try and achieve more successful policy outcomes. 1
The only point of consensus that has emerged in the literature, however, is that
public opposition is perhaps the single most difficult problem to overcome in any
selection for a HLW repository.2 The lack of a national solution has resulted in
international collaboration in geological research, and in attempts to search for a
global HLW repository site. 3 Considering the seemingly insunnountable problems,
and that the search for a repository site has now extended into the international
domain, it is appropriate to explore how national governments previously responded
to the siting challenge.
This chapter undertakes an analysis of radioactive waste policy in the UK, the US
and Switzerland. It explores how the policy makers in each state responded to the
overwhelming public opposition to radioactive waste repositories. It seeks to uncover
the main obstacles and underlying themes behind the failure to locate national HLW
sites in particular, and hence some of the reasons for a global search. This is
important not only for showing the history of policy development and the constraints
operating on policy makers, but also to illustrate that current and future policy
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implications derive from past choices and past events.4 The UK is selected as the
main focus because British Nuclear Fuel Limited (BNFL) was the main shareholder
in Pangea Resources International (PRI). Switzerland was chosen for NAGRA's 5 role
as a secondary shareholder, and the US because of its major role in nuclear activities
and connection to PRI through Golder Associates.
The 'not in my back yard' {NIMBY) syndrome is a prominent response to the siting
of a range of hazardous facilities including nuclear installations. Yet to rely solely on
the NIM:BY syndrome as an. explanation for strong community opposition is not
particularly helpful in understanding the underlying motives behind public objections
to radioactive waste sites.6 too often, policies are formed and decisions made
without a proper appreciation of community concerns, which can lead to a further
hardening of attitudes. In addition, NThIBY should not be confused with NIABY
('not in anyone's back yard1) which is a more accurate tenn used for describing
outright opposition to waste facilities.7 NIABY is usually the position taken by
environmental groups, peace ai;;tivists and others who often fonn local, national and
international alliances to share infonnation and pool resources to maximise
opposition.
So what precisely are the motivators driving the NIMBY and NIABY response to
radioactive repository proposals? There are a number of determining factors,
including nuclear stigma,8 perception and social amplification of risk,9 a lack of
confidence in the technology, a mistrust of govemment 10 and concentration of risk
upon a particular population.11 This chapter advances the apparently obvious
� M. Gowing, Reflection�· on Atomic Energy History: The Rede Lecture. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978 p7.
5
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conclusion that the entire site selection process needs legitimacy. In order to achieve
this, new and iru1ovative measures must be established for greater public
involvement, to advance the necessary trust and gain acceptance for the site selection

process. 12 Yet the clear failure of the UK and the US to achieve that basic objective

over many decades is remarkable, and tha specific approaches that failed need
documenting in order to prevent a repetition of past mistakes. Finally, some
comparisons are made between the three nations under review and their closest
counterparts in an attempt to draw out some broader conclusions.

Radioactive Waste in the UK: an Intractable Problem
Radioactive waste management has often been described as the Achilles heel of the
nuclear industry. While it is just one of the many important aspects of the nuclear
fuel cycle that needs to be adequately safeguarded, the management of HLW in
particular has a long and troubled history. 13 A review of the literature reveals
numerous studies, reports and analysis of the technical and political difficulties
associated with radioactive waste disposal. While there are many different
approaches and conclusions on the subject, there is at least a consensus that the

industry focused on the problem much too late, 14 engendered deep suspicion and
failed to gain public support. The main rem;on for this was that the nuclear industry
was born out of the atomic era and scientific attention concentrated exclusively on
the arms race and then later on limiting weapons proliferation. Because of this a
number of problems such as radioactive waste management were not solved before
nuclear power was introduced on a commercial scale.
The commercial era of nuclear power began in the UK when the Atomic Energy
Authority turned on the first nuclear power station at Calder Hall in 1956. One year
later the US followed suit with their first commercial civil reactor at Shippingport,
Pennsylvania, operated by the Duquesne Light Company. 15 The US did not remain
12 Public involvement requires the establishing of proper communications procedures in order for a

transparent free flow of information to occur.
13
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behind for long and soon became the world's largest producer of nuclear generated
electricity. Currently, out of 439 commercial nuclear reactors worldwide, 104 are
operating in the US, compared to 59 in France, 54 in Japan, 30 in Russia and 33 in
the UK. 16 Because of the size of the US, that large number of reactors accounts for
only 20.4 per cent of its total generated electricity, whereas Lithuania's two reactors
account for 77.6 per cent of its total generated electricity, and France produces 77.1
per cent of its total electricity from nuclear power. The bulk of the world's
radioactive waste comes from electricity generation at nuclear power stations. Much
smaller amounts are produced for medical treatment and in research reactors, and of
course the waste arising from the nuclear military programmes also needs to be
properly managed. 17 The use of nuclear power as a 'clean and reliable' energy source
is significantly constrained by the lack of a long-term solution to the HLW problem.
Arguably the first place to start for a study of the rise of nuclear power is the detailed
historical account provided by British historian, Margaret Gowing. 1 s Her access to
official sources produced two insightful volumes, which cover the period from the
race to build the bomb in the late 1930s to the realisation of a commercial nuclear
industry in the 1950s. 19 That 'Heroic Phase' was marked by a period of optimism and
clear ideologically detennined views. Gowing also demonstrates the lack of political
interest in the issue of radioactive waste in the early years.20 Radioactive waste was
considered a technical problem and hardly got a mention in political debate until
perhaps the Radioactive Substances Bill of 1948.21 In the US, the nuclear waste issue
failed to achieve any scrutiny until the reorganisation of the Atomic Energy Act in
1954:12 Furthennore, it took until the early 1980s for the radioactive waste issue to
achieve the serious attention it deserved from the US Government and associated
16 IAEA.
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agencies. �. .:t when the issue finally gained recognition as a policy problem the
initial emphasis was heavily skewed in favour of technical and scientific solutions. 23
Between 1945 and 1975 radioactive waste policy was given a low priority. At this
time, in the UK as in the US, the accepted method of dealing with low activity
radioactive waste was to 1dilute and disperse' the waste into the oceans. The process
of ocean dumping commenced in the UK in 1949, well before the widely publicised
Windscale reactor fire in 1957.24 The duration of the ocean dumping policy can be
illustrated by the fact that Windscale,25 now Sellafield, has been the single longest
running contributor of radioactive pollution to the world's oceans. The dilute and
disperse policy has been an ongoing issue of contention between the Irish and British
governments for many decades. Following international concerns in the early 1970s,
the sea disposal option was restricted by a number of treaties. Since 1993, the
dwnping of high and intermediate level waste has been prohibited by a series of
amendments to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter 1972. 26 Those amendments significantly strengthened
that 1972 London Dumping Convention, but remarkably the dilute and disperse
policy still continues for low level waste. Phillipe Sands argues that the main reason
for the successful London Dumping Convention amendments was that the nation
states were able to develop global norms outside the control of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.27
While Frans Berkhout concedes that British waste management practice was
relatively "coherent and effectively operated11 during the initial years, he also
contends that there was a lack of commitment to solving the high-level waste
disposal issue.28 He cites the well-documented criticism of this ambivalence by the
23

R. Dunlap, M. Kraft & E. Rosa, Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste: Citizens' Views ofRepository
Siting. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993 p3.
24
F. Berkhout, Radioactive Waste: Politics and Technology. New York: Routledge, 1991 pl38,
�hereinafter, Berkhout, 1991].
s L. Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust. Washington: Resources For The Future, 1987
£251. [hereinafter, Carter, 1987].
6

Convention on /he Prevention ofMarine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972,

1046 UNTS 120.
27
P. Sands, "Observations on International Nuclear Law Ten Years after Chernobyl." Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law 5 (1996) p201.
n Supra n 24 Berkhout, 1991 pl38.

30

Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, chaired by Brian Flowers in 1976, to
support his stance.29 The Flowers report stated that:
There should be no commitment to a large progranune of nuclear fission power unti l it
has b een demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe
containment oflong-Iived highly radioactive wastes for the indefinite future.30

In addition, the report recommended that government establish an independent
statutory advisory committee to provide expert advice on the management of nuclear
wastes, and a separate national body responsible for radioactive waste disposal. The
Callaghan Labour Government did not accept the recommendation that the advisory
committee should be a statutory body, arguing that it would be better to allow it
greater flexibility in the early years of its life.31 The government also failed to take
up the suggestion that the independent committee be given sufficient funding to
enable it to direct geological and oceanographic research over two decades. When
the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee {RWMAC) was
established in 1978, as a non-statutory independent committee of experts, it was
made responsible for a much broader range of radioactive waste32 than originally
intended.33 Later British Governments also failed to implement the recommendations
of the Flowers report in its entirety.
There was much criticism of the decision in 1982 to create the disposal zompany,
Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive {NIREX), because of its close links to
the nuclear industry.34 Again, this was not the independent body recommende1 by
the Flowers Royal Commission. NIREX35 was jointly owned by the four main
nuclear organisations in the UK: BNFL, Nuclear Electric,36 Scottish Nuclear37 and
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the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). Of course the main reason for creating
independent bodies is to encourage transparency, accountability and public
consultation and thus reduce the potential for secrecy. Notably, the British Nuclear
Industry has been criticised for its attempts to cover up38 even the most serious
accidents. For example, Chris Cragg is scathing of the fact that it took over 20 years
and a BBC documentary to uncover an explosion that occurred on 10 May 1977, in a
shaft at Dounreay.39 The plant was run by the UKAEA, which back in the 1950s
sought and was granted permission to dump intermediate solid wastes down a
disused tunnel. It is not known what exactly was dumped there but it did react and
Cragg expressed alann that no one outside of the industry knew about the explosion
until the BBC documentary in 1996.40
The problem of secrecy was not confined to the UK: it permeated the entire nuclear
industry from the early years and the race to build the atomic bomb. Luther Carter
contends that the lack of public scrutiny and an unchecked optimism induced an
"unrealistic perception of infallibility and technical brilliance", which prevented the
industry from identifying adverse effects and developing management strategies to
overcome them.41 That entrenched practice of secrecy allowed the industry to hide its
mistakes and near misses, which engendered deep suspicion and distrust among the
public. The lack of trust increased following the media exposure and controversy
sur rounding the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents.42 It became apparent
that a nuclear accident anywhere had wide-reaching implications for all nuclear
states. Such events have the potential to heighten the NIMBY factor and impact
directly on radioactive waste policy or the site selection process. Intense community
opposition driven by the widespread public anxiety of all things nuclear, especially
the siting of ra..3:oactive waste, is a constant challenge confronting the nuclear
industry and policy makers. 43
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In the UK during the 1970s, problems at Windscale were the catalyst for shifting the
public focus on to the nuclear industry.44 The main driving force was an
unsympathetic and extremely critical media that alerted the public and helped create
a forceful opposition to nuclear waste disposal. In October 1975, for example, the
Daily Mirror led with a front-page story under the enormous headline: "PLAN TO
MAKE BRITAIN WORLD'S NUCLEAR DUMP".45 In 1977, the refusal by
Cumbria County Council to approve a planning application by BNFL for a major
expansion of reprocessing and waste-management facilities at Windscale led to a
public inquiry into the reprocessing option. Yet the balance within the Callaghan
Cabinet only tipped in favour of a full public inquiry following the reporting of a

radioactive waste storage leak from a silo at the Windscale site.46 Two central themes
dominated the inquiry: the justification for reprocessing, and operator safety and

general public protection against radiation from radioactive waste.47 While the
inquiry justified the reprocessing option in the UK, which was accepted by
Parliament, the increased public scrutiny placed the issue of radioactive waste
management finnly on the public agenda.
Subsequently, in line with the earlier recommendations of the Flowers report, the
UKAEA and government officials commissioned the Institute of Geological Sciences
(IGS) to research into the geological suitability for underground storage ofHLW. In
1979 the IGS identified 127 potential sites, with at least 12 of those suitable for
further exploration drilling.48 The authors highlighted the difficulties involved in
selecting the best geologic site and emphasised that preferences were necessarily

based on subjective judgements due to the lack of available objective data.49 Public
opposition to the drilling programme was intense and entirely sceptical of any
scientific data. Later, most agreed that attempts to secure a HLW repository was
precisely the wrong problem to tackle first, and those attempts may have
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significantly contributed to a much broader public fear of nuclear waste. 5° Fo1lowing
unrelenting public opposition, numerous delays and little progress, the drilling
programme was abandoned in 1981. Upon announcing the decision, the Secretary of
State in the Thatcher Conservative Government, Michael Heseltine, stressed that he
was taking the advice of the RWMAC which stated in its second report that:
Serious consideration should be given to the possibility that contairunent in an
engineered storage system either above ground or sub-surface, for w hich technology
already exists, might be the best way to deal with solidified high-level wastes for at
least 50 years and possibly much longer, 11

Hence the decision to store highly active liquor (HAL) in surface tanks prior to
vitrification, and placing the solidified HAL52 within steel canisters in a specially
designed surface store has since become the accepted HLW policy of consecutive
British governments. While this may be entirely appropriate in the shorter tenn, it is
extremely concerning that no strategy for the long-term management of HL W has
been implemented in the UK. Heseltine's decision to end the drilling programme was
the first in a series of retreats on radioactive waste management policy in the UK.SJ
The strategy employed by government and industry following the abandonment of
the search for a HLW repository and the creation of Nirex in 1982 was "the
simultaneous development of a shallow repository site for LLW and short lived ILW

and a deeper repository for long lived ILW". 54 The two sites selected 55 were both
subjected to intense public opposition, which prevented any detailed site
investigation. This, and a review of radioactive waste management policy in 1986 by

a House of Commons Environment Committee, led to a change in Government
policy. Consequently it was decided that only LLW could be disposed of in a shallow
repository, and Nirex was directed to focus on securing a deep repository for all ILW
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and some LLW. Despite this policy change and a willingness by Nirex to address
previous criticisms, the demonstrated ability of environmental groups to mobilise
protest, develop counter expertise and initiate legal and political challenges kept the
nuclear industry and the governmental bodies on the defensive. 56
The revised Nirex programme of 1986 concentrated on four potential sites for
shallow disposal of LLW, which became known as the four-site saga. The
advantages and disadvantages of each of the four sites in central and eastern England
are illustrated elsewhere. 57 However, the location of each site in Conservative held
seats and the decision to withdraw all four sites just four weeks before the 1987
general election, led to even more public scepticism. Of all the decisions concerning
nuclear waste, this was the one most blatantly concerned with short-term political
gain. 58 The absence ofa disposal site for LLW led to a reappraisal of policy, and to
what Harris describes as an "amazing decision" to jointly disposes ofILW and LLW
in a deep repository.59 Burying LLW deep underground is much more expensive than
near surface disposal. Because of the low levels of radioactivity and a much shorter
half-life for LLW, such an expensive option is unnecessary. In any event, the joint
disposal option never materialised in the UK due to a lack of public support for the
deep repository site. All LL W in the UK is sent to the disposal site at Drigg, which is
about six kilometres south ofSellafield.
When joint disposal was still an option, Nirex engaged in a national public
consultation process, sending out 50,000 questionnaires in 1988. From the thousands
returned, the public placed great importance on the need to be able to retrieve the
waste should there be a desire to do so in the future.60 The retrievable option would
also alleviate public anxiety about an 'out-of-sight out-of-mind' approach. Yet despite
this clear public preference, an intensive site investigation process began for deep
'pennanent' disposal. In an effort to overcome the NIMBY factor, the search was
eventually narrowed down to the two nuclear sites of Dounreay and Sellafield, with
56
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the latter chosen in 1991. The decision was made without adequate public
consultation and was a classic example of the 'decide announce defend' (DAD) tactic
which has since proved to be extremely ineffective in achieving the desired
outcomes. DAD is an approach whereby a specific policy is identified and developed
without proper public consultation, and is then announced as a decision and defended
against opposition interests.61 The tactic has also been widely discredited in Canada
and the US, particularly when used for decisions on the siting of hazardous facilities.
Many organisations have learned that when they make decisions that affect the
community, they must involve the community during the decision-making process
and not afterwards. It is extremely difficult to achieve legitimacy for any policy
when the DAD approach is applied, and it usually results in the community losing
trust, which contributes further to the NIMBY response.
A number of environmental groups and Britain's Royal Society criticised the
selection of Sellafield on the grounds that the decision appeared to be based more on
political rather than scientific reasoning.62 It is also highly improbable that Sellafield
was chosen for the best geology in the entire mainland of Britain, but apparently the
site met government criteria at that time. 63 The decision corresponded, to some
extent, with what Frank Popper describes as 1 locally unwanted land uses' (LULUs),
which is the tenn given to the hazardous facilities that generate vigorous opposition
in local communities. Such facilities include landfill or other hazardous sites,
prisons, radioactive waste sites, AIDS treatment centres and drug injecting rooms.
Community opposition to the hazardous facility often defies differences of age and
socioeconomic status to pursue a single unified objective. That integration of
disparate groups into a single mobilizing force is extremely difficult to overcome.
Andrew Blowers and Pieter Leroy extended the concept of LULU to the process of
peripheralisation and the link to 'nuclear oases,' in an effort to help explain why
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radioactive waste disposal sites often end up at or near existing nuclear facilities.64
Blowers and Leroy explain the concept of peripheral communities:
The idea ofa peripheral community or area suggests that it is located on the edges of the
mainstream. There is a geographical and spatial basis to the concept, the idea of
conununities that are physically remote or inaccessible (though not necessarily distant)
from the central, dominant region which is the focus of communications and
development. The concept also owes something to the core and periphery and the
relationship of political, economic and cultural domination and exploitation that has
been developed as an explanation for processes ofuneven development in these areas.65

Peripheral communities' tend to be remote, economically marginal (dependent on a

1

single industry or state welfare), powerless, defensive, and often reside on land that
is envil'onmentally degraded. The local community in a nuclear oasis, such as
Sellafield, depends on the nuclear employer to provide investment and jobs and is
therefore unlikely to be able to resist radioactive waste disposal facilities.66 Thus
Blowers and Leroy's central thesis asserts that:
The power of mobilised coalitions to prevent the location of LULUs in some
conununities, combined with the powerlessness of peripheral communities to resist
them, narrows the locational options, making the location of LULUs in peripheral
communities politically almost inevitable. 67

It would, however, be incorrect to assume that public opposition was the only
impediment confronting site selection and that there was unanimous agreement
among the technical and scientific experts on radioactive waste disposal. Bob Burton,
a fonner employee of the UK Atomic Energy Authority with over 25 years
experience in the industry, was extremely critkal of the industry1 s overall waste
policy choices. 68 He accused the industry of 11costly procrastination" and of
11

presiding over a long running farce".69 Burton was particularly critical of the

method chosen by Nirex for deep disposal of ILW and warned of the dangers
64
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involved in storing HAL in cooling tanks above ground.70 Perhaps not surprisingly,
due to conflicting expert opinion, government indecision and continued public
opposition, the controversy continued following the selection of Sellafield as the
potential site for a joint ILW/LLW repository. In 1994, Cumbria County Council
turned down the planning application for the construction of a Rock Characterisation
Faci1ity (RCF) at Sellafield. An RCF is an experimental research laboratory, which is
an exten.sive process that involves deep excavation and exploratory drilling to
conduct further research on the suitability of existing rock fonnations.71
The subsequent appeal lodged by Nirex in 1996 was subjected to a full public
inquiry, which lasted five months but failed. There were three reasons given why the
Environment Minister, John Gummer, rejected the appeal in March 1997.n The main
reason was that the planned development was technically deficient. Gwnmer stated
that he was "concerned about the scientific uncertainties and technical deficiencies in

the proposals presented by Nirex".73 In addition, the RCF would have damaged the
repository location. Thirdly, it would have an unacceptable impact on the
surrounding National Park. 74 In what was viewed by many as a cynical exercise, the
announcement not to proceed was made on the same day that John Major called the
general election. The decision was a major setback for the nuclear industry and in
particular a devastating blow to Nirex, almost putting an end to the companis
existence.75 There was much despair over the twenty years of radioactive waste
policy failures, and many argued that with no disposal solution in sight all

reprocessing should be cease.76 A series of illMdefined decisions highlighted the

inherent failure of the DAD approach and demonstrated the absolute need to regain
public trust if any advancement is to be made in radioactive waste policy in the UK.
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The rejection of the site at Sellafield left the Government without a practical plan to
dispose of the majority of its nuclear waste and led to yet another government
review. A House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology was
established to inquire into the management of radioactive waste in the UK. The
Lords report,77 published on 10 March 1999, was extremely critical of radioactive
waste policy in the UK. In its executive summary it stated that:
Present policy for nuclear waste management is fragmented. There are wastes for which
no long-term management has yet been decided and there are a number of significant
materials, for which no use is foreseen, which are not categorised as waste at all. Titls
leads to uncertainties in the planning of future facilities and to the continued storage of
hazardous materials in an essentially temporary state. Until the fate of these materials is
settled, and the capacity of potential sites is identified and explored, it will not be
possible to know whether one deep repository will suffice.78

In addition, among the main findings of the report was the recommendation for
phased geologic disposal, involving widespread public consultation with greater
parliamentary say on site selection. The committee also called for the creation of two

new bodies, which would subsume the roles of Nirex and the RWMAC.79 These
included a statutory Nuclear Waste Management Commission with the responsibility
to develop a comprehensive strategy and a new radioactive waste disposal company
responsible for the design, construction, operation and eventual closure of the
repository. Interestingly, the recommendation for and structure of the two bodies was
remarkably similar to those envisaged by the 1976 Flowers Royal Commission.80
Indeed, the Lords Committee supported the findings of the Flowers report, raised a
number of significant questions and highlighted the failure of consecutive UK
governments to implement effective radioactive waste policies over a number of

decades.81 The Lords Report acknowledged the relatively new field of study relating

to the public perception of risks. Yet it only provided a brief mention of Dr Nick
Pidgeon's contention that the disposal of nuclear waste conjures up mostly negativity
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in tenns of perceived risks. 82 Dr Pidgeon is the director of the Centre for
Environmental Risk, at the University of East Anglia in Noiwich. He has researched
widely into the psychological and social processes underlying people's perception of
risk, and into how that risk is subsequently communicated.83
In 1999, the industry received another setback with further compelling evidence of
the inappropriate and unacceptable methods used for the management of radioactive
waste in the UK.84 In a report leaked to New Scientist the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate (NII) expressed its dissatisfaction with the current storage of over 1300
cubic metres of HAL, in 21 cooled tanks at Sellafield.85 The NII set a target of2015
for BNFL to empty the tanks, but it is unconvinced that the deadline will be met.86
The inspectorate blamed the delay to solidify the waste into glass blocks on blocked
pipes, faulty equipment and technical failure with new plant equipment. The NII also
threatened legal action to compel BNFL to reduce the build up of HAL, which could
if successful have the potential for slowing or halting reprocessing of spent fuel and
the likely closure of some reactors.
This failure to appropriately deal with high-level waste, coupled with a history of
uncoordinated policy decisions, have narrowed the available options for radioactive
waste management in the UK and has significantly eroded public trust. The challenge
facing the industry to convince a sceptical public was compounded with the
revelations in 1999 that workers had deliberately falsified safety records at the
reprocessing plant in Sellafield.87 As an added safety measure, the mixed uranium
plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel pellets (consisting of a mixture of reprocessed uranium
and plutonium) are manually checked and recorded for precise uniformity, which is a
laborious but essential task that the workers had cheated on.88 Upon discovery,
Japan, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden suspended contracts with BNFL.
82
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Moreover, the UK encountered further international embarrassment in June 2000,
when 12 out of the 15 parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North East Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention) called for an end
to reprocessing. 89 An end to reprocessing would place increased demands on the
industry to secure a 'permanent' repository and could result in increased pressure to
find a multinational solution. 90
Despite the intense opposition, the UK Government did grant permission for the
expansion of the MOX reprocessing plant at Sellafield in September 2001. The
decision met with much criticism from a number of European states and has since
been the subject of a series of legal challenges. The main issue of contention involves
radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea, which it is alleged contravene the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.91 In its justification for the
decision the UK Government weighed "the small radiological, and other, detriments,
against the economic benefit of operating the plant". 92 The Government placed more
emphasis on the "national economic interest11 than on the long-term social and
environmental considerations.93 The 'justification report' made only minor references
to the radioactive waste issue. It failed to highlight the direct link between
reprocessing and increased volumes of HAL, not to mention the problematic delays
experienced in the UK in solidifying that waste.94
The justification report did acknowledge the government commitment to embark on
a consultation phase for the long-term management of solid radioactive waste. The
government consultation paper "Managing Radioactive Wastes Safely" was part of a
detailed attempt to stimulate debate and inspire public confidence in the decision
making process. 95 The new policy direction was in response to the recommendations
89 K.
90
91
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of the House of Lords Committee and signified its rejection of the failed DAD
approach. It also concurred with the advice provided by the RWMAC, which stated
that DAD should be rejected in favour of consensus building.96 The proposed
national debate includes a number of questions most likely designed to invigorate an
informative debate. These include, 11should the waste be put in an underground
repository? or stored, until we know more about its risks and better ways of dealing
with it? or some other option or combination?"97 Despite a history of benign neglect,

it now appears that there are genuine attempts to engage the public in the decision
making process for long-term radioactive waste policies in the UK.
The United States' Dilemma over High-Level Radioactive Waste
A number of other nuclear states have experienced similar difficulties with
radioactive waste disposal, allhough most appear to be at a more advanced stage
compared to the UK. In the US, at first the emphasis was purely on the weapons
programme, and then on the development of effective breeder reactors for long-tenn

fission energy use. 98 The US Atomic Energy Acts 1946 and 1954 reflected the initial

euphoria and unchallenged optimism of the nuclear industry by failing to provide

explicit details of the nature and magnitude of the associated risks.99 Public concern
with the waste management issue was raised following the liquid HLW leaks from
the tanks at Hanford in the 1960s, and following the premature commitment to the
00

salt mine facility in Lyons, Kansas, in the 1970s. 1 The nuclear industry experienced
another setback in the late 197Ji, with the Carter administration's decision to prohibit
reprocessing indefinitely. 1

01

The 1977 study Nuclear Power Issues and Choices 102 is

widely viewed as the single contributing factor to that notable policy shift. The
decision to end reprocessing because of proliferation concerns effectively brought an
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end to the optimistic phase and increased demands for a more permanent solution to
the radioactive waste issue. rnJ
In the rn, the preferred option for the long-term management of HLW is to dispose
of the waste in underground geological repositories. While HLW104 is yet to be
placed in a 'permanent' repository in the US. the first underground repository for
military transuranic waste (TRU) 105 became operational in 1999. Yet the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, took over 20 years and cost
around $US I billion before it gained Environmenta! Protection Agency approval in
1998. The agencies responsible for TRU experienr;ed controversy and opposition to
site selection, similar to that in the UK and various other nuclear states. The long
delays with the WIPP project clearly demonstrate the technical complexity involved
with underground repositories, especially in salt formations, and highlights the high
standard demanded by a sceptical public. However, Carter 106 notes that the
stereotypical cliche of'not in my backyard' (NIMBY) did not apply in New Mexico,
where local support for the project was high. 107 Indeed, the support seems to fit better
with Blowers' analysis and CL'ncept of peripheralisation in either a nuclear oasis or, in
the case of WIPP, as a 'greenfield' location. 108 The latter phrase refers to a relatively
new development project with no previous experience of the industry; it has the
advantage that it provides employment opportunities for the local community. 109
HLW repositories have yet to become operational in the US, as a result of various
considerations. Prominent among these is the public anxiety about all things m1clear
and the direct opposition to proposals for the siting of radioactive waste. Local
opposition has proven difficult to overcome under a federal system of government,
and it is perhaps even exacerbated by a history of conflict between the Department of
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Energy (DOE), the wider public and various interest groups. 110 Tlw DOE is the
leading Federal Government Agency that manages and oversees radioactive waste
programmes. It has evolved from the Atomic Energy Commission and has
continually suffered from criticisms of its secrecy and for its disregard of state and
public participation in the decision making process. 111 It had to contend also with a
history of federal-state conflicts over the search for repository sites. These conflicts
intensified in the 1970s when the federal agency embarked on an extensive push for
site selection without a fonnal role for the states. Notably, CongrP.ss failed to pass
any nuclear waste policy legislation throughout the entire 1970s because those
conflicts could not be resolved.
After much debate involving state concerns, vested interests and some environmental
groups, Congress finally passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982. 112 Under the
Act the Federal Government retained responsibility for HLW management and
narrowed its options to a commitment to finding a geologic repository. To assist with
this objective, the Act established a nuclear waste fund and set a target for an
operating repository by 1998. 113 The DOE was given the responsibility for site
investigation and eventual construction of the repository. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) would licence the proposed facility, while the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) was required to set relevant safety standards. 114 The Act
completely rejected the DAD approach, which had failed so badly at Lyons, Kansas

in the 1970s, and the Act was clearly designed to gain greater public understanding
and support. 115 In an attempt to achieve fairness and equity, at least two sites, one in
the east and one in the west, were considered necessary. Yet critics argue that the
general public was not adequately consulted before Congress passed the 1982 Act. In
their view the decision making process was captured by the "technological and
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· policy elites" and did not extend to the people who would be most affected by the
facility. 116
Consequently, public opposition was intense and the responsible agencies failed to
achieve any fonn of consensus towards a suitable site. In 1983, for example, the
DOE listed nine potential sites, but this was narrowed to three by 1986 because of
resistance from local opposition groups. 117 The three remaining sites were Deaf
Smith County in Texas, Yucca Mountain in Nevada, and the Hanford nuclear
reservation near Richland in Washington. 118 Despite the restriction to three sites,
public pressure continued and, in December 1987, Congress abruptly abandoned its
original plan for geographical equity by ending site investigation in the eastern states.
With an election pending many had called for a complete review of policy, but others
such as Senator Bennett Johnston led the way and insisted that the DOE should press
ahead. 119 He was greatly influenced by Carter's study,120 which he frequently referred
to during his questioning of former Nevada Governor Grant Sawyer at a Senate
hearing. 121 Carter recommended a single primary-candidate site, with Yucca
Mountain as his preferred choice. 122 Subsequently, amendments to the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act were passed as part of the complex Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987. The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act 198?123
directed the Department of Energy to focus on Yucca Mountain as the sole HLW
candidate repository site. 124
The 1987 amendments initially appeared to have a number of advantages, such as
removing political pressure at the national level. It was also envisaged that a single
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site would significantly reduce costs and be more manageable from a technological
perspective. 125 Yet critics argued that the single site selection process was a return to
the previously rejected DAD principle and condemned the government for making
the decision purely on political grounds. A nwnber of factors supported this
contention, including Nevada's low population and weak political representation in
Congress. 126 The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate were Texans, the House Whip was from Washington, while Nevada lacked
any significantly placed representatives. 127 Mary Louise Wagner, an associate of
Senator Johnson, reportedly told Nevada Governor Milier that "the dt.cision was
politically motivated". 128 The decision removed any semblance of geographical
equity by placing the enlire burden of risks from the nation's HLW onto the state of
Nevada. Finally, it is difficult to argue, as some have done, that technical
considerations were prominent, when Congress rather than the DOE made the
decision to select Yucca Mountain as the sole site for the repository. It was therefore
not surprising that the decision met considerable opposition in the state of Nevada,
and the 1987 amendments became know locally as the "Screw Nevada Bill". 129
Public Perceptions of Risk
Attempts to understand the links between risk perception and public opposition to the
siting of nuclear waste facilities appear more advanced in the literature relating to the
US compared to that for many of the other nuclear states. The public perception of
risk is a major obstacle to site selection, and must be overcome if the HLW problem
is to be resolved. Risk appears to evoke vastly different interpretations, meanings and
responses among technocrats and social groups. The technocratic concept of risk is
based on the assumption that "risks" can be objectively quantified by various risk
assessment methods. 130 The techniques of measurement used are grounded in a
125
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positivist empirical perspective, similar to some ofthe methods used in mathematical
or economic theory. These methods focus narrowly on estimating the probability of
events such as an earthquake, a nuclear plant accident or a fatal aviation collision
occuning. The number of deaths, injuries or illness resulting from the hazardous
event are compiled and statistically analysed, to predict the likelihood of such future
undesirable events occurring. 131 A technical risk analysis can be beneficial in
recognising specific problems and can help improve the reliability and safety of
technological installations. However, those methods have been criticised by many in
the social sciences for reducing the complexity ofhuman nature to a mere numerical
value.
Social scientists tend to focus instead on the effects a hazardous event may have on
people who experience them. Under this framework, risk is not seen as existing "out
there" waiting to be measured but as a concept invented by humans to help them
understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties oflife. 132 Slovic and Weber,
for instance, argue that:
There is no such thin g as "real risk" or "objective risk". The nuclear engineer's
probabilistic risk estimate for a nuclear accident or the toxicologist's quantitative
estimate of a chemical's carcinogenic risk are both based on theoretical models, whose
structure is subjective and assumption laden, and whose inputs are dependent on
judgment. Ill

The social concept of risk is much broader than the technocratic concept, and
experience, values, attitudes, media exposure, and cultural identity can influence
perceived levels of risk. Indeed, the social perception of risk often extends way
beyond the hann caused in the geographical area where the event or accident
occurred. Perceptions of risk resonated throughout the world following the nuclear
accidents at Three Mile Island and especially after the nuclear reactor accident at
Chernobyl in 1986. The public's perception of risk is underpinned by social and
ethical considerations and can include issues ranging from short-term and long-term
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concerns over environmental degradation to civil libertarian values such as the right
to know and freedom to choose. 134
These diverging perspectives stem from the belief that on the one hand technology
can continue to advance wealth creation and provide solutions to associated risks
while on the other hand the conviction remains that some technologies such as
nuclear energy are part of the problem. 13 s The debate often becomes polarised to
such an extent that ideological beliefs predominate over any serious attempt to
resolve the different perceptions of risk. Because of the long-tenn potential
consequences associated with nuclear activities it is virtually impossible to predict
safety with any quantifiable degree of certainty. 136 Yet this task is left to the nuclear
'experts' who can only use probable safety as a guiding tool. Under the probability
theorem, Ulrich Beck states that even if two or three nuclear reactors were to blow
up tomorrow, the expert's statements would remain true. 137 Effectively Beck argues
that one or two accidents are unlikely to significantly change the probable safety
statistical predictions, usually carried out in the 1aboratory, but events such as the
Chernobyl reactor accident can result in devastating consequences that are
pennanently etched in the public memory. Efforts to downplay the risks to the
public, or to delay the reporting of accidents, as happened following the accident at
Chernobyl, can seriously erode public trust. In such circwnstances it is not surprising
that many community members reject the expert analyses, associate fear and dread
with all nuclear activities, and adopt a NIMBY stance. This in turn can lead to the
public being branded as emotional or irrational, which further polarises the debate,
and can be a signifo::ant impediment to any lasting solution for HLW management.
In the initial years of the technological risk debate, and despite much research, little
progress was made in resolving the disjunction between the various concepts of risk
analysis. This changed in 1988 when Kasperson and coUeagues developed a
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theoretical framework that specifically sought to fuse the technical and social
conceptions of risk. 138 The "social amplification of risk" (SAR) thesis is based on the
premise that events pertaining to hazards interact with psychological, social,
institutional and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate individual
and social perceptions of risk and shape risk behaviour. 139 An increase in perception
of risk can result in a range of secondary behaviour patterns and consequences, from
demands for additional information and govenunent intervention to issues of
liability, higher insurance costs and loss of trust in institutions. 140 In the SAR
framework, risk is conceptualised partly as a social construct and partly as an
objective property of a hazard or event. Its main advantage is that it seeks to avoid
total relativism on the one hand and technological determinism on the other. 141 In the
area of nuclear waste management, it is perhaps the only theoretical framework that
can help bridge the gap between the vastly different perceptions of risk between the
technocrats and the wider community.
The social amplification of risk usually begins with an adverse event such as an
accident or the reporting of plans to locate a potentially hazardous undesirable
facility or LULU. A proposed HLW repository is one such example that generally
raises public concerns and induces fears of potentially dangerous accidents and/or
long-term health or environmental consequences. These fears can either be amplified
or attenuated, depending on a range of factors, including the rationale for the
repository, the persuasiveness of the technical, safety and social arguments, trust in
institutions and an adequate communication and consultation process. The SAR
theory posits two major stages, tenned 'amplification stations', which are the transfer
of information about the risk event or potential hazard, and the cultural response
mechanisms within the relevant society. As significant studies show, positive or
negative media exposure can have a considerable effect in helping shape public
tJa R. Kasperson, 0. Renn, P. Slovic, H. Brown, J. Emel, R. Goble, J. Kasperson& S. Rarick, "The
Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework," in The Perception ofRisk, edited by P.
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139
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perception of risk. This in turn may be greatly influenced by either trust or mistrust
of the technical experts and or the responsible institutions. Thus, for a geological
repository to become a reality, the decision-makers have to choose between either
overriding public concerns, which is likely to be problematic, or somehow alleviating
community anxiety about nuclear waste to engender trust and achieve sufficient
public acceptance.
A large number of psychometric studies in the US and elsewhere have been
conducted to help gain an understanding of the different attitudes, perceptions and
behaviours towards nuclear and other hazardous activities. One such study, by
Fischhoff, Slavic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs, demonstrated that public attitudes
to radiation differ markedly from the attitudes of risk assessment experts. 142 The
layperson groups rated nuclear power as a much higher risk than did the experts,
whereas the opposite occurred when it came to rating potential danger associated
with medical X�rays. Psychometric studies were also used to gauge the public's
reaction to the proposed HLW repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Two
t elephone surveys were conducted, using a national sample of 1201 and a sample of
1001 residents of Nevada. 143 A wide range of questions were posed to determine the
participants' opinions of the repository concept, their perceptions of risk,
compensation and behavioural changes in relation to vacation, work or where they
may choose to live after repository approval. One discovery was that 53 per cent of
Nevada respondents and almost 49 per cent of national respondents agreed that a
repository is the best way of storing HLW permanently. Yet, sUiprisingly, 11both sets
of respondents viewed the risk of nuclear power plants to be less serious than that of
a high�level nuclear waste repository". 144 Over 70 to 80 per cent of respondents from
both samples rated all questions designed to characterise their perception of risks at
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the high end of the scale. In addition, some 63 per cent of Nevada's respondents
disagreed that their state is the best place for the repository because the nuclear
weapons test site is already there.
The results from the telephone srnveys reveal high public perceptions of risk, and the
opinion polls in Nevada confirm high levels of opposition to the repository siting. In
1989 the Nevada legislature responded to the resounding public resistance by passing
two resolutions, which it later claimed exercised its veto over the repository under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 145 The two resolutions were presented to the President
and both Houses of Congress, sending the strongest message possible of Nevada's
opposition to the repository. Also in 1989 the Nevada Governor, Bob Miller, signed
into law Assembly Bill 222 which stated that "it is unlawful for any person or
governmental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada" . 146 A state poll
of Nevada residents revealed a 74 per cent support for this law and an 80 per cent
backing for the State to do all it could to stop the repository. When Congress failed to
respond to the resolutions and following legal advfoe from the Attorney General,
Governor Miller advised Congress that Nevada had effectively vetoed the selection
of the Yucca Mountain site. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, James
Watkins, did not agreed with Nevada's interpretation and advised Congress to
proceed with the characterisation of Yucca Mountain as planned. 147 Subsequently,
the State of Nevada felt it had no option but to seek a legal resolution to the political
impasse.
Nevada took its case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where it sought a review
of the Secretary's decision. In its submission, Nevada raised a number of legal
objections but the main contention was that Congress did not have the constitutional

145 Assembly Joint Resolution 4, passed on 17 January 1989 expressed Nevada's "adamant opposition
to the placement of a high-level nuclear repository". Assembly Joint Resolution 6, passed on 23
January 1989 prohibited repositories at Yucca Mountain "without the prior consent of the Nevada
Legislature or a cession ofjurisdiction".
u6 Nevada Revised Statutes SS 459-910 (1989).
147 S. Swazo, "The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and the Tenth
Amendment: Nevada V Watkins." Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996) p134.
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authority to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987. 148 In Nevada v Watkins149
the court ruled that Congress did exercise legitimate authority under the property
clause of the constitution because Yucca Mountain was Federal owned land.
Furthennore, the Court detennined that the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1987 pre-empted Nevada1s attempt to veto the Federal government's choice. The
main reason given was that Nevada's statute "had the actual effect of frustrating
Congress's intent". 150 The Watkins Court relied on the Supreme Court ruling in
English v General Elec. Co., 151 which stated that:
while part of the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law

in question, another part of the field is defined by the state law's actual effect on nuclear
safety. m
It appears in this instance that effect outweighed purpose, and state law was
overridden by Federal responsibUity for nuclear waste management. Following the
decision, the DOE, as the responsible federal agency, resubmitted its application with
Nevada for envirorunental permits to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site.
Despite the setback, opposition remained strong in Nevada and the state political
leaders vowed to undertake every measure possible to prevent the repository going
ahead.153 The State of Nevada lodged an appeal in the Supreme Court in 1991 but
lost when the circuit court decision was upheld. Nevada continued to frustrate DOE
attempts and denied requests for the necessary water pennits for site evaluation
procedures. 154 The DOE subsequently sought redress in the federal courts and was
eventually granted the pennits to proceed. The relationship between the DOE and
Nevada remained contentious throughout, with continued legal challenges at various
stages of the entire process. Among the many legal challenges, Nevada petitioned the
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courts for a review of numerous funding decisions made by the Secretary. 155 Nevada
also challenged a number of siting guidelines, one of which was lodged by the
Attorney General on 17 December 2001. In its submission Nevada claimed inter alia
that the DOE guidelines were inconsistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 156
Hence legal arguments surrounding site selection still continue some twenty years
after the 1982 Act.
The goal of an operating repository at Yucca Mountain advanced a step closer to
fruition on 9 July 2002, when Congress passed a resolution to override the State of
Nevada's veto on the earlier recommendation to proceed with the next stage of the
process. House Joint Resolution 87 was passed by 60 votes to 39 in the Senate, 157
and was signed into law by President George Bush on 23 July 2002. 158 That
congressional approval was in response to the Secretary of Energy, Spencer
Abraham's letter of recommendation to the President, on 14 February 2002. In his
letter Secretary Abraham said,
the results of this investigation have been openly and thoroughly reviewed by the
Department and oversight entities such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and the US Geological Survey, as well as
having been subjected to scientific peer reviews, including a review undertaken by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The Department also has made available the
scientific materials and analyses used to prepare the technical evaluations of site
suitability for public review by all interested parties. The results of this extensive
investigation and the external technical reviews of this body of scientific work give me
confidence for the conclusion, based on sound scientific principbs, that a repository at
Yucca Mountain will be able to protect the health and safety of the public when
evaluated against the radiological protection standards adopted by the Environmental
Protection Agency and implemented by the NRC in accordance with Congressional
direction in the Energy Policy act of 1992.1 s�
us For a successful outcome for Nevada, sel! Nevada v He"ington, 827 F2d 1394 (9tb Cir. 1987)
whereas the State failed to convince the court in Nevada v United States Dept ofEnergy, 133 F3d
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The Secretary continued with additional reasons for approving the site including the
need to maintain energy security and environmental protection, and specific mention
was made about the 100,000,000 ga1lons of high-level liquid in storage awaiting
solidification and eventual disposal. National security was also prominent among the
reasons for recommending approval of the Yucca Mountain site. The letter
highlighted that 40 per cent of the US combat fleet's vessels are nuclear powered and
those submariaes
: and aircraft carriers need to be periodically refue1led. The extracted
spent-fuel rods are currently stored above ground. Secretary Abraham emphasises the
need to improve homeland security by outlining the fact that HLW and excess
plutonium is stored at 131 sites in 39 States across the US. 160 Despite these
compelling arguments and the congressional resolution, Nevada Governor Kenny
Guinn has promised to continue the legal cha1lenges in the courts.161 The lawsuits
will lead to further delays but it is expected that the Yucca Mountain repository will
eventually open, albeit beyond time and significantly over budget.
Nuclear Energy and Radioactive Waste Policy in Switzerland
Switzerland is another state with substantial experience in nuclear energy and
radioactive waste management. It is a small nation both in size and population, yet its
energy consumption has increased dramatically in recent decades in line with other
industrialised nations. It is a prosperous country, but has few natural resources, and
must import about 80 per cent of the fuel it needs for energy generation. 162 Electricity
accounts for 20-25 per cent of Switzerland's overall energy demands, and five
nuclear power plants supply 40 per cent of that energy. Another 53 per cent is
supplied by hydropower, but further expansion is limited due to environmental
considerations. 163 Alternative sources such as solar and wind play an extremely
limited role. One of the main reasons for this is that the alpine landscape is
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unsuitable for wind power and solar is yet to become commercially viable. 164 In
order to guarantee supply, electricity operators have signed contracts with their
foreign counterparts. Hence Switzerland has access to 2.5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear
generated electricity from France should it be required. Interestingly, the Swiss have
been able to take advantage of peaks and troughs on the European grid and has
become a major trader in electricity. In 1995, for example, its electricity exports
totalled 36.2 GW, compared to a total import of28.9 GW. 165

Despite sometimes trading in their favour, the overa11 dependence on foreign energy
imports 166 is not entirely consistent with the Swiss tradition of self-sufficiency.
Indeed, in part because of this tradition, the Federal Government was able to
convince the community of the benefits of nuclear power in the late 1950s.
Following a referendum in 1957 which was passed by the Parliament and all the

cantons, the Federal Government assumed responsibility for nuclear legislation. 167

Under this ame::ndment to the constitution, the cantons retained control for the
licensing of nuclear installations. Switzerland has a long tradition of participatory
democracy and leads the world with the largest number of referenda held at the
national level. 168 The referendum has become a significant part of the decision

making process since Swiss federation in 1848. While it has the advantage of
inclusiveness and provides the ultimate legitimacy for decisions, it can lead to
uncertainty for industry, when circumstances surrounding an issue subsequently

change. 169 As in the US, the nuclear industry has to contend with a Federal system of
governance, which provides the community with additional avenues of influence.
The public in Switzerland appear to have more input in decisions concerning nuclear
activities than is the case in most countries.
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The Swiss community has taken the opportunity to influence nuclear policy on
numerous occasions since the first nuclear power plant began operation in 1969.
Initially, nuclear power seemed a viable option to meet the growing energy demands

without compromising the nation's autonomy. 170 As in other industrialised countries,

opposition to nuclear power grew in Switzerland in the 1970s, in line with a general
increase in envirorunental awareness. In 1975, the first public action against nuclear
activities occurred with the occupation of a site for a new nuclear reactor in
Kaiseraugst, in the canton of Aargau. Public opposition continued, even though two
anti-nuclear popular initiatives were lost in 1979 and 1984. The resistance to nuclear

power was reinforced following the Chernobyl accident in 1986. 171 Subsequently, a
planned 1,000 MW reactor for Kaiseraugst near Basel was abandoned. 172 Public

opposition was further demonstrated in 1990 by a referendum, which placed a 10-

year moratorium on the expansion of commercial nuclear power in Switzerland. 173

Among the factors highlighted during that debate was the problematic management
of radioactive waste.
The five nuclear reactors are the main source of radioactive waste in Switzerland.
Under Swiss law the owners and operators of the plants are responsible for the safe
management of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including spent-fuel storage and

radioactive waste. 174 The nuclear power plants generate about 90 metric tons of
spent-fuel annually. Switzerland has no reprocessing facilities and sends its spent
fuel overseas to Cogema in France and BNFL in the UK. It recycles the returned

MOX in three reactors, namely Beznau I and 2 and Gosgen. 175 The Swiss have
endeavoured to find solutions to effectively manage their nuclear waste. In 1972 the
National Co-operative for the Storage of Radioactive Waste (NAGRA) was

established as one of the first such organisations in Western Europe. 176 NAGRA is
responsible for the disposal of all types of radioactive waste and is engaged in
ongoing research into the various alternative methods. In January 1985, NAGRA
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produced a comprehensive eight-volume safety assessment report for a hypothetical
repository, titled Project Gewahr 177 (Project Guarantee). It was submitted to the
Federal Council who presented its evaluation of the report in June L 38.
Among its conclusions, the Federal Council accepted all aspects of the feasibility
study for disposing of low and intermediate level waste. It also accepted the viability
of HLW disposal, but requested further evidence of specific site suitability for
Switzerland. Hence, NAGRA was required by the Federal Council to commence an
investigative programme in sedimentary rock. 178 From two preliminary studies,
NAGRA selected the Opalinus Clay of the Zilrcher Weinland, in Northern
Switzerland, as the preferred option, and commenced its assessment in 1991. Phase
one 179 was completed by 1994, and progress is continuing during phase two 180 with
intensive investigation in localised areas. 181 The focus of "concentration is an area of
some 50 km2 of sedimentary rock in the Zurcher Weinland where Opalinus Clay
occurs at a depth of 400 to 1000 metres". 182 Opalinus Clay is considered suitable as a
host rock for long-lived HLW because of its extremely low permeability. NAGRA
has constructed an underground research laboratory in the Opalinus Clay, at Mt Terri
in the Jura Mountains, and is also engaged in underground test site evaluation at Ute
Grimsel Pass in the Swiss Alps. 183 Neither site is intended for disposal and both are
used specifically to advance knowledge and optimise methodology options.
Under the guidance of NAGRA, Switzerland appears to be well advanced in the
technological aspects of geologic disposal. It is also involved in significant
international research, cooperation into repository design and feasibility studies. 184
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Nationally, it appears somewhat constrained in finding a suitable HLW repository,
not only because of its size but also because of the particular geological fonnations
in Switzerland. The entire south of the country is ruled out because the Alps are
being pushed upwards by about Imm each year. 185 The Opalinus Clay in the Zurcher
Weinland is potentially the optimal location for a high-level waste repository in
Switzerland. Results from the Benken borehole tests in 1998/99 continued the
positive expectations of low seismic activity. 186 As part of Switzerland's stepwise
repository implementation process, NAGRA completed a safety assessmeri.t of a
proposed deep geological repository for HLW and long-lived intermediate level
waste in 2002. The assessment was undertaken as part of the Entsorgungsnachweis
project, which is concerned with siting, engineering and safety, and overall
feasibility of geological disposal in Switzt:rland. Details of the comprehensive safety
as3essment are contained in the NAGRA Technical Report 02-05. 187 The safety
assessment revealed a suitable host rock that provides robust secure isolation from
the human environment; an engineered multi-barrier system to ensure long-tenn
confinement and radioactive decay withi!: its confines; and an overall structure that
allows for slow attenuation of radionuclides n:!ease to the environment within safe
accepted standards. NAGRA's post-closure safety assessment was internationally
peer reviewed and its findings validated, based on sound science complete with an
appropriate balance of quantitative and qualitative evidence. 188
The International Review Terun took account of the fact that the post-closure safety
assessment is only one stage in the stepwise decision making process, with much
more research required before a suitable site can be identified. 1 g One area requiring
further study is the structural suitability of the rock in the Opalinus Clay for the
excavation and mining of tunnels. It is unclear at this stage if the usual methods of
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rockbolting and tunnel reinforcement will suffice, and this can only be detennined
based on site-specific geological data. 190 During their visit to Switzerland, in 1996,
the RWMAC group gained the impression from some Swiss professionals that a
suitable dh;posal site "may simply not exist" at the national level. 191 Hence,

Switzerland may yet pursue the option of utilising a multinational HLW repository
should one become available. In keeping its options open, however, by actively
engaging in both national and international research, Switzerland is well positioned
to avail of the most suitable choice for its specific needs. Its ultimate choice will also
depend upon achieving the necessary public acceptance.
Comparable International Experiences with HLW Policy
Other nuclear states with varying degrees of success in radioactive waste disposal are
Sweden, France and Canada. While there are difficulties associated with comparing
approaches and experience across nuclear states, such an exercise can help advance
knowledge of the technical and non-technical a spects of nuclear waste disposal. 192
Many similarities exist between the Swedish and Swiss nuclear energy programmes,
with both placing a high reliance on nuclear power to produce energy. Currently, 12

nuclear reactors produce half the electricity consumed in Swedi:::;:. 193 In 1972 the
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) wa•; established,
with responsibility for the transport, disposal and management of all Sweden's
radioactive waste. In addition to its technical capabilities, SKB works closely with
local municipalities to convey information and to foster cooperation between itself
and the public. 194 In contrast to the DAD decision making approach for radioactive
waste policy in the UK and the US, Sweden like Switzerland has a long tradition of
local participatory democracy. Sweden quickly learned that it was important to carry
public opinion rather than adopt a top down approach such as DAD, which in many
cases ovenides local concerns.
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Largely because of its more open approach, Sweden is often cited for its 'outstanding'
accomplishments in managing nuclear wastes. 195 Among the most documented
example of successful r adioactive waste disposal is the LLW and ILW repository
near Forsmark, on the east coast of Sweden. This facility has been operating since
1988 and is located under the Baltic Sea, near the Forsmark nuclear power station.
So what lessons can be drawn from the Swedish experience? As elsewhere nuclear
power and radioactive waste are intertwined with politics. Yet there are significant
differences in the way Sweden has managed its nuclear activities compared to the
other nuclear states. Initially nuclear power was embraced and aggressively purnued
in the earlf 1970s in Sweden, but opposition to nuclear facilities increased towards
the end of the decade. 196 Electoral tunnoil saw two national governments fall before
the end of the decade, and public discontent surrounding nuclear safety only
diminished following a national referendum in 1980. Despite falling short of a clear
majority, the government responded to the high no vote, and established a policy
framework to phase out nuclear power by 2010. 197
The phase out policy ensured that nuclear power became a less divisive issue,
especially when added to the impact of legislation in 1977, which made nuclear
operators responsible for the handling and final disposal of radioactive waste.
Moreover, Sweden (unlike Switzerland and the UK) chose not to recycle its spent
fuel, which removes the problem of having to vitrify HAL and ultimately dispose of
the vitrified waste. 198 In 1985 Sweden constructed a central interim storage facility
(CLAB) to house its spent·fuel rods. The facility is located 30 metres below the
surface, near the Oskarshamm nuclear power station, and the spent rods are stored in
deep-water ponds to cool the waste. Sweden maintains a cautious approach to HLW
policy and the interim store is part of the overall plan to remove excessive heat from
the rods, before placing them in a permanent repository. 199 The other nuclear states
could learn from Sweden, which recognised the importance of a two-way flow of
195
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communication. Swedish governments have responded to community wishes and
have sought to involve the public in the decision making process for radioactive
waste. 200 Arguably, the emphasis on providing unrestricted infonnation and seeking
public involvement in the HLW management process were central to eventually
achieving the policy outcomes.
France is another nuclear state with reasonable success in the management of
radioactive waste. There are similarities between the French and British experience,
in the initial years in particular. 201 Yet it appears that the French quickly learned from
early mistakes and now enjoy a greater political commitment to nuclear waste

disposal.202 With France generating over 70 per cent of its electricity from 51 nuclear

power plants, public acceptance of nuclear activities is greater than in most other
nuclear states. A study by Slovic, Flynn, Mertz, Poumadere and Mays of French and
US attitudes, perceptions and behaviours associated with nuclear power and other
technological risk areas found some similarities as well as some notable

differences. 203 Both sets of citizens viewed the risks from radioactive wastes as more
hazardous than those from nuclear power plants, and for both groups medical X-rays
were among the least risky. Those particular fi'ldings replicated earlier studies. The
low public perceptions of risk from medical X-rays suggest perceptions are

influenced by perceived benefits, familiarity, and trust in the medical profession. 204

Furthennore, the French placed greater trust in scientists, industry, government
officials and nuclear experts, compared to the US sample. 205 The French also fanned
the view that decisions on nuclear installations should reside with the experts and
government authorities rather than the people.
While the perceived risks from nuclear activities are similar in the US and France,
the acceptance of those risks is higher in France, and that acceptance seems to be
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influenced by a much higher level of trust. Consistent public confidence in technical
expertise has enabled France to vigorously pursue a nuclear fuel production cycle,
which includes a full commitment to reprocessing.206 France has also secured
contracts for reprocessing spent fuel from a number of other cowitries. Indeed,
because of this experience France has been deemed the world leader in developing
reprocessing and related waste-handling facilities. Unlike the UK, the French
Government appears to have embarked on a more flexible approach to radioactive
waste management. The Lords report207 observed that France has the advantage of
using just one type of reactor, the pressurised water reactor, and as such has fewer
types oflLW to contend with.
France is further advanced than the UK in the site selection process and has disposed
of its LLW and ILW in near surface engineered facilities. While it has yet to achieve
a repository for HLW it has made good progress, and has left open the option of a
retrievable or non-retrievable repository in deep geological fonnations.208 By
keeping their options open and by not setting unrealistic deadlines, the French
government has considerably more flexibility and discretion when compared to the
US with its emphasis on a single site at Yucca Mountain. Indeed, France has been
investigating deep geological disposal since the 1970s. Yet their initial investigation
of four sites was halted in 1989 after only two years' studJ , because of direct public
opposition. This led to a government review of management strategies for HLW and
long-lived ILW, which included a number of public hearings.209 In 1991, following
th,., review, France passed a law outlining a framework of research and development
for the management and disposal ofHLW over a fifteen-year period. The framework
placed a strong emphasis on the participation of local communities in the site
selection process.
While it is more likely to achieve the desired outcomes for site selection with greater
public involvement, there are of course no guarantees. The French Green parties and
206
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associated groups oppose nuclear power and argue against the deep disposal option.
It remains to be seen whether these groups can generate enough opposition to impede
the government plans for a HLW repository. In 1998 the French Government
announced its decision to build an underground laboratory at the Est clay site at Bure
in Meuse department. 21 ° France is also conducting research at another clay site at
Gard, near Marcoule. It was envisioned that a final decision on the chosen repository
would be made by 2006, but it is now likely that this deadline will have to be
extended. France does however have the advantage of a large civil nuclear
programme, which enjoys considerable public support. It has recognised the
importance of retaining this support and has adopted a more flexible and open
approach than many other nuclear states. 2 n The 1991 legislation also advanced this
objective by separating the National Agency for Management of Nuclear Wastes
(ANDRA) from the French Atomic Energy Commission, thus ensuring a greater
degree of independence from the nuclear industry. 212
Canada is another nuclear state often cited for its efforts towards greater public
participation in the decision making process for HLW disposal. Comparisons can be
made with the United States. While there are many similarities in the design and
management of radioactive waste between Canada and the United States, there are
some notable differences in approach. Both nations chose the once through fuel
cycle without the reprocessing option.213 Canada also prefers geologic disposal as the
most appropriate solution to the HLW dilemma, and the structure of the Federal
agencies responsible for radioactive waste management is similar. Kraft identifies the
main difference in approach as Canada's commitment to gaining public acceptance
for the repository concept before considering specific Iocations.214 Another
significant difference is the deadlines imposed on the DOE in the US compared to a
more measured approach in Canada. Perhaps in part this elusive deadline may have
forced the US Government and the DOE to embark on the classic 'decide announce
defend' approach, which historically has been extremely unsuccessful. The Canadian
210
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approach appears more in line with the recent international consensus on the need for
voluntary siting.215
Canada has recognised the policy failures inherent in DAD and has strategically
moved towards a more open deliberative process. It has experienced some success
with this approach, most notably with the siting of hazardous waste treatment centres
in the provinces of Alberta and Manitoba.216 In both cases, a history of conflict and
public opposition was replaced with an extensive process of public deliberation.
While these examples of success are modest, the basic principles can be transferred
to the more troublesome area of radioactive waste repository siting. In a study
involving LLW in Deep River, Ontario, Gunderson and Rabe note that the volunteer
principle can play a constructive role in site selection but actual implementation
depends on a range of suitable circumstances.217 What is apparent from the
experience in Canada is that an open and honest information process combined with
the 'bottom up' voluntary approach remains the best option for successful siting of
repositories. Support for the waste treatment plant in Alberta dropped considerably
when the facility managers withheld information pertaining to a series of incidents at
the plant.218
The importance of engaging in a cooperative community based siting approach in
Canada is in stark contrast to radioactive waste policy in the US where efforts to
acquire trust and public participation in the decision making process were deemed
insufficient. To assist with the cooperative initiative, the Atomic Energy agency of
Canada Limited (AECL) has adopted five key principles to guide its siting process:
(I) a commitment to safety and environmental protection; (2) voluntarism in acceptance
by a host community; (3) shared decision-making at each stage of deciding whether and
how to proceed; (4) open communication of information to the interested public about
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plans, procedures, activities, and progress from the earliest stages in the process; and (5)
fairness to the host community in provision of benefits in recognition of its service to
the nation.219

These principles appear to support the view by Ballard and Kuhn of an emerging
"open approach to the siting process in Canada". 220
The cooperative community based approach has brought success for the clean up of
low-level radioactive waste in the Port Hope area of Southern Ontario. A legal
agreement was reached in 2001 between the Government of Canada and the local
people of Port Hope and Clarington.221 Two earlier attempts at siting a low-level
radioactive waste facility, during the 1980's, failed because of insufficient
community involvement. As the second attempt ended with the failure to progress
the Deep River option, the communities where the wastes are located came fotward
with their local solution. Port Hope and Clarington had been involved in the process
for at least two decades, and were two of the 850 municipalities consulted by the
Siting Task Force in 1998. The latest initiative began when the two local Municipal
Councils passed resolutions seeking discussions with the Federal Government for a
locally based solution. Local committees were fonned and the Federal Government
provided funding and facilitated the process including the hiring of technical
consultants. The Government's willingness to enter into a legal agreement illustrates
its commitment to community participation in the design of the project. Property
value protection and host community grants became part of the agreement in direct
response to the community wishes. The agreement also involves a commitment of
$CAN 260 million by the Federal Government and comru.its the parties to cooperate
toward the development and implementation of the Initiative.222 The success of the
Port Hope Area Initiative in Canada was due to the step by step community driven
approach that culminated in a legal agreement. It is unclear whether Canada will
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achieve similar success for a HLW repository, but Kraft223 is optimistic that it will do
so over the next few decades. However, he does caution that much will depend on
how the recommended policy is ultimately implemented.
Conclusion
There are some vast differences and many similarities in the ways nation states have
managed their radioactive waste. The more successful policy outcomes were found
in the nuclear states with the capacity to fully engage the public in the site selection
process. Of the three main states reviewed here, Switzerland has a long history of
referenda and the public is able to play a direct role in the decision making process.
Switzerland may be somewhat constrained by its geology and is extremely unlikely
to attempt to force an unwanted repository on its populace. The responsible agencies
in Switzerland have actively engaged the community in all aspects of the
consultation process, and have well advanced radioactive waste policies for low and
intennediate level waste. Switzerland has established exceHent technical capabilities
and is working towards a comprehensive solution for its HLW, which may involve a
multinational solution. Sweden, France and Canada have also implemented
substantial radioactive waste policies. Both Switzerland and Sweden have long
traditions of participatory democracy and have embraced the concept of consensus
decision-making. Both nations embarked on a meast.red approach and have shown
an ability to adapt to public sentiment. Sweden for example responded to public
concerns in 1980, and agreed to phase out nuclear power by 2010. This may have
assisted their ability to enact more effective radioactive waste policies. More
recently, support for nuclear power has risen considerably in Sweden and that phase
out option may yet be reversed.
France and Canada have also enjoyed reasonable success with the management of
radioactive waste. France in particular enjoys widespread public support for nuclear
power and has achieved disposal facilities for LL W and IL W. It has kept open both
the retrieval and non-retrieval disposal option for HLW, which allows for greater
flexibility and may potentially alleviate the public fear of 'pennanent' disposal.
Canada has recently adopted a more open process ofHLW site selection based on the
223
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voluntary concept. It has also recognised the need for a measured deliberative
approach underpinned by the necessity to maintain public trust and confidence.
Canada had some success with the voluntary site selection for other hazardous
wastes and it remains to be seen if it can enjoy the same level of success for the more
troublesome HLW. What is obvious from this review is that the states with a more
community participatory process appear more likely to achieve the desired policy
outcomes for the overall management of radioactive wastes.
It seems somewhat ironic that two leading nuclear states, namely the UK and the US,
have struggled so comprehensively to implement effective radioactive waste policies.
The culture of secrecy employed by both nations during the Atomic Age (during the
race to build the nuclear bomb) appeared to linger for decades and to impact upon
later policy initiatives. A successful site selection process for HLW relies profoundly
on achieving public trust and confidence. The culture of secrecy, combined with poor
public consultation initiatives, have had the effect of eroding public trust. Both
nuclear states have relied on the top down DAD approach to site selection. This
method increases public distrust, which enables adversaries and environmental
groups to mobilize massive opposition to the selected site. This directly transfers to
political pressure, which can have the effect of reversing the original decision. The
decision to abandon the RCF for Sellafield in 1997 symbolises the failure of the
DAD approach adopted by Nirex throughout the 1980's. The UK is yet to adequately
dispose of its ILW, let alone the more controversial HLW.
In many respects the UK is commencing the entire process again with its latest
initiative for public consultation. While this is a welcome development it must be
supported with a genuine commitment for change and an absolute desire to achieve
and maintain public trust. BNFL has developed excellent technology for managing
its radioactive waste on site. Its third vitrification line if successful should help
reduce the stockpile of HAL to more acceptable levels, which should also assist with
building public trust. Likewise the US appears likely to gain the necessary public
trust for its nuclear activities and radioactive waste management in particular. After a
long process and huge expense, it has established a successful operating underground
repository for military transuranic waste (TRU) at the WIPP plant in New Mexico.
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Although still struggling to implement its preferred HLW repository at Yucca
Mountain in Nevada, because of intense opposition from the host state, the repository
is increasingly likely to become operational m the not too distant future.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE PANGEA PROPOSAL FOR A HLW REPOSITORY IN
AUSTRALIA
In December 1998 the Australian public was alerted to the Pangea 'proposal' to locate
the world1s first 'voluntary host' HLW multinational repository somewhere in the
Australian outback. The concept was revealed when the UK environmental group.
Friends of the Earth, obtained a leaked promotional video made by British Nuclear
Fuels Limited (BNFL), which they sent to an Australian environmental group who
passed it on to the Australian media. 1 The untimely release of the project combined
with the non-disclosure of meetings between PRA and some government ministers
placed PRA and its supporters on the defensive and enabled their opponents to
advance a 'secret agenda' argument. Pangea Resources Pty Ltd International (PRI)
had been established in March 19972 to examine the feasibility of locating a geologic
repository for the disposal of some of the world's radioactive waste in a voluntary
host state. The companies behind PRI were BNFL, the Swiss cooperative for nuclear
waste management (NAGRA), and a US engineering firm known as Golder
Associates. PRI set up a subsidiary body called Pangea Resources Australia Pty Ltd
(PRA) on 12 January 1998.3

The Australian Federal Resources Minister, Senator Nick Minchin, responded
quickly by rejecting the PRA plan, and his spokesperson stated that no fonnal
proposal had been lodged with the Federal Govemment.4 Following extensive public
opposition, which resulted in the enactment of two State Acts prohibiting the storage
of HLW in Western Australia and South Australia and a Federal Senate motion
I
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opposing the project, PRA formally withdrew its operations from Australia in
January 2002.5 Soon after, some of the main people involved with PRA helped
establish a non-commercial organization called the Association for Regional and
International Underground Storage (ARIUS), whose focus is now on finding a
regional repository for Europe.6 As PRA was the first major attempt to find a
'voluntary host' state to accept HLW from other nation states, it is important to
examine the reasons for the overwhelming public resistance that led to the fonnal
political rejections in Australia. This requires both an exploration of the Pangea
project and an analysis of the subsequent debate, which spanned the Australian
continent over a two-year period.
Upon learning of the preferred repository locations the Australian public initially
reacted with dismay, but this response, according to the Westem Australian Labor
Party7 leader Dr Geoff Gallop, quickly turned to unequivocal opposition.8 The
reaction of environmental and conservation groups was predictable, but the level and
extent of outright public hostility to the plans took the proponents and some of its
supporters by surprise. The public opposition was driven, in part, by the premature
disclosure of PRA's plans and by fears of an extensive secret attempt to 'dump'9 a
significant amount of the world's radioactive waste in Australia. 10 PRA later admitted
that it would have preferred a more orderly disclosure ofinfonnation, and that it had
not intended to reveal its plans until the end of 1999 11 or perhaps even late-r.
Unfo1tunately for PRA, its capacity to counteract the adverse claims was made more
difficult when it was revealed that, as far back as 1993, those later associated with
PRA had commenced a global feasibility study that included Australia. 12
s R. Martin. "N-Waste Dump in Tenninal Decline." The Australian, Wednesday 23 January 2002 pl.
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Despite the ill-timed revelations and the political controversy surrounding the
project, PRA initially seemed unfazed and began its extensive campaign to convince
a highly sceptical public. To assist them with this tac;k, the company recruited a
number of high-profile respected Australians to their Scientific Review Group
(SRG). These included Dr. Peter Cook, a senic.,r geologist, who was appointed
chainnan, and renowned immunologist Sir Gustav Nossa!, along with geologist Dr.
Phillip Playford, engineer Brian Anderson, and Roy Green, a physicist with the
COmmonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). JJ Nossal
in particular advanced the Pangea concept in the public arena by calling for an
infonned debate and for the concept to be reviewed by the "best Australian
scientists". 14 His article in a national newspaper revealed his support for the proposal,
which was summed up with his expression that 11we have the opportunity to offer the
world an Australian solution to a global problem". 15 Nossal was heavily criticised for

his stance mostly by environmentalist groups. 16 In August 1999 at a seminar at the
University of Western Australia, 17 Nossa! stated that he was not endorsing PRA but
he continued his call for an "emotion free debate". 18

In this chapter the merits of the Pangea project will be assessed using the 'triple
bottom line' criteria of economic, environmental and social considerations. There are
many justifications for using this approach, ranging from broad political and
international law acceptance of the concept of sustainable development (SD), to
specific references to SO principles in the radioactive waste management literature. 19
The SD principle was advanced in the UK during a 1995 government review of
radioactive waste policy. The review concluded that 11 radioactive waste management
policy should be base<l on the same basic principles as apply more generally to
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environment policy and in particular on that of sustainable development". 20 The SD
concept has its critics and has been subjected to extensive debate and much
disagreement over its precise meaning and definition among professional groups and
within academia.21 More recently, however, somewhat of a consensus has emerged
on the imperative to develop policies based on integrating the triple bottom line.
Considering the very long timeframes for the radioactive materials in the HLW to
decay to safe accepted levels, it is vital that any management plan must be
simultaneously ecologically viable, economically feasible and socia1ly {or publicly)
acceptable. 22 The chapter will therefore also explore how well PRA handled the issue
of risk perception and how well prepared it was to promote public trust, which is
important for gaining public acceptance for the disposal of hazardous material, and
especially nuclear waste. Studies show that once an institution loses public
confidence it is nearly impossible for it to regain it.23

Economic Benefits
The origins of the Pangea concept can be traced to the Synroc Study Group {SSG),
which commenced its research in December 1988. The Australian Federal
Government established the SSG to examine the commercial prospects for Synroc in
a global context.24 It consisted of four Australian resource companies,25 assisted by
the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and the
Research School of Earth Sciences at the Australian National University (ANU).
Synroc, an acronym for synthetic rock, was invented in 1978 by Ted Ringwood of
the ANU.26 It consists of a titanate ceramic waste-form made from four principal
minerals, and was specifically designed to immobilise HLW elements. Synroc offers
an alternative to borosilicate glass and, when complete, constitutes a solid in which
20
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the radionuclides are held within the latt ice of crystals. 27 Studies have shown that
Synroc offers superior resistance to groundwater leaching compared to borosilicate
glass "by factors of SOO to 2000 for univalent and divalent elements".28 The SSG's
research supported the earlier findings. Synroc's ability to withstand high
temperatures offers the potential for deep drill-hole burial of HLW some four
kilometres underground, rather than in mined repositories half a kilometre below the
surface. 29
PRA was established as a commercial venture and the Pangea concept evolved from
some of the SSG's conclusions and recommendations.30 The potential use of Synroc
opened up the possibility of Australian involvement in nuclear waste disposal. The
SSG stated that the ''rewards would be even more substantial if Australia were to
take pennanent title to foreign HLW (as Synroc) and to bury it irretrievably in a
suitable geological environment in the Australian shield".31 It is unclear how much
importance PRA placed on those comments, but David Pentz, Chairman of PRA,
made the following remarks at the 1999 waste management conference in Tucson.
After describing the history of Pangea and the links with Synroc, he stated:
In 1992 a public announcement by the then-responsible minister in the Federal
Government in Canberra did not elicit the usual negative response that many other
nations have experienced towards a proposal for a nuclear disposal facility. In fact its
32

announcement was virtually unnoticed by the media and the public.

If PRA did assume that there would not be much public opposition, that assumption
was seriously flawed.
PRA relied heavily on technical arguments to convince the public of the robust safety
features inherent in the project. The Pangea project began with a six-stage site
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selection process, with stage one a global search for suitable locations commencing
in 1993. 33 The Pangea concept placed "most emphasis for assuring long-term
radiological safety on the properties and stability of the rock-groundwater system,
rather than relying heavily on the system of engineered barriers that are constructed
within a deep repository."34 PRA's view was that the emphasis on geology provides a
more understandable disposal system, with clear demonstrable safety standards and
easier evaluation techniques, and that it also ensures a more economically viable
repository. The initial stage of the process involved an extensive desktop study to
identify arid or semi-arid geologically stable regions of the wortd.35 The preferred
location would provide a natural safe containment system that would remain stable
for hundreds of thousands of years. The specific site criteria involved high-isolation
characteristics with low relief topography, low rainfall, high evaporation, stable
geology and hydrogeology, absence of important mineral resources, and remoteneris
from centres ofpopulation. 36 Following these criteria, PRA identified parts of South
Africa, Argentina and Australia as the most favourable areas. Some parts of China,
Southern Russia and Kazakhstan rated well but contained regions that bo rdered on
high seismic hazardous activity.
The economic benefits for Australia were expected to be considerable. In November
1999 PRA commissioned Access Economics to investigate the potential economic
impacts of the multinational repository project for Australia.37 The economic strength
of the repository development was illustrated with the requirement of a $10.5 billion
investment (in 1998 dollars) over the 40-year lifespan of the project. It was estimated
in return that the repository would earn $200 billion in export revenues38 and
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contribute around $90 billion directly to Australian governments in the fonn of
royalties and payroll and company taxes over the same forty years.
The Pangea project envisaged a dedicated port and rail link to an inland repository
site extending over an area seven kilometres by two kilometres on the surface and to
a depth of several hundred kilometres underground.39 The HLW and spent fuel
would be shipped to Australia in heavy steel casks in purpose-built ships. It was
estimated that over the 40-year life of the repository 3,000 transport casks and 70
ships would be required, aU of which would be manufactured in Australia.40 The
project would provide direct employment for around 2,000 people, including 600
jobs in the international shipping operations. The projected employment figures were
even more encouraging, according to the Access Economics modelling, with an
estimated 6,000 jobs per year in Australian industry during the operational phase.
The mode! on investment and employment was based on the classic Keynesian
stimulus to aggregate demand complete with multiplier effect.41 Hence when the
induced consumption expenditure is factored into the model the projected
employment almost doubles. Considering the very great economic investment and
employment potential, it is not surprising that some industry groups openly
supported the project. In December 1998 the executive director of the Institute of
Public Affairs, Dr Mike Nahan, said, "Australia should seriously examine the case
for large scale waste disposal". 42 He claimed that the project would be equivalent to
the size of the gold industry in Australia.
Access Economics also used macroeconomic simulation to gauge the potential
impact of the proposal on the Australian and Western Australian economies. The
model used, b ased on neoclassical economic assumptions, involves comparing two
long-tenn simulations.43 First the standard projection was run to establish a base
39
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scenario and then the Pangea repository project was added to produce a likely set of
outcomes. The two main impacts were on business investment between 2004 and
2014 and on exports from 2009 onwards. 44 The biggest impact in the project's peak
investment year of 2008 was found to equal almost 1.5 per cent of aggregate business
investment, or 0.2 per cent of GDP. Furthennore, the Access Economics Report
predicted that the project would produce a full one.per cent increase in GDP above
the level in the base simulation at the height of the upswing in 2021.45 Interestingly
the projected stimulus in demand increased employment by 17,000 by the year 2008.
In addition, after the initial peak and fall, anticipated export revenue remained
consistent at $5.5 billion from about 2022 onwards. 46 As with any economic
modelling it is impossible to empirically v alidate the findings because of the need to
rely on the particular assumptions used. This limitation does make broad public
acceptance of the economic claims difficuJt to achieve but this type of modelling is
widely used among economic theorists and govenunents throughout the Western
world.
This projected level of investment and employment opportunity would be tempting
to any government, which may help explain the initial mixed messages from the
Australian Federal Government. Senator Minchin, the Resources Minister, publicly
rejected the proposal from the outset,47 yet his public comments were not matched

with unequivocal legislative backing. The opportunity to legislate against the
proposal and alleviate growing public concern was presented to the government as
early as 10 December 1998, but it refused to do so. During the Committee stage in
the Senate, a proposed amendment by Greens Senator Dee Margetts to the 1998
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Bill sought to prohibit the
construction of a large nuclear waste disposal facility anywhere in Australia.48 This
initiative gained the support of the Labor Opposition but (with the help of an
independent Senator) the Coalition Government defeated the amendment by a
majority of one. During the debate Senator Grant Tambling, on behalf of the
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Government, failed to provide any definitive reasons for not allowing the amendment
except to repeatedly say that it was not necessary.49 This enabled S:nator Margetts
and others to argue that the Government wanted to keep the door open for the
importation of nuclear waste.50
Australia exports uranium but is not a nuclear state because it has no energy
producing nuclear reactors. It does however produce small quantities of low-level
and long-lived intennediate level radioactive waste, from the use of radioisotopes for
medical and industrial research at Lucas Heights. 51 Australia sends its spent-fuel rods
to COGEMA52 in France for reprocessing, and under the contract the ILW will be
returned. This is the type of waste classified as HLW in the main nuclear states,
where it is strongly advocated that it must be disposed of in geologic repositories to
ensure safety over the long term. 53 Yet it can not be justified on economic grounds to
construct a deep underground repository in Australia to se.cure such a small but
dangerous quantity of long-lived radioactive waste. One of the arguments advanced
by PRA was that a shared facility would minimise expense and benefit the smaller
nuclear states in particular.54 Yet the direct cost reduction benefits to Australia from
hosting a multinational repository to offset the costs of a national repository was not
given much attention throughout the public debate.
If the shared facility argument has economic merit, then surely it must follow that
any costs associated with potential hazards well into the future must also be shared
by the nation states responsible for producing the waste and utilising the
multinational repository. This was a considerable flaw in the economic argument
advanced by PRA, because there were no arrangements in the proposal to safeguard
liability provisions over the long-tenn. All responsibility woul d rest with the
49 The Opposition argued that it was not contrary to any of their amendments and would not prevent a
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Australian Government following the closure of the facility after an operating period
of 40 years. Moreover, the Access Economics Report suggested that part of PRA's
$90 billion royalty payments to Federal and state governments could go towards the
"long term care fund" of the repository, which would be controlled by the Australian
Government.55 Considering that the waste remains radioactive for tens of thousands
of years, it is debatable whether such a funding arrangement would be adequate over
the long-term. Therefore it is possible that any short or medium term economic gains
for Australia could be offset by remediation costs associated with potential leakage
and contamination of the biosphere long after repository closure.
Another economic consideration is the potential loss in tourism from the negative
connotations associated with a nuclear waste 'dump'. Political leaders take tile risk of
a possible downturn in tourism seriously. In the US, the State of Nevada regularly
uses the effects on tourism as a main argument against the Yucca Mountain
repository. 56 The State maintains that thousands might stay away if Nevada is seen as
unsafe because of the dangers of storing the 'harmful' waste. During the PRA debate
the Tourism Council of Australia issued warnings about the impact of a nuclear
waste 'dump'. The Western Australian branch president, Laurie 01Meara, said the
tourist industry was based on Western Australia being "clean" and "green11 and the
waste site would damage that image in the "eyes of tourists11 57 During the debate and
•

since, two Premiers of opposing political persuasions advanced similar arguments
about Western Australia's clean green image. When opposing the PRA project,
Premier Richard Court emphasised both the importance of maintaining the State's
good image for clean primary produce and totitism/8 and stated that his government
would not risk damaging either. S!1 His successor, Premier Geoff Gallop, has
repeatedly used Western Australia's 'clean green image' in his arguments for
opposing both the PRA repository project and Australia's national low-level

55
56

Supra n 37 Access Economics 1998 p8.

D. Berns, "Las Vegas Operators Fight Nuclear Waste Dump Plan." Hotel and Motel Management
217 (2002) p41.
s7 L. Tickner, "Tourism Warning on N-Dump." The West Australian, Thursday 22 July 1999, p6.
ss "Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Tuesday 7 September 1999
r,648.
9
A. Burns, "State Bwies N-Dump Plans." The West Australian, Wednesday 8 September 1999 p4.

78

radioactive waste repository. Thus, an economic argument th<1t rests on the negative
image ofHLW is used to counter the PRA economic case.
Environmental Benefits of Geological Repositories
The main environmental and safety benefits of geological repositories were not
particularly well explained to the Australian community. The advantages of securing
HLW in deep geological repositories are twofold. The primary objective is to
physically isolate the waste from the human and biological environment in order to
protect humans from ionising radiation. The second (and perhaps now even more
important objective) is to put the waste beyond the reach of terrorists and subversive
groups from rogue states. Deep disposal ofHLW places it beyond the reach of both
biological and human contact.60 The repository is selected and designed in such a
way as to prevent the migration of radioactive material from the repository back to
the biosphere.
The choice of wording is important in explaining the benefits of the repository
concept. Phrases such as "the site will have high isolation characteristics" 61 may be
appropriate for infonnation sharing between experts but greater clarity is required
when attempting to inform the public of the rationale behind the repository concept.
In 1991 the collective opinion of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee
explained the geological disposal concept in the following terms:
Radioactive waste disposal systems are designed to isolate the waste from humans and
the environment for the necessary times to ensure that no potential future releases of
radioactive substances to the environment would cons titute an unacceptable risk.62

Clearly the challenge remains to achieve the correct balance between articulating the
safety features and environmental benefits without further increasing public anxiety
about some of the complex aspects of nuclear activities.

N. Chapman & I. McKinley, The Geological Disposal ofNuclear Waste. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1987 p43. [hereinafter, Chapman & McKinley, 1987].
61
Supra n 36 Mccombie, et al., 1999 pl.
62
Nuclear Energy Agency: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. "Disposal of
Radioactive Waste: Can Long-Tenn Safety Be Evaluated? A Collective Opinion," Paris, 1991 p6.

60

79

One possible way to achieve this is to remind the public of the necessary and
successful measures taken on a daily basis to protect the workers from radiation at
nuclear power plants.63 Obviously humans need to avoid exposing themselves to
radiation at any time during the nuclear fuel cycle. This is achieved by shielding
humans from the radioactive material at all stages throughout the nuclear process.64
Operators regularly use remote controlled handling equipment from behind protected
thick walls to carry out their activities. Their vision is obtained either with the use of
cameras and television screens or through specially designed insulated windows,
depending on the particular task being perfonned. 65 Despite extremely high levels of
radioactivity, the spent-fuel assemblies placed in ponds, filled with water enable the
spent-fuel rods to be cooled and then if chosen, dismantled during the first step in the
reprocessing process. At depths of 10 to 15 metres the water provides a natural
radiation shield that safeguards the technicians working on the rods from elevated
platfonns.66 It is necessary to use an appropriate language to not only better explain
these complex issues, but to distinguish between the more imminent dangers
associated with nuclear reactors compared to radioactive waste.
The repository concept is also complex, difficult to explain and can talce time for
community members to gain a comprehensive understanding of its inherent features.
The public appears to envisage different connotations from the phrase "isolate and
contain1167 compared to the scientists and related experts, who regularly use that term
to describe the design features of geological repositories. It is not uncommon for
images of a highly radioac1ive, easily flowing liquid substance, to be evoked in the
public mind upon hearing such an explanation. The HLW ready for disposal is in a
solid form. The radiation shielding qualities of a deep repository needs to be
constantly reiterated. It may well be much better to explain the environmental
benefits of the repository concept in two separate stages. The primary emphasis
could focus on clearly outlining the substantial rarliation shielding qualities of
63
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underground repositories. The proponents may well need to regularly illustrate the
desirable aspects of placing the HLW deep underground in robust surroundings that
provides the public with "more th.:m adequate shielding from the radiation emitted by
the waste".68 The second environmental and safety feature of geological repositories
is its anti-migration benefits. That aspect was less convincing to the Australian public
because of the belief that the radioactive material would leak into the ground water
systems sometime in the future.
Initially, design features of geological repositories relied solely on the natural
geology to prevent mi gration of the radioactive material, but with increasing
demands for maximum safety, engineered barriers are now widely accepted in many
nuclear states.

69

Specifically designed multi-barrier systems can be used to avoid

rejecting geologically marginal sites, and can also provide an additional safety
feature for even the most suitable geological formations. Engineered barriers fall into
three categories: the waste form itself, the container it is housed in, and the backfill
and particular sealing arrangements used. 70 The HLW intended for disposal is not in
a liquid form, since the highly active liquor (HAL) resulting from reprocessing has
been solidified prior to disposal. The preferred method in the UK is to convert the
HAL into a glass matrix corrosion resistant substance, a process known as
vitrification.71 The solidified waste is then encapsulated in specifically designer.
containers, which form the next stage of the barrier system. There are differences in
container design, with most nuclear states intending to use steel canisters. It is
difficult to predict corrosion rates for the time-scale involved, but a conservative
estimate for steel guarantees retention of the radionuclides for at least a thousand
years. Finland and Sweden have opted for the more expensive long-lived copper
canisters, predicting that they will preserve their integrity for tens of thousands of
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years.72 The sealing of shafts and tUIU1els with concrete combined with backfilling

provides the final technical barrier.73 This sealing arrangement minimises ground

water movement and can also retard radionuclide migration. The technical barriers
provide an assurance of safety that should help instil community confidence in the
repository concept but the host rock and the natural geology are the only effective
means of providing absolute safety for the long duration required.
There are diverging expert opinions on the most suitable geological formations for
storing and ultimately containing the HLW over the long-tenn. Among the main
choices are salt, clay and granite. Some prefer salt formations because of the �bsence
of water, since dryness limits radionuclide migration and because · of the
encapsulation qualities of salt. Over a relatively short period of time, the salt creeps
down and completely surrounds the waste, which further inhibits migration.
However. retrieving the waste is more difficult in salt formations, it is likely to be
costly and it may even be impracticable over the longer tenn. The WIPP repository
in Carlsbad, New Mexico, where transuranic waste is sent, is now a working
example of underground nuclear waste disposal in salt formations. Although WIPP
has not been functioning for long, having commenced receiving waste in 1999, it is
operating better that expected.74

PRA selected Australia for its geological stability and low seismic activity in the
region under study. To highlight the stability argument the proponents maintained
that the area under consideration, in central Australia, has been undisturbed since the
break up of the 'Pangea' supercontinent over 200 million years ago.75 The two

geological stability arguments were disputed, however, which contributed to the
public skepticism of the technological safety features of the repository concept. PRA
claimed that Australia had the desired stable geology with low rock penneabitity,
72
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whfoh would ensure little water movement. This claim was contested by Professor of
Geology, Dr Robert Pidgeon, who said that "sedimentary basins generally have
porous rocks that contain groundwater aquifers and unless some very special
situation is envisaged, such rocks are exactly the type of site that should be avoided
in the disposal of HLW".76 He went on to argue that if the locations suggested in the
print media were correct, then the 11company strategy is flawed in its understanding
of the geological principles ifl.volved". 77 These claims corresponded with the earlier
assertions made by fonner �eologist and State Labor MP, Mark Nevill, who said that
"the rock in the area is protozoic and sedimentary and more penneable than
granite".78 This publicised expert disagreement demonstrates the complexity of the
technical issues, which fed into the public perception that greater risk was involved
than was being claimed by the proponents.
Earthquake activity occurs mainly along the boundaries of the Earth's tectonic

plates.79 One of the objects of the Stage I study was to identify and clearly avoid the

major tectonicaUy active regions. The Pangea Technical Report 01-01 (PTRl) cites
the Global Seismic Hazard Map to illustrate the most tectonically risky areas
throughout the world. 80 Because Australia is centrally located in the middle of one of
the largest tectonic plates on Earth, it is a low risk area. Australia became the
preferred choice, and PRA focused on the extensive contiguous sedimentary basins
extending from central Western Australia into northern South Australia for their

feasibility study.81 The PTRl provides scant detail by way of explanation for the

preferred locations but it does acknowledge that intra-plate seismic activity does
occur and allows that designated areas would need to be evaluated on a region-by

region basis. 82 This means that somewhere in the sixth stage of the evaluation

process the candidate site would be subjected to a detailed geological investigation to

76

R. Pidgeon, "Your Say.'' The Sunday Times, 9 May 1999, p15.
Ibid.
M. Priest, "MP Dumps on N�Site." The Sunday Times, 28 March 1999 p22.
79
Earthquakes are caused by sudden fault movements, which occur when stress builds up sufficiently
to force one plate down below another. See Quakes, Queensland University Advanced Centre for
Earthquake Studies, Department of Earth Sciences, The University of Queensland. Earthquake maps
of Queensland and Australia. Available: http://quakes.earth.uq.au/seis_maps pi.
8
Supra n 33 PTR 2001 p39.
81
Supra n 27 Barnaby, 2000.
82
Supra n 32 PTR 2001 p37.
7

7
78

83

fully assess the potential for seismic activity. This specific detail went largely
unnoticed in the media, and the public were certainly not reassured when expert
disagreement over the volcanic risk factor in the relevant parts of Australia appeared
in the press.
In responding to an article in the Australian Financial Review, 83 Professor John
Veevers took exception to the views expressed by the Chairman of the SRG, Dr Peter
Cook. The main areas of contention were disagreement over the global nature of the
disposal problem, the suitability of Australia's geology and the extent of the risks
involved.84 Professor Veevers, who became perhaps the most outspoken professional
critic of the proposal, maintained that the waste should be taken care of where it is
created. To support this, he highlighted the small quantity of radioactive waste
Australia created; contrasting the 250,000 tonnes ofHLW produced in the Northern
Hemisphere but destined for the multinational repository with the four tonnes ofILW
produced at the Lucas Heights reactor in Sydney. In addition, he argued that
Australia did in fact experience recent significant seismic activity, with earthquakes
in the Great Victorian Desert reaching a magnitude of 5 to 6 on the Richter Scale in
the past 100 years.85 He also drew parallels with the three intra-plate earthquakes in
the New Madrid area in Missouri, which reached a magnitude of 8 in 1811-12, to
demonstrate the risk factor associated within intra plate zones.86 Dr Cook felt
compelled to clarify his position and reiterated his calls for further detailed research
and full public consultation before any rational decision could be made.87 The expert
disagreement's fed negatively into an already sceptical public and the environmental
arguments ofthe repository were diminished further as a result.
Social Aspects
The nuclear industry has stated on many occasions that, because of the dangers of
ionising radiation, it is extremely important to safeguard humans and the
P. Cook, "The Geology of Nuclear Waste." Australian Financial Review, Friday 17 December 1998
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, �nvironment for generations to come. 88 PRA relied heavily on the technical and
safety aspects of the proposal to convince a sceptical public that their method of
"isolation and containment 11 would fulfil this long-term environmental objective.89
While there is little doubt PRA engaged extensive technical expertise, from a
strategic point of view one must question why more attention was not given to
addressing the public's perception of risk associated with the relatively unknown
repository concept. The problem was compounded by the need to provide detail
without using incomprehensible or vague language. Indeed the accusation of
speaking above the community in technical jargon has been levelled at the nuclear
industry, in practically all the nuclear states trying to site a repository.90 PRA
attempted to resolve this difficulty by establishing a website, organising conferences
and providing infonnation to interested parties, but it failed to engage the public in a
broader debate.
The task was made more difficult because of the premature release of the proposal
and the resulting antagonistic stance taken by political leaders. The major
shareholder acknowledged this difficulty and admitted that the Australian anti
nuclear movement was able to take control of the initial agenda, which put PRA on
the defensive. BFNL maintained that during the initial media contact
Pangea was forced to publicly defend itself against emotive and sometimes outrageous
claims, This meant that it was difficult to conduct a free and open debate on the merits
of the concept: including the technical and environmental soundness, the non
proliferation aspects, and economic benefits for Australia.91

In addition, because the project was primarily a two-year feasibility study, there are
no official Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to assess, as these would not have
been required until much later in the developmental stage. PRA found it difficult to
counter adverse environmental claims without the capacity to refer to EIS documents
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and because of the technicalities involved in explaining the repository design. 92
Austn1.lians rely heavily on the media for political and current affairs infonnation,
most of which is obtained from television reports,93 and this does not a11ow for
detailed in-depth analysis of technical proposals. PRA did make additional
infonnation available on request, but this effectively meant that the finer details of
the repository concept were confined to particular groups or individuals with a
specific interest in the project.
Another significant problem was that the project did not rea!::h the stage of
facilitating an independent peer review to objectively access the research undertaken
by PRA, the SRG or Access Economics. A similar criticism was directed at the DOE
for their research into the Yucca Mountain repository study,94 and it is somewhat
surprising that PRA was not better prepared as a result of this experience.
Consequently, the Australian public was expected to fonn an opinion based on two
conflicting versions, one of which was highly technical and the other heavily
influenced by the environmental lobby groups.

Moreover, the most detailed

technical report finalised by PRA was not reviewed by the SRG until late 2000 and
was not approved for publication until May 2001. This was well after the public had
made up its mind and after legislation outlawing the repository had been introduced
into the Western Australian Parliament.
In addition to the technical arguments, PRA selected Australia for its advanced stable
democratic system of government, compared to some of the other nations with
similar geology. A report prepared for PRA, by Dupont and Associates highlighted
the political stability argument. It stated that Australia
is almost alone in the world in having the optimal mix of geography, political stability,
technological sophistication, low population density, climatic conditions and geological
structure for a waste repository.95
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The chairman of the SRG, Dr Peter Cook, also advanced the political stability
argument against selecting some of the nations identified in the Pangea world study
for their geological suitability.96 Surprisingly, in selecting Australia for inter alia its
political stability, PRA failed to articulate detailed philosophical arguments to assist
with its desire to achieve public acceptance for the project. During the entire study it
failed to provide a single report outlining the social benefits for Australia. The
Advancing Australia's Security lnterests91 report did discuss broad social aspects but

these were global in nature, somewhat idealistic and far removed from the concerns
of the Australian general public. The report focused on Australia's global and
regio!1a! 1security1 interests and put forward arguments such as assisting to reduce the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; strengthening the alliance with the US;
containing terrorism; supporting the United Nations; and protecting the global
environment.98 These issues are without doubt important but mostly relate to foreign
policy and were a difficult "sell" to convince the Australian public to accept an
international repository. That may have changed somewhat since the events of 11
September 200 I.
The main contention after the economic and safety arguments was an appeal for
Australia to consider the proposal in the interests of 'good global citizenship'. This
appeal came from such prominent people as former US Administration official,
Robert Gallucci,99 who stated that
Australia was in a 'unique' position to help solve one of the world's biggest problems:
safe storage of nuclear waste and plutonium from bombs dismantled at the end of the
Cold War. If Australia could appreciate the concept and decide it was in the national
interest, there would be enormous benefits for the world. 100

Yet with the proposed repository set to receive only 20 per cent of the world1s HLW,
the security arguments did not resonate with the Australian public. The 'good global
citizenship' argument appealed to altruism of the highest order. When combined with
'16Supran87Cook, 1998pl7.
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the unproven teclmology, and the reliance on economic assumptions, it was
extremely difficult for PRA to convince the public that any benefits outweighed the
perceived risks. The repository concept was a significant undertaking by a private
company, which attempted to persuade the Australian community of both private
benefits and the public good security benefit without detailed philosophical
arguments, and without govenunental backing.
Without the backing of national or international governments it was perhaps not
surprising that some of PRA's supporters reverted to the moral 1cradle to grave'
argument. Dr Nahan contended that 11Australia which has an estimated one third of
the world's uranium reserves, should take some responsibility for the by-products of
the uranium it exported". 101 The most outspoken Federal politician in favour of the
proposal, Senator Ross Lightfoot, stated that 11we can't expect to benefit from
exporting uranium if we are not prepared to deal with the waste created from its
use 11• 102 The cradle to grave argument was repeatedly rejected by the Federal
Government, who asserted that its "involvement in the uranium mining industry in
no way obligates Australia to accept wastes resulting from the nuc'Jear power
industry11• 103 This also equated with the accepted international position that nations
who benefit from nuclear power are responsible for its generated wastes. Most
community members also rejected the cradle to grave argument and took the view
that it was just another means of imposing an international repository on Australia
complete with unwanted and unnecessary risks.
Political Response to the Public Opposition in Australia
Australian community sentiment has ranged from healthy scepticism to outright
mistrust of institutions and specific professions. Recent studies have shown a low
standing of politicians among the wider public, with perceptions of their honesty and
trust consistently rated low.104 It was therefore not surprising that resistance quickly
emerged in Australia to the plans for a multinational repository, due partly to the
101
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premature release of the Pangea concept, and partly to the notion of 'clandestine'

governmental discussions. 105 The controversy was fuelled by the revelation of
discussions between PRA and senior members of government and by at least the
initial mixed messages coming from some Liberal Party parliamentarians. People
from Pangea met with the Deputy Premier of Western Australia (WA), Hendy
Cowan, on 14 November 1997 in his ministerial office but information of the
meeting was not disclosed to the public until after the news of PRA's plans broke. 106

To add to the heightened scepticism, in February 1999 the Western Australian
Premier's office became embwiled in the controversy, when it was revealed that
Premier Richard Court's fom1er Chief of Staff, Ian Fletcher, was also present at the
meeting with PRA in November 1997. 1G, The furore increased when it was
discovered not long after Fletcher's resignation from the Premier's office that PRA

had approached Fletcher to act as its media adviser. 108 Premier Court later admitted
that his office received regular updates from PRA following the 1997 meeting, but
stated that he was never informed of the details. Opposition groups found this
difficult to believe and claimed that PRA had being developing a relationship with
key people over a long period of time. Consequently, the proponents of the concept
were confronted with an aggressive media, eager to expose any meetings between

PRA and senior members of governmerit. 109 In essence the controversy enabled
opponents to advance the 'secret agenda' argument, which reduced the capacity for
any meaningful debate. It also forced many politicians into taking a particular stance
against the repository project at an early stage.
The minor parties led by the Greens maintained the pressure in the State and Federal
Parliaments, with questions relating to the Pangea concept and any other 'secret
meetings' with politicians. Public pressure increased when the controversy extended
into the Federal sphere in March 1999, when it was revealed that a Federal Minister
ios Despite the rejection of the project by almost all politicians.
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had met with PRA. From the outset in rejecting the project, Senator Minchin had
assured the Federal Parliament that there had been no ministerial level discussions
with PRA. 110 However, Federal Conservation Minister, Wilson Tuckey, caused his

government some embarrassment when he finally admitted that he had met with

PRA executive Jim Voss in Perth on 5 November 1998. 111 The admission came well
after Resources Minister Minchin had inadvertently misled Parliament by clearly
stating that no Minister had ever met with PRA. Subsequently, both Ministers were
forced to apologise to Parliament, but only after Minchin's office had rung all 30

Ministers to ensure there were no more meetings to report. 112 While the incident
caused the Federal Government some embarrassment, it was arguably far more
damaging to PRA and the proponents of the repository. Moreover, the credibility of
PRA was also questioned when it was revealed that Voss himself had previously

stated that he had not spoken about the project to any government ministers. 113 The
reporting of another 'secret• ministerial meeting with PRA merely increased the
perception of mistrust and reinforced the public fears of an extensive plan to
construct a multinational repository in the Australia outback.
The initial lack of transparency was used by the anti-nuclear lobby to fuel the
perception that 'secret plans' were in place to use Australia for the world's first HLW
dump• . 114 Working in conjunction with the Greens, they maintained a protracted

1

grassroots campaign across Australia during the Pangea concept debate, to sustain
pressure and influence public perceptions of risk. In Western Australia, where the
controversy began, a number of environmental groups joined forces to streamline
activities and maximise their impact. The groups came under the banner of the Anti
Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia (ANAWA) and were coordinated by Robin
Chapple, who at the time was research officer for the Greens Western Australia

member of State Parliament, Giz Watson MLC. 115 ANA WA and associated groups
110
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provided a website and disseminated information, organised seminars, compiled
newsletters and videos, and held rallies and local meetings in both urban and rural
areas to canvass opposition to the repository. ANAWA was rewarded for its
extensive public and media campaign when it achieved around 50,000 public
signatures to a petition opposing the Pangea project. 116 In addition, the broader
public also voiced their opposition to the concept through talk back radio, editorial
letters and correspondence to their parliamentarians by way of various other
petitions. 117 This was one of largest public responses to a single issue in WA, which
highlighted the level of concern with the long-term risks associated with geological
repositories.
The public pressure was something the politicians could not ignore and was
transferred directly into a political outcome. Initially, the Court Coalition
Government appeared reluctant to introduce legislation prohibiting a radioactive
waste repository in Western Australia, but following the protracted public debate it
did have a motion opposing the project passed in Parliament on 7 September 1999.
The motion as moved in the Legislative Assembly by the Minister for the
Environment, Cheryl Edwardes, stated:
That this House notes (i) the Premier's statement that foreign nuclear waste should not be stored in Western
Australia;
(ii) that the Premier's stand reflects the broader public opposition throughout Westem
Australia to any such proposal;
(iii) the comments by the Director and Operations Manager of Pangea Resources
Australia Pty Ltd, Mr Marcis Kurzeme, in The West Australian newspaper of24 August
1999, to the effect that Pangea will abandon its idea to locate an international nuclear
waste repository in Western Australia if the proposal meets with continued public
opposition; and
(iv) expresses its total opposition to any proposal from any person or company to situate
an international nuclear waste repository in Western Australia on the grounds that such

u6 The signatures were presented in the Legislative Council of the Western Australian Parliament by
Giz Watson MLC, see the ANWA web-site http://www.anawa.org.au/action/petition.html
117
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a repository poses a significant threat to Western Australia's environment and public
safety. 118

While the motion was welcomed as a progressive step, it was still viewed as
�nadequate, and the public demand for legislative backing remained. To alleviate the
mounting pressure the Government finally agreed to support the opposition's
prohibitive legislation, which had been introduced into Parliament on Wednesday 11

August 1999. 119 Indeed before the legislation passed through Parliament the
Government strengthened the Bill through a series of amendments, the most notable
being that any change to the Act would require the approval of both Houses of
Parliarnent. 120
Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibition) Act 1999
The purpose of the Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibition) Act 19fQ121 (NWSA) was to
send the strongest possible message to PRA by enshrining the widespread
community resistance to the multinational repository in state law. In the second
reading speech, the Opposition leader Dr. Geoff Gallop stated:
The Bill is intended to prohibit the construction and operation of a Pangea·style nuclear
waste storage facility in West em Australia. The objective of the legislation is to protect

the health, welfare and safety of Western Australians and the environment in which we
live by prohibiting a waste facility for any radioa ctive material derived from the
operations of a nuclear reactor, nuclear weapons facility, nuclear reprocessing plant or

isotope enrichment plant. It implicitly recognises that any potential economic benefits

must be balanced against the social and environmental implications. In so doing, it also
recognises that there are more ways for Western Australia to progress and develop than
as the world's nuclear waste dum p. 122

The bipartisan-supported NWSA 1999, which was assented to on 7 December 1999,
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radioactive waste except for low-level waste generated in Australia. 123 The Act
provides a penalty of $500 000 124 to anyone, including directors of a corporation, 125
for a violation of the law. The Act also prohibits any public money, including from
any statutory authority, to be spent on any activity associated with the development,
construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility in the State. 126 The Act
sent the strongest possible message from the Government of Western Australia to
PRA that its proposal was not acceptable. Yet while the legislation was viewed as a
win for opponents of the Pangea concept, it was apparent to some at least that a
future Federal Government could override the State Law. Moreover, the Greens
Western Australia have since reintroduced the legislation in an effort to clarify the
definition of nuclear waste. 127 The main point of contention is Section 3 (b), which
could be used by the Radiological Council, through the Federal Government, to
argue that the plutonium in spent fuel has a future 'beneficial use'.
The successful passage of the NWSA in the Western Australia Parliament presented
more than a problem for PRA, and the debate subsequently shifted to South
Australia, where however, public opposition was equally strong. Throughout 1999,
various opinion polls indicated a finn resistance to nuclear waste repositories,
starting with a Channel Seven survey in July, which showed that 93 per cent of South
Australians were opposed to hosting a national radioactive waste repository in their
State. In late September 1999, Greenpeace commissioned a poll that clearly showed
broad public concern about the management of nuclear waste in Australia. The
polling, undertaken by Insight Research Australia, involved telephone interviews
with over 1000 people throughout the country. 128 In response, a massive 85 per cent
indicated a strong desire for the Federal Government to enact legislation to ban the
import of foreign wastes into Australia. 129 When questioned about disposing of
Supra 121 Section (7).
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125
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Australia's domestic waste in South Australia, 55 per cent of the total number

surveyed opposed the idea. 130 Notably, 86 per cent of South Australians answered

that question in the negative. The survey also revealed a preference for renewable
energy131 and opposition to a new reactor at Lucas Heights in NSW. 132 Despite
including a prelude to question four, which critics could argue was somewhat
leading, opposition to the Lucas Heights reactor was strong in all of the six states.
The polling results show a consistent pattern of anxiety with all things nuclear and a
strong opposition to radioactive waste repositories in Australia at that time.
Social Amplification of Risk in Australia
As the events unfolded in Australia1 it became apparent that the circumstances were
conducive to the 'social amplification of risk', and thus unfavourable to PRA. This
was largely due to the heightened community suspicion driven by the initial
allegations of secrecy surrounding the concept, followed by the protracted media
exposure. The public perception of risk was amplified further when the Pangea
project was linked with Australia's national repository debate. 133 While perceptions
of secrecy and mistrust commenced in Western Australia, 'social amplification of
risk' was more evident during the South Australian debate. The daily South Australia
newspaper, The Advertiser, was perhaps the main amplification station, and was later
joined in that role by Channel Seven television in Adelaide. Both adopted an
aggressive anti-nuclear stance. The primacy of the nuclear waste issue was
highlighted in November 1999, when The Advertiser for two consecutive days
selected the nuclear-waste issue for its hard-hitting front-page headline. The most
sensational front-page appeared on Friday 19 November, with a headline saying
"COMING TO A DUMP NEAR YOU1• 134 It was accompanied by a large illustration
of a 'danger' radiation symbol, widely recognised throughout the world and
130 Ibid Question two was: "Do you support the federal government's proposal to send all of
Australia's nuclear waste to South Australia for disposal?" Yes:23%, No:55%, Other:23%.
131
Ibid Question three was: "Do you think the federal government should spend as much on
alternative renewable technologies as it does on nuclear technology?" Yes:83%, No:8%, Other:9%.
132
Ibid Question four was: "The government admits t here is no disposal method for higher level
nuclear waste. Do you think Australia should build a new reactor which will produce more of this
waste?" Yes:15%, No:75%, Other:10%.
133 H. Manning, "Issues of the South Australian Political Chronicles." Australian Journal ofPolitics
and History 41 (2001) p285. [hereinafter, Manning, 2001].
134 P. Coorey & B. Huppatz, "Coming to a Dump near You." The Advertiser, Friday 19 November
1999 pl.
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frequently used at anti-nuclear demonstrations. The main story was backed up with a
full report on page four, complete with a provocative photograph of Australian rock
singer and environmentalist, Peter Garrett. 135

This type of imagery was designed to feed the perceptions of ac already susceptible
public. The environmentalist movement had been alarnted for some time that South
Australia would end up with all of the nation1s nuclear waste, following the decision
in 1998 to locate the national low-level radioactive waste repository in the Billa

Kalina region. 136 The region covers 67,000 square kilometres of northern South

Australia and includes the towns of Andamooka, Roxby Downs, and Woomera. The
public anxiety in SA commenced in 1997, when the Commonwealth/State
Consultative Committee (CSCC) advanced the co-location option for Australia's
radioactive waste in a single site. The CSCC's main recommendation was included in
the Phase Three Site Selection Study:
The Commonwealth/State Consultative Committee on the Management of Radioactive
Waste supports the need for a national store for long-lived intermediate level radioactive
waste, and in 1997, endorsed consideration of co-locating such a facility with a national
near-surface repository. 137

The co-location option was included in numerous public documents and supported at
various times by the relevant Commonwealth and State ministers. Notably:
Commonwealth, States and Territories agree that the co-location of a repository and an
above growid storage facility at a single national site would provide a com prehensive
strategy for Australia's small inventory ofwaste. 138

In November 1999 The Advertiser reported that South Australia would be the most
likely "dumping ground" for Australia's medium to high-level radioactive waste,
including the returned waste from the overseas processing of the Lucas Heights
spent-fuel rods. 139 To support this assertion, the newspaper cited an ANSTO
135
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newsletter dated 4 March 1999, which revealed the expectation that the returned
waste would be "accommodated alongside the national waste depository11 • 140
Environmental groups also drew attention to the evidence provided by the Chief
Executive of ANSTO, Professo r Helen Garnett, at the Senate Joint Committee on
Public Wo rks in May 1999. 141 During an interrogation by Labor :MF and vice
chai rperson, Mrs Janice Crosio, Professor Garnett not only reinforced the preferred
co-location option, 142 but also admitted that the reprocessed waste was indeed
destined for South Australia. Speaking of the management of the reprocessed waste,
the exchange went as follows:
Prof, Garnett: It will come back in an appropriately qualified storage container, and all
of that is included in the cost. They are qualified for 50 years.
Mrs Crosio: I do not care about the cost now. Where are you going to store that for 50
years?
Prof. Garnett: That �<,cs 1,; the storage facility which we have talked about earlier to be
co-located....
Mrs Croslo: In South Australia? So we classify that as low level intermediate waste?
Prof. Garnett: No that is the repository. That is what goes in the ground.
Mrs Crosio: So consent is also for fuel rods as well?
Prof Garnett: No, it is not fuel rods. It is no different in composition to the hundreds
and hundreds of cubic metres of long lived intennediate level waste that already exists
in Australia from Defence activities and other activities. The clean up of the St Mary's
site resulted in a very large volume of long lived intermediate level waste going to
storage.
Mrs Crosio: For the record, when our reprocessed fuel rods come back they will be
deposited eventually in South Australia?
Prof, Garnett: Yes. 143

In view of this evidence, The Advertiser on Friday 19 November 1999 gave Peter
Garrett, President of the Australian Conservation Foundation, greater prominence. 144
140
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It published his calls for the Parliament to enact legislation to prevent South
Australia from becoming an international radioactive waste 'dump'. Garrett cited the
example ofPRA to warn of the dangers of accepting the medium-level waste, which
he claimed, if allowed to happen would result in higher category level waste dumps
for South Australia. 145 The problem, which the Federal Government found extremely
difficult to overcome, was that the environmentalist groups were able to link the low
level site in South Australia to the nation's intennediate-level waste, under the co
location option. This in turn was transferred into claims that such a repository, once
approved, could easily be upgraded to facilitate the importation of HLW and a
connection was made directly to the PRA project. 146 Subsequently, South Australians
were extremely concerned that their State would end up with the long-term burden
and responsibility for low, intennediate and perhaps even high-level international
radioactive waste. On Saturday 20 November 1999, The Advertiser again placed the
nuclear waste issue on its front page, this time with a heading "NOT IN OUR
BACKYARD". 147
Responding to the mounting political pressure, Coalition Premier John Olsen flatly
rejected any moves for a medium or high-level waste repository for SA and claimed
no knowledge of the increased likelihood that South Australia was d«: .itined to host a
repository for the returned ILW. He also wrote to the Fedeml Re·:ources Minister,
Nick Minchin, demanding consultation on the issue. 148 Minchin had been heavily
criticised by environmental NGO's and the media for failing to adequately consult
the public during the low-level waste site selection process. In support of its main
report, The Advertiser ran an editorial berating the Federal Minister for his lack of
openness on the nuclear waste 'dump' issue. It stated:
When will politicians in the nuclear waste case exemplified by Federal Resources
Minister and SA Senator Nick Minchin realise that without putting all the known facts
before the public they inevitably arouse resentment and opposition? i.9
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Minchin denied any failure to consult with the community and issued a press release
highlighting the withdrawal of two potential sites from the low-level site selection
list following community consultation. 150 However, his assertions that a selection
process for the 'medium1 level repository had not yet commenced was tempered by
his refusal to rule out co-location of a medium and low-level waste repository. 151
Hence anxiety among South Australians remained.
Mistrust of politicians was maintained and reinforced by continued reports in The
Advertiser and backed up with regular strong editorials. Public scepticism of nuclear

related issues was already high in South Australia, as a result of the British atomic
testing at Maralinga between 1953 and 1963. 152 British efforts to clean up the
Maralinga site were feeble, and all three attempts were unsuccessful. 153 The pollutant
of concern was plutoniwn, mainly isotope 239. 154 In 1985, a Royal Commission in
Australia estimated the cost of cleaning up the Maralinga test site at around $600
million. In 1991 Australia lodged a claim for Britain to share in the costs of
rehabilitating the site. 155 The prolonged dispute over liability and associated costs
kept the issue in the pul:.i• ..: domain and at the same time increased the public
perception of risk with all nuclear activities, and particularly in South Australia.
Criticism was also directed towards the Australian Federal Governn 1nt for not
conducting a proper clea.11 up of th� affected areas at Maralinga. Moreover,
opponents of the PRA project, including green groups, the State Labor Opposition,
and the media, rerutarly reminded the public of Maralinga during the PRA 156 and
national repository debates. 157 Senator Minchin accused the opponents of
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exaggerating the prob[ems at Maralinga to generate more fear over the proposed
national repository.
The other issue which compounded the problem for the national repository selection
process, and for PRA, is that the Federal Government continues to label Australian
waste arising from reprocessed spent-fuel rods as "intermediate level Category S". 158
In so doing, Australia is among the few nations in the world that does not apply the
widely adopted classification ofHLW to reprocessed nuclear waste. This disparity in
nuclear waste cl�sification amplified the mistrust of Australian government agencies
and lent credence to the anti-nuclear lobby's assertions that a national radioactive
waste 'dump' in South Australia was merely a stepping-stone to the international
repository for HLW. In defence of its classification system, the Australian Federal
Government and its agencies have argued that they have used the modified
international IAEA criteria published in the Safety Series No. 111-G-1.1 in 1994.159
ANSTO, for example, has argued on many occasions that the returned processed
waste will be below the specified heat range of2kW/m3 for HLW contained in the
1994 publication. The Safety Series does classify HLW as "thennal power above
about 2kW/m3 and long lived radionuclide concentrations exceeding limitations for
short lived waste," but the document it is only a guide, is not conclusive and it has
not been widely endorsed.
Moreover, it seems somewhat disingenuous for the Australian Federal Agencies to
single out only the quantitative heat specifications to support their labelling of long
lived intermediate level waste {LLIW). The IAEA guide also considers other
parameters for distinguishing boundaries, "such as the type of radionuclide, the
decay period and the conditioning techniques". 160 It also recommends geological
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disposal for the "long lived radionuclide concentrations exceeding limitations for
short lived wastes". It specifically states:
The suggested boundary levels for high level waste need not be distinct because of the
general consensus that a high degree of isolation is necessary for management of
radioactive wastes having very high concentrations of short and long lived
radionuclides. 161

In other words, the IAEA's internationally preferred method for the long-term
management of both LLIW and HLW is to s<;cure the waste in a deep geological
repository. During the Senate Committee inquiry into a new reactor at Lucas
Heights, a number of NGO's and the Sutherland Shire Council accused the Federal
Government of manipulating the classification categories to avoid using the more
contentious HLW label. Whatever the reason, instead of alleviating anxiety, the
dis crepancy surrounding the waste categories has served to increase the public
perception of mistrust in the management of radioactive waste. Furthermore, it raises
the pertinent question as to why the responsible Australian agencies do not adopt the
entire IAEA safety guide and include a geological repository for its LLIW which it
terms Category S.
Critics also raised the possibility that Australia might be tempted to seriously
consider the Pangea project in order to minimise the economic costs associated with
a fature repository for the higher category level waste. Environmentalists pointed to
the earlier released Phase Two, Site Selection Study, which made specific reference
to long-lived intermediate level radioactive waste Category S, to highlight their
concerns. 162 The report stated:
As mentioned in the project study group's Report on Public Comment Phase 1, the small
quantity of Category S waste in existence does not justify the construction of a deep
disposal facility at present. Deep underground co-disposal of radioactive waste of low
radiotoxicity and Category S radioactive waste would be expensive unless an existing
facility and infrastructure, such as an abandoned mine site, could be used. 163
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The situation was made more difficult for the Federal Minister, at a significant time
in the debate, by the direct involvement of the television media during July and
August 2000. The Adelaide branch of Channel Seven also acted as a major
amplification station for risk and fear of nuclear waste, when it organised funded and
drove the entire I'm with Ivy campaign. 164 The television network approached an 80year old pensioner, Ivy Skowronski, who had earlier gained public notoriety for her
efforts in seeking tougher laws for home invasion crimes. 165 Commencing in July,
momentum was maintained over a four-week period by the regular appearance of
high profile celebrities on the Today Tonight 166 progranune, all of whom supported
the populist Ivy crusade. The campaign culminated with a public rally organised by
Channel Seven, which attracted around 1500 vot'al protesters. 167 At the rally Ms
Skowronski claimed that 125,000 people had signed the petition opposing a
radioactive waste 'dump' in South Australia. On the steps of Parliament House and
struggling to be heard above the noise, Senator Minchin criticised the media for
generating unnecessary public fear and repeated his calls for a national storage
facility for low- level waste. Channel Seven also came under criticism by the ABC's
Media Watch for 11running a scare campaign" and for its lack of objectivity in not

reporting all the facts. 168
While the I'm with Ivy campaign was primarily directed at the national low-level
waste repository, the television network allowed the public to make the connection
that a national repository was merely a stepping-stone for PRA. This power of the
media to influence the repository debate was highlighted when Minchin was forced
to issue yet another media release to clarify government policy. He repeated the
Australian Government's position of rejecting nuclear waste from other nations and
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went on to criticise the fear campai gn. He said:
I have serious concerns that the I'm

with

fry campaign has led people to believe that it

could be possible that international high level waste would somehow be acceptable in
Australia, despite the I•ederal Gm·:imment's repeated public and private rejection of any
proposal to accept international waste. Such a campaign is deliberately designed to
promote fear and confusion about radioactive waste in the wider community . 169

Arguably, the media in this instance intensified the public perception of risk and
played a direct role in generating mistrust of the responsible agencies for managing
radioactive waste in Australia.
Senator Minchin's attempts to regain credibility by shifting the blame to the media
suffered a significant blow at the end of 2000. 170 On 26 December 2000, The
Advertiser informed the public that the previous Commonwealth Labor Government,

led by Paul Keating, had secretly moved 130 barrels of low to intennediate level
waste to Woomera, in South Australia, for storage in 1994. 171 At the same time, the
public also learned that the Commonwealth Government would grant licences to both
the Defence Department and CSIRO for the continual storage of the low and
intennediate level waste 11t Woomera. To add to the public mistrust surrounding the
secrecy, half of the waste was found to be of a higher category than originally
thought and was subsequently reclassified as intennediate level. 1 n The Advertiser
maintained its fervour with a forceful editorial, which condemned both Labor and
Liberal governments for their "dissimulating" behaviour on the issue of radioactive
waste. 173 In trying to make the point that the "little known presence of intennediate
level waste" had not harmed the state's image, Minchin heightened mistrust that a
precedent could now be set for the acceptance of the higher level waste arising from
spent fuel rods. 174 Whatever the reasons for their actions, the credibility of
governments and their agencies were significantly eroded by acts of secrecy and or
1 69
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by the upward reclassification of radioactive waste. Consequently, the increased
anxiety and mistrust of authority made it virtually impossible for progress to be made
in any site selection process for radioactive waste in Australia.
The Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2000
The debate in South Australia, while sharing some similarities with that in Western
Australia, was much more intense, and at times degenerated into heated exchanges
between State and Federal government ministers. Initially the Olsen Coalition
Government was reluctant to enact prohibitive waste legislation and rhose not to
support either of the nuclear waste bills introduced by the Democrats 175 or the
ALP 176 opposition. Olsen claimed that there were deficiencies in both bills, but did
not initiate amendments to strengthen the proposed legislation. When it finally
responded to the unrelenting public pressure by introducing its Nuclear Waste
Prohibition Bill, the Olsen Government placed itself in direct opposition to their
Federal Coalition colleagues, and particularly to fellow South Australian, Senator
Nick Minchin. 177 Undeterred by public sentiment, Minchin accused Oi.3en of being
misguided by responding to the anti-nuclear scaremongering, and he went on to say
that he could override state laws. In reply, Olsen stated his preparedness to mount a
High Court challenge to test the capacity of the Federal government to override the
state legislation. m In reality such a constitutional challenge would have little chance
of success, because under section 109 of the Federal Constitution when there is an
inconsistency between State and Federal law the latter prevails.
Notwithstanding the robust legal position, to achieve public approval and thus
political consensus for a radioactive waste site in South Australia remains difficult.
The Labor Opposition and the minor parties insisted on the inclusion of a referendum
provision in the South Australian legislation. The amendment was designed to trigger
a referendum if the Commonwealth moved to override the State law to establish a
mediwn or high level nuclear dump in South Australia. It was described as the
175
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ultimate nuclear deterrent and would have obvious political ramifications for any
Federal govenunent prepared to select South Australia for the national repository.
Not surprisingly the Olsen Government's opposition to the referendum provision was
described as weak, and opponents made claims that he was acting more to protect his
Federal colleagues than in the best interests of South Australia. The rest of the Bill,
however, did enjoy bipartisan support. Following the passing of the Bill in the
Legislative Assembly, the Olsen Government came under intense criticism for
postponing the debate on its own legislation, because it did not have the numbers to
defeat the referendum trigger amendment in the Legislative Council. 179 The mix up
over pairs at the end of the parliamentary session was a major embarrassment for
Olsen, and meant that debate on the legislation was postponed until the resumption
of Parliament in October 2000.
When the Bill finally passed through Parliament it did not include any mechanism
for a referendum. The South Australian legislation was very similar to the Western
Australian Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibitition) Act 1999. 180 It included the
$500,000 fine for a breach, but it also contained a $500m penalty for a corporate
breach. The Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2000 181 only permits
low-level waste to be stored in South Australia. It prohibits the importation or
transportation of all other nuclear waste into the State, as well as regulating against
the construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility. It prohibits public
money being spent on encouraging medium or HLW waste storage facilities, which
effectively prevents any government agency from even conducting feasibility
studies. 182 The intent of the legislation was not only to send a strong message to
PRA that it was not welcome, but also to signal to the Federal Government that any
radioactive waste other than low-level would have to be stored elsewhere in
Australia.
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When the Rann Labor Government was elected in South Australia, in March 2002, it
did not have the numbers in the Legislative Council to get its referendum trigger
legislation passed and had to abandon its plans. Adopting a different approach, the
State Government prepared legislation to declare the area around the Woomera site a
public park, in a bid to block the Federal plan for the national LLW repository. 183
The Federal Government responded by moving to acquire the land by using the
'urgency' provisions of the Lands Acquisition Act 1989. The Federal Government
claimed it was acting in the national interest by compulsorily acquiring site 40a to
locate the LLW reponitory. The State of SA instituted legal proceedings under the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, and argued that the
compulsory acquisition of the land was unlawful. In the State of South Australia v
Honourable Peter Slipper MP, the full bench of the Federal Court upheld the appeal

that the Federal Government had misused its powers by acquiring the site to prevent
the State Government declaring it a public park. 184 It ruled that the Federal
Government did not satisfy the 'urgent necessity' provisions of the Lands Acquisition
Act to acquire the land and the acquisition was therefore invalid. Subsequently, the
Federal Government abandoned its efforts to locate a LLW repository in SA, and has
since left the responsibility for LLW to each of the individual states. 185

Conclusion
The Pangea multinational repository project was somewhat ambitiou::; and premature,
in the sense that no other country has yet achieved an operating HLW repository.
Despite the economic benefits, the Australian public was not ready to accept the
unproven technology or the associated risks for such a long time into the future. PRA
failed to gain control of the debate following the initial controversy surrounding the
'secret agenda' allegations. PRA must also take responsibility for failing to provide
detailed convincing philosophical or social arguments to counter the f)Ublic's
perception of risk. The presence of PRA in Australia significantly intensified anxiety
among environmental NGO's and the broader community, which directly
complicated the national search for a low and intennediate-level waste repository
183

R. DiGirolamo, "Parkland Ploy for Dump Site." The Australian, Tuesday 3 June 2003 p7,
State ofSouth Australia v Honourable Peter Slipper MP, FCAFC [2004], 164.
5
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site. In tum the additional scrutiny and controversy surrounding the national site
selection process, combined with the contention over the classification of wastes in
Australia, fed back negatively into PRA's attempts to secure a multinational
repository in Australia.
The Australian media played an important role in alerting the public to the issues, but
on occasions also acted as an amplification station to intensify the public perception
of risks pertaining to nuclear waste. Its readiness to expose the 'secret plan' to import
'foreign' HLW commenced in Western Australia, but was surpassed by what can only
be described as a media frenzy in South Australia. The daily newspaper in South
Australia, The Advertiser, was an active participant and at times adopted an
aggressive stance. It was Channel Seven television in Adelaide, however, that
overstepped its role for direct commercial gain. In organising, funding and then
fuelling tht:: I'm with Ivy campaign, it lost all objectivity, when moving from
reporting and infonning the public to actively inciting oppositiot1 to repository sites.
In effect the media's active involvement, particularly in South Australia <luring the
'twin repository debates,' frustrated both PRA attempts to secure a multinational
HLW repository and the Australian Government's efforts to locate a national LLW
site.
In addition, the heightened perception of risk was exacerbated by a mistrust of
authority, which stemmed directly from the dissimulative actions of various
governments and associated agencies involved in radioactive waste management in
Australia. Arguably, the main challenge facing ,my future attempts to secure a
national, multinational or regional repository will be the necessity to achieve public
confidence in the geological contairunent concept to offset the public perception of
risk associated with all things nuclear. The next chapter explores the repository
concept through the lens of global public goods theory, with an emphasis on the issue
of risk perception. It seeks to broaden the security arguments for geological
repositories and explores the set of circumstances most likely to engender
governmental support.
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CHAPTER FOUR

MULTINATI ON AL REPOSITORIES: AN ACIDEVABLE
PUBLIC GOOD OR A RISKY PROPOSITION?
The long-term management of HLW and its associated risks present a significant
policy challenge for nation states to resolve. There are essentially two policy options.
The first is that each nation state is responsible for the management of all radioactive
waste wi,\in its territorial borders. 1 The second is a multinational solution involving
interstate relations on either a regional or a broader international level. 2 The second
option, most suited to the smaller nuclear states, would involve tbree3 or more
nations using a shared repository for HLW in a voluntary host state.4 The
collaborative option is similar to Pangea Resources Australia's (PRA) 'voluntary host
concept', in that a multinational repository requires a voluntary host state. The PRA
project raised many political, legal and moral questions in Australia. It was from the
outset a commercial venture, with the primary aim of securing a profit, while
providing a 'desirable service•,5 but it failed on a number of fronts to achieve public
acceptance.
In terms of providing a global public good there were two main failings with the
PRA proposal. Firstly, it was destined to receive only 20 per cent of the world's
HLW, which is too small a percentage to enhance overall global security. Secondly,
all responsibility for the repository would have reverted to Australia following
closure after forty years.6 Thus it was hardly surprising that the arguments for a
single multinational repository, as a means of improving global security, did little to

th..:

I This was
pr1:;i.tic,n taken by the Australian Government in its response to the Pangea Project. See
N. Minchin, "Questions without Notice: Nuclear Waste Storage." Australian Parliamentary Debates,
Senate, 18 October 1999, p9813.
2
M. EIBaradei, "Towards a Safer World." The Economist (US) (2003) p48.
3
A third possibility could result in two countries collaborating under a bilateral arrangement but that
would provide only direct benefits for the two involved and it is not discussed here.
4
C. McCombie & N. Chapman, "SAPIERR Proposal for a Pilot Study on European Regional
Repositories." AR/US Newsletter 4 (May 2003) p2.
� Access Economics. "The Economic Impact of the Nuclear Waste Repository Project." Canberra:
Draft Report, prepared for Pangea Resources by Access Economics, 1998.
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convince the Australian public or its political leaders of the merits of such an
ambitious proposal. In particular, the appeal for Australia to become a 'good global
citizen' by accepting other countries' HL W failed to resonate with the community.7
As a result of the recent heightened danger of global terrorism, there is now greater
public awareness of the potential for catastrophic radioactive fallout from a strike
involving nuclear materials.8 Nuclear experts and state leaders acknowledge the risk
associated with surface storage of HLW in numerous locations around the world.
Thus there is an opportunity to engage the global community in a rational debate
about safeguarding each nation's HLW in order to enhance global security and
increase environmental protection.
The previous chapter detailed some of the reasons why the Pangea multinational
repository project failed in Australia. This chapter applies public goods theory to the
multinational repository concept to evaluate its strengths and to identify the likely set
of circumstances required to bring such a proposal to fruition. There are two separate
scenarios in which a multinational repository would provide a public good. In the
first, a group of states agree to collaborate to construct and operate a single
repository. Under that arrangement the states involved would originate from the
same geographical area, and would pool resources to maximise the benefits. Suitable
geology to safely isolate the waste,9 and economies of scale to reduce costs, appear
to be the biggest incentives for regional collaboration and are likely to be most
beneficial to the smaller nuclear states. There would also be regional security
benefits obtained from safeguarding each country's HLW in a single repository
within the region. This would therefore count as a 'regional public good1.
The second scenario involves a more comprehensive solution for safeguarding the
totality of the world's HLW. If the global security benefits are added to the
7

R. McGregor, "Dumper Sells What No One's Buying." The Australian, 12 December 1998, plO.
The Future Foundation. "Public Attitudes to the Future Management of Radioactive Waste in the
UK." Report for United Kingdom Nirex Limited, February 2002 plO. [hereinafter, The Future
Foundation, 2002}.
9
I. Miller, J. Black, C. McCombie, D. Pentz & P. Zuidema, "High-Isolation Sites for Radioactive
Waste Disposal: A Fresh Look at the Challenge of Locating Safe Sites for Radioactive Rep ositories."
Paper presented at the Waste Mana gement '99 Conference, Tucson, 3 March 1999 p2.
8
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geological and economies of scale arguments, then it follows that ideally the entire
global inventory of HLW should be safeguarded from theft or diversion and from
terrorist attacks. A single HLW repository with limited capacity (such as in the first
scenario) would only marginally reduce the potential for global surface terrorist
strikes. It would not greatly restrict the likelihood of rogue states obtaining and
utilising weapons grade materia1 10 from spent fuel to manufacture atomic weapons. If
the second more comprehensive scenario were to be pursued, the best option for
reducing risks and enhancing world safety and security is to move the HLW to a
limited number of strategic locations. 11 This truly global solution, while more

difficult to achieve, would maximise the security benefits for a larger number of
nation states. It would involve the construction of at least three, possibly four,
regional repositories, which could form a 'global network of multinational
repositories'.
Although desirable in terms of security, aiming for the more comprehensive solution
first may be counter productive. The involvement of a larger number of states makes
consensus more difficult to achieve. State leaders in Europe could quickly
complement existing efforts by the Association for Regional and International
Underground Storage (ARIUS) 12 and Support Action for a Pilot Initiative for
European Regional Repositories (SAPIERR). 13 These two organisations have pooled

resources to undertake a feasibility study for a multinational repository in Europe. 14

State support would provide a stimulus to the ongoing research, and direct state
involvement would likely accelerate the process and maximise the chance of success.
An operating regional repository, providing environmental, economic, and safety and
security benefits, would serve as an example, and could form the model for regional
repositories in other parts of the world.
In addition to seeking to uncover incentives for states to cooperate, this chapter
argues the case for monitored retrievable underground repositories (MRUR) as a
10

P. Webster, "Minatom: Thr Grab for Trash." Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 58 (2002) pp37 & 66.
niereinafter, Webster, 2002].
I Ibid.
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means of reducing public perceptions of risk. The reason for recommending
underground repositories is to remove the potential for an aircraft attack, while a
comprehensive ongoing monitoring system would assist in gaining the necessary
public confidence in the safety features of geological repositories, and leave open the
option for future technological advancement. The MRUR is a variation of Kristin
Shrader-Frechette's recom.-nendation for monitored retrievable surface storage,15
which was advanced well before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The
retrievable option should alleviate anxiety with the out-of-sight out-of-mind closed
repository approach, and should also increase the likelihood of achieving overall
public acceptance. The MRUR concept would apply to either the regional repository
or t o the more 'inclusive network' of global repositories.
Global Public Goods

The concept of public goods is not new, having gained recognition in the 181h century
by Adam Smith. In his treatise The Wealth of Nations, Smith, while maintaining the
desire for minimal govenunent intervention in the market, advanced the importance
of good roads, canals and navigable rivers to facilitate economic growth. 16 He and
other social theorists acknowledged the concept of the government collecting taxes in
exchange for the provision of protection or defence. A secure environment enabled
traders, merchants, labourers and consumers to effectively conduct business in an
orderly, peaceful fashion. 17 Smith made a clear distinction between private goods
more efficiently provided by the market, and certain goods best left to the provision
of government for the benefit of all.
In 1954, Paul Samuelson's rather technical article 'The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure' advanced the debate on public goods. Samuelson, although not using
the specific tenns, introduced 'non-excludability' and 'non-rivalry' as the central
characteristics that distinguish a private good from a pure public good. He defined
public goods as:
15

K. Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case against Geological Disposal of
Nuclear Waste. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993 p213. [hereinafter, Shrader
Frechette, 1993].
16
A. Smith, The Wealth ofNations. Hannondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1982 p251. First published
in 1776.
17 Jbidp497.
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Collective consumption goods which all enjoy in common in the sense that each
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other
individual's consumption of that good. 18

This non-rivalry component implies that any one person's consumption of the public
good has no effect on the amount of it available for others. A traffic control light is a
prime example: a pedestrian crossing a street with the assistance of a traffic signal in
no way inhibits another pedestrian from also using it. 19 Samuelson contrasted the
optimal competitive market pricing arrangements for private goods with the sub
optimal arrangements available for the cost of providing collective consumption
goods.20 In other words, once a public good is produced and paid for, it is non
excludable, which means that it is either impossible or extremely costly to exclude
those who do not pay for the good from using it. Again, the traffic control signal is
non-excludable because once it is produced and properly installed its benefits accrue
to all.21 It would be completely impractical to attempt to prevent people who did not
pay for it from using it.
Two issues linked to the theory of public goods that need to be managed effectively
are free riding and externalities. Free riding is directly associated with the non
excludable characteristic of public goods and refers to a lack of incentive for
consumers to meet the cost of supplying the good.22 If a public good is to be funded
by taxation, there is the obvious tendency for individuals either to vote for tax
reductions or to attempt to pay less tax, without limiting their expectation to benefit
from the collective good. Thus a free rider problem unresolved usually results in the
under-provision of the public good. "Externalities arise when an individual or a finn
takes an action but does not bear all the costs (negative externality) or all the benefits

18

P. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." The Review ofEconomics and Statistics
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Prospects." Prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden: Institute of Development Studies
Sussex, 2001 plS. [hereinafter, Sagasti & Bezanson, 2001}.

111

(positive externality) of the action". 23 Positive externalities and free riding are
essentially the same, since the benefits accrue to persons who did not contribute to
the costs. Negative externalities are such things as air, water, and noise pollution, the
unwanted by-products of particular industrial or conununity activities. In the nuclear
energy industry goverrunent and management have gone to great lengths to minimise
negative externalities. Nuclear accidents such as the Windscale fire in the UK in
1957, the meltdown of the Three Mile Island reactor in the US in 1979, and the
Chernobyl disaster in the Ukraine in 1986, are examples of undesirable by-products
of the nuclear industry.
Few goods are purely public or purely private. Most goods involve a mix of public
and private benefits and costs, requiring perhaps some fonn of combined funding
arrangements to produce the good or to remedy negative externalities.24 Pure public
goods are rare; examples include clean air, unpolluted waters, public sanitation,
financial stability, and public peace and security. Some goods that the market is
unable to provide include various kinds of infrastructure, health services, and disease
prevention control, and (something which the market itself depends on) law and
order.
While Samuelson's article (the main argument of which was in algebra), failed to
resonate within government or throughout the wider community, only a few years
later John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society did.25 Galbraith cautioned against
over-reliance on the free market, which could have the detrimental effect of
producing 'private wealth amidst public squalor'. He was in effect warning against
the dangers of under-supplying public goods. His famous example of the
undesirability of driving expensive cars down badly paved, uncleaned, unpoliced
public streets struck a chord, and demonstrated the need for more collective funding
for roads and the provision of other public goods.26
23 I. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M Stem. "Defining Global Public Goods," in Global Public Goods:
Internation al Cooperation in the 2lst Century, edited by I. Kaul. I. Grunberg & M. Stern. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1999 p5. {hereinafter, Kaul, Grunberg & Stern, 1999].
2.4 H. Stretton & L. Orchard, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Theoretical
Foundations ofthe Contemporary Attack on Government. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994 p72.
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Despite the terminology, it would be incorrect to assume th...t the provision and
funding of public goods is solely the responsibility of government. The goods are
deemed 'public' because of the nature of the benefits and/or costs, not because of who
produced or funded them.27 The magnitude and complexity of some public goods
makes it impossible to rely exclusively on government funding for their provision.
There has therefore sometimes been a reliance on financial contributions from
private sources, including profit and non-profit organisations and individuals.28
Assistance or direct provision of public goods by non-profit organisations is not new.
Various individual and community groups have actively participated in that regard,
with volunteer fire fighting being a well-known example. For certain public goods,
costs are borne directly by the users or beneficiaries, a method Ferroni refers to as
11

internalising externalities".29 That method of funding goods or services is similar to

the user pays system, but in the case of a public good the benefits usually extend
beyond those that paid to provide it. Recently the private sector has become more
involved in the provision of public goods, usually by way of combined funding
arrangements. Public-private partnerships are now commonplace around the world
in providing public goods such as energy, water, health and education. 30
Modernity and globalisation have produced many benefits around the world but have
simultaneously brought about substantial risks that can only be resolved through
collective global action.3 1 The use of nuclear fission for generating electricity has
benefited many people by powering industry, helping to create more jobs,
contributing to economic growth and providing modem domestic comforts. But the
risk of radioactive dispersal from reactors and nuclear waste is a by-products of the
technology that has to be carefully managed. Ulrich Beck defines this phenomenon
of risk as a "systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and
27 M. Carbone, "Global Public Goods: A New Frontier in Development Policy?" The Courier ACP
EU (March-April 2002) p38.
28
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Development Banks, Washington, 19 February 2002 p13. [hereinafter, Ferroni 2002].
30
D. Rondinelli, "Partnering for Development: Government-Private Sector Cooperation in Service
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11-13 December 2002.
31
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introduced by modernisation itself'.32 Many public goods can be obtained by
removing uncertainty and eliminating or reducing risks that are harmful to society at
large. It follows that an elimination or reduction of certain risks such as radioactive
fallout is a public good. If the benefits were available beyond national borders it
would be considered a regional or global public good only.33
The concept of public goods has only recently been applied to the global arena, in
response to rising policy challenges stemming from globalisation. In 1986
Kindleberger 34 made an early contribution to the debate, and a decade later Sandler35
also observed that there was an undersupply of public goods at the international
level. Some of the issues Sandler highlighted as requiring collective global responses

are global warming, ozone depletion and nuclear waste containment.36 Sandler has
since written extensively on the issue of global and regional public goods and has
recently added transnational terrorism to the list requiring collective action.37 The
debate on the need for collective action to resolve transnational issues was advanced
with the publication of Global Public Goods in 1999, which p rovided policy analysts

with a new tool to confront the shortcomings of globalisation.38 The editors, Kaul,
Grunberg and Stem, with the backing of the United Nations Development
Programme, advocated a broad conceptual framework of examining global policy
challenges through the lens of a global public good. The authors maintained the
existing non-rivalry and non-exclusionary definition of public goods, and provided

an analysis of the externality and free rider problems.39 Global public goods arise

when the benefits, or costs in the case of a public bad, spill across national borders
and can be captured or resolved only by the collective action of states.
31
lhid.
33
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In their introductory chapter, Kaul, Grunberg and Stem defined global public goods
as:
Outcomes (or intermediate products) that tend towards universality in the sense that
they benefit all countries, population groups and generations. At a minimum, a global
public good would meet the following criteria: its benefits extend to more than one
group of coW1tries and do not discriminate against any population group or any set of
generations, present or future.40

Applying the above definition of global public goods to multinational HLW
repositories shows that the "benefits must extend to mxe than one group of countries
and must not discriminate against any population group or any set of generations,
present or future 11 •41
Regional Public Goods
International public goods fall into two categories, global or regional, the latter being
defined by a more limited geographical reach of the benefits supplied. The benefits
of pure regional public goods are 'non-excludable' (no country in the region can be
excluded from benefiting) and 'non-rival' (one country's consumption does not
subtract from the amount available to other countries in the region). 42 In reality, very
few regional public goods are strictly confined to a specific geographical region;
most are mixed, providing a combination of national and transnational benefits.
Similarly, regional public bads such as pollution extend across national borders, to
impact on neighbouring or adjacent nation-states. The extent of the spillover benefits
or harms determines whether the public good is deemed regional or global. An
industrial accident dispersing pollutants across a number of national borders in a
specific geographical area would be a regional public bad. A coordinated regional
health programme to contain or eradicate contagious disease provides a regional
public good.43 The benefits from disease prevention in a region will have some
degree of spillover effects in the global sphere by protecting the broader human
population as well as avoiding potentially costly remedies.

40
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Identifying the factors likely to promote collective action to provide regional or
global public goods can be problematic. Sandler illustrates some factors that promote
collective action at the transnational level. These include:
the removal of wicertainty, a high share of nation-specific benefits, a limited number of
essential participants and the presence of an influential leader state.44

The rationale for regional or global public goods is that collectively the benefits to
participating states are greater than they would be if the states acted alone. States
were compelled into collective action to reduce ozone-depleting substances under the
1987 Montreal Protocol.45 The same level of commitment or cooperation is yet to be
achieved to mitigate global warming under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 46 Some of the
large industrial states, such as the US, argue that the cost of reducing greenhouse
gases is much higher to them than the benefits from doing so. That position may
change sometime in the future, but essentially the benefits of putting measures in
place to reduce greenhouse gases must be seen by each state to outweigh the
associated costs.
Similarly, the problem for proponents of multinational repositories is that the costs
may be perceived to be much greater than the benefits. The costs are not necessarily
financial, and in many instances there are direct monetary advantages to be gained
from utilising a shared repository. Support for the multinational repository has been
slow, with some reluctance to even discuss the option among many states struggling
to implement national repositories. The main concern, most evident at the European
Nuclear Society's 1999 Topseal conference,47 was that any dialogue regarding taking
someone else's HLW could run the risk of undennining the step by step, transparent,
'bottom up' approach necessary for public confidence building at the national level.48
Sweden, Finland and France are opposed to the 1shared1 concept and have enacted
43
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specific legislation prohibiting the import of nuclear waste.49 The UK, Gennany,
Australia and Argentina are also opposed to the concept, while the US, Japan, Spain,
Canada and South Africa remain neutral on the issue, and a ppear to be keeping the
option open,50 Indeed proponents of the multinational repository are keen to
emphasise what they call a 'dual track' approach. They highlight the fact that research
into the shared option does not impact on or inhibit a national solution and they argue
the benefits of keeping both options open.
The public and many leaders still perceive the greatest costs to be the risks from the
relatively poorly understood and as yet empirically unverifiable features of
geological repositories. 51 An examination of the literatwe also reveals a large
confidence gap between the nuclear experts and the public, on the environmental and
safety benefits of geological repositories. 52 Each nuclear state has experienced
varying degrees of community opposition to repository siting. The likelihood of
implementing HLW repositories largely depends on achieving greater public trust,
understanding and support. 53 The necessary public confidence will be achieved only
if the environmental, safety and security benefits are clearly articulated, and if such
logical arguments can overcome the initial and in many cases prolonged scepticism.
It is evident that the proponents of the HLW repository concept have failed, thus far,
to convince the public that the benefits of geological disposal are greater and more
desirable than the risks of surface storage. One reason is that much of the debate
occurs only between technical experts at conferences and through academic journals.
Even when the environmental safety benefits are highlighted in a public forum,54 the
popular press often neglects to adequately report them. Instead, as demonstrated in
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the Pangea case, the media often pick up on key phrases or uses emotive words like
nuclear waste 'dump' that significantly help shape public perception of risks.55
Yet leaving the HLW at interim surface storage facilities in numerous locations
around the globe poses a security risk. There are widely differing views on what is
meant by human security, ranging from aspirations for the elimination of poverty to
substantial improvements in human rights, to the prevention of ecological disasters
and transboundary pollution.56 Here we are concerned only with the need to
safeguard the world's HLW in order to protect humans from any environmental
impacts, from the threat of weapons proliferation, or from what may be the more
immediate threat of terrorism. Under certain circumstances multinational repositories
have the potential to provide environmental, economic and security benefits at a
regional or global level. The elimination or reduction of risks associated with the
existing and widespread surface storage of HLW would enhance the global public
good of human security. Reducing the number of global surface sites, and shifting
the waste to centralised facilities would diminish the risk of theft or diversion of
weapons useable material,57 while isolating the HLW in underground repositories
would provide enhanced security from more specific risks such as terrorist attacks.

Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Threat
As stated already, peace and security are pure public goods, and once achieved
within a region, all people living there freely enjoy its benefits. Historically, nationM
states have often actively cooperated on a range of security issues in order to achieve
and maintain peace and stability for all. Because of proliferation concerns,
international efforts to ensure the peaceful use of atomic energy have remained a
high priority in international relations since the commencement of the atomic age.
After World War Two, attempts were made to regulate against nuclear weapons
5s R. McGregor, "Black Stump Nuke Dump." The Australian, Wednesday 2 December 1998 p5; B.
Hurrell, "A 'Great Place' for Nuclear Waste: State Promoted as Dump Site." The Advertiser,
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Times, 4 April 1999, pl & 4; P. Coorey & B. Huppatz, "Coming to a Dump Near You." The
Advertiser, Friday 19 November 1999 ppl & 4.
s6 G. King & C. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security." Political Science Quarterly 116 (2001/02)
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proliferation, while at the same time, nuclear technology for the peaceful production
of civil energy creation was pennitted.58 In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)59 was signed, and although not perfect it was a bargain between the
nuclear weapons and non-weapons states. The non-weapons states agreed not to
pursue a weapons programme in exchange for nuclear materials and technology for
energy creation. Around 187 nation-states have signed the NPT, and while it has
been largely successful in containing the spread of nuclear weapons, it is now
evident that much more needs to be done to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and
to safeguard weapons grade material in an ever-changing world.
The attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington sent shock waves
across America and other western nation states.60 Those terrorist strikes evaporated
the West's sense of security based on its economic stability and military power.61 The
main threats against states and world security in contemporary times are organised
crime networks, nationalist and religious extremisms, and global terrorism. 62 The
latter appears to present the greatest challenge, and it thrives amidst ,:ollapsed or
failed states and political and economic malaise. hnmediately after the attacks of
September 2001, the US responded with a promise to track down the perpetrators,
and they embarked on a concerted effort against global terrorism. The chief suspects
were Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network, and the US commenced bombing
Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, in an effort to capture bin Laden and destroy his
strongholds. Despite executing a swift war, the US was unable to seize bin Laden, or
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the war on terror. A subsequent bombing in Bali,
on 12 October 2002, killed 202 people and illustrated the ongoing danger from acts
of terror in many parts of the world.
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Far from eliminating global terrorism, since the 'war on terror' began there has been a
suicide bombing on a hotel near Mombasa in November 2002, triple bombings in
Riyadh in May 2003, 63 and car bombings at the Marriott Hotel Jakarta on 5 August
2003, and in Istanbul on 15 November 2003. There has also been the notorious train
bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004 that killed 191 people, and another car
bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004.64 All of
these resulted in the tragic loss of life, and the attacks were claimed by terrorists with
links to al Qaeda. The reason for mentioning these horrific acts here is to illustrate
the complexity of the problem and to demonstrate the new level of terror threat.
There are diverging views on how best to contain terrorism, with some advancing the
argument that significant gains have been made65 while others argue that the war on
terror may have inadvertently increased the further risk of terrorism. 66 There can
however be no doubt of the continuous risk and the need for all nuclear states to
update their nuclear policies from those designed during the Cold War to what is
required to meet the new level of security threat.
In 2001, the British Security Services listed the main terrorist threats in the UK as a
possible nuclear attack and a biological or chemical attack o n the London
Underground. In response to the new level of threat in the US, Congress allocated a
record sum of $1.5 billion in the budget of 2002 to be spent on terrorism related
research.67 Following a full reassessment of a range of goverrunent, public, and
industrial practices, leaders in many states became acutely aware of the need to better
safeguard existing nuclear materials. In October 200 I at a European meeting of
MEP's in Strasbourg, time was set aside to debate safety at nuclear sites. In
November 2001, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei has said that:
The ruthlessness of the September 11 attacks bas alerted the world to the potential of
nuclear terrorism making it far more likely that terrorists could target nuclear facilities,
nuclear material and radioactive sources worldwide. The willingness of terrorists to
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sacrifice their lives to achieve their e vil aims creates a new dimension in the fight
against terrorism. We are not just dealing with the possibility of governme n ts diverting
nu clear materials into clandestine weapons programs. Now we have been alerted to the
potential of terrorists targeting nuclear facilities o r using radioactive sources to incite
panic , contaminate property, and even cause injury or death among civilian

populations.68

There is now a renewed focus on the risk of nuclear terrorism among some leaders
and within academia and various organisations. Charles Ferguson and William Potter
of the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, in Monterey, illustrate four main threats
from nuclear terrorism. These are:
1. Thetheft and denotation of an in tact nuclear weapon
2. The theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of
a crude nuclear weapon- an i mprovised nuclear device (IND)
3. Attacks against and sabotage of nuclear faciliti es, in particular nuclear power
plants, causing the release oflarge amounts ofradioactivity
4. The unauthorized acquisition ofradioactive materials contributing to the fabrication
and deto nation of a radiological dispersion device
radiation emission device (RED).69

(RDD) - a "dirty bomb" or -

The first two involve nuclear explosions that would cause great panic and could
potentially result in many fatalities. The first two therefore present the greatest
anxiety to those responsible for maintaiP.ing security. Ferguson and Potter maintain
that the US and other nuclear states "must work immediately to remove the
probability of nuclear terror acts with the highest consequences and mitigate the
consequences of the nuclear terror acts that are the most probable".70 The authors
argue the case for securing, consolidating and eventually eliminating all the world's
highly enriched uranium, as well as the need to maximise security around all global
plutonium stocks. Their solution is ambitious and challenging and would most
certainly require the active involvement of the leading nuclear states.
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Graham Allison, from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard University, is highly critical of current nuclear policy and the inadequate
response by government to the heightened level ofthreat.71 He asserts that a nuclear
terrorist attack is inevitable if the US and the other states maintain their current
course. He further argues, however, that such an ultimate catastrophe is preventable.
His solution requires all nuclear weapons and the materials that they can be made
from to be secured to a new 11gold standard".72 This would need to be backed up by a
global clean-out of all fissile material that cannot be 'locked down' to the 'gold
standard'. The global endeavour of locking down all fissile material would require a
strong commitment and drive from the most influential nuclear states to achieve that
particular global public good. Allison acknowledges the risks from attacks on nuclear
facilities and on what he describes as the 1softer target' of spent fuel ponds.73 A
concentrated effort to safeguard all nuclear materials, including spent fuel and HLW,
is also required to enhance global and regional security. Multinational repositories
may well become part of the overall policies required to maximise public security.
Post September 11, all nuclear states undertook a major revaluation of security for a
range of nuclear installations. Evidence from the US illustrates the existing
precarious situation and the fact that much needs to be done to improve nuclear
security. Only hours after the attacks, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) quickly moved to reassure officials and the public that the containment
structures of nuclear reactors were designed to withstand the impact of a fully loaded
jumbo jet. Just over a week later, the agency had to retract its earlier overly
optimistic statement, and admit that the structures were only designed to withstand

the force from much smaller aircraft.74 A large aircraft attack that penetrated the
walled structures of a reactor could cause the core to go critical, similar to what

occurred following the Chernobyl accident in 1986. A reactor could also be attacked
by an act of sabotage involving conventional explosives, but this would most likely
require insider assistance. A damaging attack on the cooling system, resulting in a
71
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loss of water, could cause the core to overheat and possibly result in meltdown,
releasing large quantities of radioactive material into the atmosphere.75
Following the heightened level of terror threat, the NRC did call for a review of
security measures at nuclear facilities. Although the details are considered sensitive,
it is believed that the main areas l!nder review concern the most highly radioactive
material and includes nuclear reactor sites. 76 The owners and operators of the nuclear
power plants and the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's primary trade
association, argue that the reactors are the most secure commercial facilities in the
US. Yet critics, such as Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute, reject such
optimistic assertions and refers to a "culture of denial 11 that has penneated the nuclear
industry for many. decades.77 Others have expressed alarm at the apparent
unwillingness of the NRC to upgrade its 25 year old "design basis threat11 to match
the terrorist threat to nuclear installations. A regular critic of US homeland security,
Democrat Congressman Edward Markey, released a report in March 2002 outlining a
number of security gaps at nuclear reactor sites.78 The report analysed around 100
pages of NRC correspondence, in response to several letters of inquiry by Markey.
Among the main areas of criticism are that the NRC does not know how many
foreign nationals are employed at nuclear reactors, and that it does not require
adequate background checks that would detennine past terrorist links.79 Of the 21
nuclear reactors located within five miles of an airport in the US, only four per cent
of them were designed with some regard for light aircraft impact. Despite these
obvious weaknesses, the NRC has rejected the need to install anti-aircraft capabilities
at reactor sites. so
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In a critical report in 2003 the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) described the Bush
Administration's efforts on homeland security as swprisingly lax and inadequate. 81
By using a letter grading system with the highest score A equal to four points, the US
Administration only received an overall average of D for a host of potentially
vulnerable security related areas. Yet, significantly, the nuclear industry and
particularly the NRC attained the highest grade A for the security of nuclear power
plants.82 While commendable for providing some additional on-site security, the
NRC places a heavy reliance on probability statistics, and is not required to conduct
aircraft impact evaluations prior to licensing nuclear reactors. Thus although a heavy
aircraft attack on a nuclear reactor may be classified in statistical terms as a low
probability risk, the consequences from such an incident occurring could be
devastating and should no longer be dismissed as purely theoretical or improbable.
The security of other nuclear materials did not rate as high, with the PPI advocating
the need for far greater attention to secure the large n umber of licensed sources of
radioactive materials in the US. This concern stems from the over 250 reports of lost
or stolen nuclear materials in the US each year, although the majority of these
materials are recovered.83
While much of the initial focus in the aftennath of 11 September 2001 surrounded
the security of nuclear reactors, the vulnerability of spent fuel in cooling ponds may
well be a much greater concern. 84 When the majority of today's reactors were
designed and built in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was envisaged that the spent fuel
would be reprocessed and the uranium and plutonium extracted and recycled. The
spent fuel ponds were designed to hold only around 200 tons of fuel for a 1,000megawatt reactor, which would require 20 to 27 tons being removed from the core
each year and placed in the cooling ponds.85 The ponds were never expected to reach
81
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anywhere near capacity because the cooled fuel rods were intended to be sent for
reprocessing. The option of recycling spent fuel rods is limited because reprocessing
occurs mainly in the UK, France and the Soviet Union, with the US and others opting
for direct disposal after a period of storage. And because of delays in implementing
pennanent storage or geological disposal sites, the nuclear industry has been forced
into higher-density spent fuel storage, in ponds designed to hold much less.
The main danger to highly stacked ponds would be posed by a loss of water, which
could occur following a terrorist attack or a less sophisticated act of sabotage on the
cooling system. 86 If this were to occur, convective air-cooling would not be sufficient
to prevent a rise in temperature in densely packed ponds. Recently discharged spent
fuel can heat up rapidly and to the point where the zircaloy fuel cladding catches fire,
releasing the volatile fuel's fission products.87 It is easier to maintain lower density
ponds, even though an act of aggression could still occur during the required cooling
stage of fifty years or more. If a direct hit occurred during that time, the lower
number of fuel rods would result in much less radioactivity being emitted into the
airstream. To overcome the curient overcrowding problem, nuclear states should
move quickly to secure more pennanent facilities to safeguard their spent fuel over
many generations. The nuclear industry's preferred option of underground geological
repositories has the clear advantage over surface storage in virtually eliminating the
potential for surface air strikes.
The nuclear states engaged in reprocessing spent fuel rods are France, the UK and
Russia, who all have the additional security concern of safeguarding the highly active
liquid waste (HAL}88 extract from the reprocessing process. The waste is a
concentrated solution of fission products in nitric acid and includes caesium-137. It is
classified as HLW and has to be constantly cooled to prevent boiling. In the UK the
liquid waste is stored in above-ground storage tanks at Sellafield, in a complex
known as 8215. There are twenty-one tanks, seven of which are kept empty to
86
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enable the speedy transfer of liquid in the event of an emergency. 89 The method and
quantity of HAL stored at Sellafield is a high order safety and security consideration.
The issue has received more public attention since the heightened terror threat at the
end of 2001. Yet the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) has been concerned
with the build up of HAL for some time and in 1995 published a report dealing with
the issues. The NII stated in the report that a commercial aircraft could breach the
concrete structure of the 8215 facility and penetrate one of the tanks, resulting in a
release of high-level waste to the environment. Gordon Thompson the executive
director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, has been a consistent critic of the HAL storage facilities at Sellafield.
Thompson maintains that the NII did not consider the effects of the fuel air explosion
that would accompany a direct hit from a commercial aircraft.90 He further contends
that the NII did not consider the implications of such an attack on the cooling or
containment of the HAL in the surrounding tanks.91 Thompson provides the
following alarming scenario:
The initial breaching of one or more liquid HLW tanks, and the accompanying fuel-air
explosion and fire, would create severe radioactive contamination of the Sellafield site.
The resulting radiation fields could preclude actions needed to provide cooling and
containment of liquid HLW in other tanks in the 8215 facility. Then, over a period of
days, these tanks would boil dry, after which the solid residue in the tanks would heat
up and release volatile radioisotopes including caesium-137 to the atmosphere. The
eventual release of caesium-137 to the atmosphere might exceed 50 per cent of the
inventory in the tanks, The present inventory is about 8 million TBq (2,400 kilograms).
Thus the release of caesium-137 to the atmosphere might exceed 4 million TBq (1,200
92

kilograll15).

The situation is particularly disconcerting because of the high concentration of
nuclear materials at Sellafield and because of the condensed geographical nature of
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surrounding counties and nation-states. 93 To compound the problem, BNFL has
encountered availability shortfalls with its two-vitrification lines, having only
achieved an average 34 per cent production capacity from 1991 until 2001. In 1999,
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) was extremely critical of BNFL for the
ongoing delays in solidifying the HAL. 94 Delays in the vitrification process were
attributed to blocked pipes, faulty equipment and other technical difficulties. The NII
has directed BNFL to reduce the build up of the liquid waste to a buffer stock by
2015, but as of February 2000 it was yet to be convinced that the target would be
met.95
In an effort to rectify the problem, BNFL commissioned a third vitrification line,
specifically designed to overcome the problems associated with lines one and two.
Yet the construction, testing and operational phase of the third line is well behind
schedule, and as of June 2C04 is still not in the planned production phase. Ironically,
in its 2003 Annual Review, BNFL claimed that it was "overcoming the throughput
challenges experienced on the old vitrification lines".96 That was a record year, with
the target of 250 containers to store exceeded by 83, one above the previous record.
Despite highlighting the 'record', the review makes no mention of the third
vitrification line. There is little information available on the company's website
regarding the third line. The waste management conference held in Oxford, during
September 2003, was noticeable for the absence of presentations or infonnation
regarding the vitrification plant. A paper presented at the Oxford conference did
reveal, however, that there was still 1500m 3 of concentrated HAL in the 21 tanks. 97
That quantity is virtually the same as it was in 1999, which shows that little progress
has been made. BNFL claims to be focused on resolving the problem but even if it
meets its target by 2015, and reduces the HAL to the required buffer stock of200m3,
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the vitrified waste will remain in above ground storage for the foreseeable future.
While much safer than the existing large quantities of HAL, surface storage is only
an interim solution and is far from ideal in tenns of reducing the risks from terrorism.
Another security concern is the risk of terrorists using a dirty bomb. The so-called
'dirty bomb' is a crude device that consists of conventional explosives such as
dynamite, or semtex, and some radioactive material.98 It is not in the strictest sense a
nuclear weapon but the intent of its potential explosion is to disperse the radioactive
material into the atmosphere.99 The dose of radiation exposure would depend on the
quantity of radioactive material used and the location and size of the bomb. The
impact on humans would be greater in densely populated areas. Frank Barnaby, a
nuclear physicist, maintains that if a 'dirty bomb' were to explode the exposure dose
levels would be relatively smalt. 100 He acknowledges however that its main impact
would be psychological. An explosion involving even a small quantity of radioactive
material would create nfear, panic, and social disruption, exactly the effects terrorists
wish to achieve". ]OJ A 'dirty bomb' is remarkably easy to construct, once the
materials are obtained, which is a major cause of anxiety among those charged with
the responsibility for maintaining security. The relative easy construction highlights
the need to compile an accurate inventory and then safeguard all high-risk
radioactive material.
There is now a growing appreciation of the urgent need to transfer HLW to
geological repositories. As Lord Oxburgh and his fellow House of Lords Select
Committee members succinctly stated:
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC of 11 September 2001 not only
override any remaining arguments for long-tenn storage of nuclear waste at or near
ground level but also reinforce the recommendations in our 1999 Report for early and
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deliberate progress on the one remaining realistic option of deep geological storage. 102

He went further in a 2002 Geoscientist article when he stated:
Afl:er September 11, even those who would previously have been content (for whatever
reason) to see wastes retained at surface indefinitely, now have to t hink again. Scenarios
for an aerial attack on Sellafiel d have been modelled, and they are not attractive. 103

The absence of a long-tenn policy for effectively safeguarding HLW in the UK is
disturbing to some, and not only illustrates the lack of commitment from consecutive
British govenunents, but is indicative of the challenge ahead to safeguard the global
inventory of HLW. Waiting for 'ideal sites' may no longer be an option, and the UK
and all nuclear states may wish to heed the advice of Lord Oxburgh and move with
deliberate speed to secure the waste in interim repositories. 104
One country often cited for its innovation and vision concerning nuclear technology
is Sweden. In the early 1980s, Sweden demonstrated great foresight when designing
its Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Fuel (CLAB) 105 by planning for almost
every possible scenario. Acknowledging the unpopularity of 'pennanent repositories'
in all nuclear states, Sweden came up with an innovative concept that was well ahead
of its time. CLAB was constructed 30 metres underground and as such is far more
secure than any similar surface facility located anywhere in the world. It became
operational in 1985. Recently, Brita Freudenthal of SKB remarked that
when we built this plant, we thought about human intrusion, terrorism even war. People
in the nuclear industry laughed; they thought, 'typical Swedes'. They arer.'t laughing any
more.

106

Freudenthal was speaking post September 11 2001 with the new realisation that
nuclear facilities may be particularly vulnerable to terrorism or acts of sabotage.
Many of the nuclear states are now somewhat envious that they are not as advanced
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as Sweden in terms of the security of their spent fuel. The CLAB facility, which has
been operating without incident for almost two decades, is also indicative of how
technology could be used to provide interim storage underground for HLW. 107 Since
1985, the underground spent-fuel pond has been regularly monitored, maintained,
and when required, more fuel rods have been added to it. CLAB, therefore, is an
existing example whereby an underground facility does not have to be 'out-of-sight
out-of-mind'. Sweden is also well advanced with its plans for a permanent deep
HLW repository. Site investigations for a deep repository are continuing in
Osthammar and Oskarshamm. Both sites have local community support, and a final
decision on the preferred site is expected in 2008. ios
While the US, the UK and Sweden are all established nuclear states with well
developed technologies, only the latter has existing ,.mderground facilities to
safeguard their spent fuel rods. Much can be learned from the Swedish experience
and it may well be advantageous for all nuclear states to combine knowledge and
resources, to find the optimal safe solution to enhance the public good of human
security.
Risk Perception and Public Trust
The main obstacle to date in implementing the nuclear industry's preferred option of
geologically repositories has been public opposition, largely driven by the perception
of risks associated with the extremely long timeframes involved for the radioactive

material to decay to accepted safe levels. 109 Public anxiety about geological disposal
is focused on the potential for leakage into the ground water systems much earlier
and at higher levels of radioactivity than experts predict. It is extremely difficult to
resolve issues of risk, as comparing particular risks in society involves great
uncertainty. Analysts either have to rely on probability statistics or undertake

sampling surveys to gauge the public perceptions of risk. 110 Since each method has
its limitations and both essentially rely on subjective assessment, decisions on global
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HLW security are in the end political. In tenns of safeguarding HLW in geological
repositories, the fundamental issues for the nuclear states to resolve are: What level
of risk is socially acceptable? And what measures can be put in place to effectively
manage that risk?
As the House of Lords Select Committee report revealed, there are really only two
policy options for HLW, long-tenn surface storage or underground geological
disposal. 111 Until recently it has been difficult for decision-makers to move away
from long-term surface storage of HLW to geological disposal because the public
perceived the repository option as being risky and irreversible. Yet there are
measures that can be put in place to minimise the risks associated with geological
repositories. The 1999 House of Lords Select Committee Report advocated phased
disposal underground, as a practical means of securing the waste, while leaving open
options for further technological advancement. In the phased disposal concept, the
site chosen would ultimately be backfilled and sealed. 112 Consequently, the public
perceives little difference between proposals for deep geological repositories and the
phased disposal concept. It is however possible to apply the monitored retrievable
storage concept to the underground environment by using a variation of CLAB. A
monitored retrievable underground repository (MRUR), without specific time
constraints for closure, would remove the 'finality' aspect and perhaps even shift the
public debate away from issues of hydrology and leakage of radioactivity to safety

and security of the HLW. 113 It would provide for the capacity to monitor the

interaction between the waste canisters and the geological environment at regular
inteivals over a prolonged timeframe.
The necessity of gaining and maintaining public trust as a means of alleviating
perceptions of risk is widely recognised. A range of factors including leadership, risk
communication and public access to infonnation can influence l evels of trust. An
effective public participation process, complete with a willingness to respond to
community concerns, is also necessary for building public trust. When consulted the
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public has shown a clear preference for monitored retrievable HLW storage facilities.
This is based on a desire to 'wait-and-see' if new technology or an alternative to
geological repositories emerge. Until recently the preference for retrievable storage
facilities was to construct them on the surface but that appears to be changing. One
of the main conclusions from a 1999 Consensus Conference 114 in the UK states that
"radioactive waste must be removed from the surface and stored underground, but
must be monitorable and retrievable" . 115 The imperative of gaining public trust was
also prominent at that conference. An appreciation of the capacity for a MRUR to
help build public trust will likely grow as the debate unfolds. A concerted effort will,
however, have to be undertaken to broaden the debate to involve as many
stakeholders as possible. The issue most likely to create such an incentive for
widespread engagement in the HLW repository debate is regional and global
security.
Since the heightened level of terror threat, security of all nuclear materials has
attained a much higher priority amongst political leaders, but the extent of public
awareness of the link between security and geological repositories remains unclear.
In 2001, a follow-up study conducted by the Future Foundation sought to measure
public awareness and attitudes towards radioactive waste management in the UK. 116
It revealed that awareness levels remained low, but when prompted the public

recognised the importance of finding solutions and rated the issue highly.
Interestingly, at the end of the interview when asked "had they any other concerns?"
seven per cent volunteered terrorism and security without any prompting. 117 That
was a reasonably high response, as the authors illustrated the difficulty people find in
providing responses to 'on the spot' questions (79 per cent did not raise any additional
concerns). It is likely that prompted questions on security would have resulted in

higher resp·onse levels. 118 The desire for higher levels of infonnation and public
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The UK Centre for the Environment and Economic Development. "Final Report." Compiled from
the UK National Consensus Conference on Radioactive Waste Management, Westminster Central
Hall, London, 21-24 May 1999. Online version.
116
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participation was high, with around two-thirds stating their preference for additional
infonnation. This suggests the UK public is willing to engage in the debate, but
much needs to be done to ensure the public receives adequate information to increase
the existing levels of awareness. It is likely that the findings from the UK study
would transfer to other nation states.
Public acceptance of geological repositories will likely grow as the debate unfolds. It
wilt gain momentum after a period of demonstrable safe operation. The WIPP
repository has already achieved technical success, but will require a much longer

operating timeframe before its safety features can be confidently confinned. 119 The
first operating HLW repository in the world, likely to be Yucca Mountain in Nevada,
or perhaps Sweden, will also boost public confidence and will when operational
eliminate the argument that no nuclear state has implemented a repository for HLW
because 'it is perceived as being so dangerous'. The opening of the first national
HLW repository will be an important psychological step, but it will do little to
provide the public good of enhanced regional or global security by reducing the risks
from terrorists or rogue states.
Enhancing Internadonal Nuclear Security as a Public Good
In the current climate of terrorism the arguments for safeguarding HLW and spent
fuel rods in underground repositories appear much stronger than ever before. The
attempt by Pangea to locate a multinational repository in Australia helped to raise
international awareness of the HLW disposal problem, and provided a practical
working experience for key people now involved with the ARIUS. Following the
fonnation of ARIUS in February 2"02, 120 the shift in focus on radioactive waste
solutions for smaller users has achieved broader support for the shared repository
concept, at least at the regional level. There appears to be a greater appreciation of
the security benefits of underground repositories than was present during the Pangea
debate. Safeguarding the entire global inventory of spent fuel and HLW in geological
repositories, although desirable ar.d feasible, is a significant challenge. A more
achievable option might be to aim for a regional multinational repository rather than
119
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seeking a 'complete' global solution from the outset. The political realities are such
that Europe has the largest concentration of nuclear reactors, and ARIUS has already
gained support for the multinational repository concept among some of the smaller
nuclear states.
ARIUS was formed by electric utilities and waste agencies from Belgium, Bulgaria,
Switzerland, Hungary and Japan, 121 and has since been joined by associates from
Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Latvia. 122 ARIUS has worked closely with
Decom Slovakia. In 2003, ARIUS and Decom Slovakia were jointly responsible for
initiating and funding the Support Action for a Pilot Initiative for European Regional
Repositories (SAPIERR). The two organisations submitted a research proposal
within the European Commission's (EC) 61h Framework Programme (FP6), in May
2003. 123 The FP6 is the European Community Framework Programme for Research,
Technological Development and Demonstration. One of the criteria for eligibility is
that all proposals seeking assistance from the FP6 must have transnational
characteristics. The SAPIERR project is a pilot study into the feasibility of a
multinational repository for Europe. There are 21 organisations from 14 states
participating in the SAPIERR working group. 124 The pilot study is mainly funded by
the project coordinator, Decom Slovakia, which receives its funding from the EC in
Brussels, and ARIUS, which is funded directly by the Swiss Government
Department of Education and Science. Although only in the initial stages, SAPIERR
is considered an important development for the multinational repository concept and
the study could benefit from the application of public goods theory.
For a multinational repository to meet the criterion of a public good, the benefits
must extend to both nuclear and non-nuclear states. Those without nuclear waste are
not required to participate, and therefore obviously cannot benefit from the
economies of scale criteria. The most apparent benefit to non-nuclear states from a
multinational repository is the enhanced security provided by removing the HLW
121
Ibid.
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from the surface to the less vulnerable underground environment. The elimination of
the potential for a terrorist strike or an act of sabotage on a HLW facility is most
advantageous to all states in the region. Hence, under a security appraisal, the
benefits of a regional multinational repository are non-excludable because the
safeguards and security benefits it provides, accrue to both the participating nuclear
states and to the non-nuclear states. There may also be environmental spillover
benefits for some states in close proximity to one or more of the participating nuclear
states.
The other main criterion of a public good is the non-rivalry component, which means
that the benefits are available to all consuming the good. In tenns of a multinational
repository, the efficiency, security, and environmental benefits to one country do not
subtract in any way from the benefits available to the other countries using the
repository. Thus a multinational repository meets the non-rival requirement, with the
only qualification being the question of space limits. Those responsible for designing
the repository would need to calculate the total amount of existing and predicted
HLW, from both participating 125 and potential non-participating126 nuclear states.
The repository should then be designed and constructed with ample capacity for
storing the total inventory of existing and predicted under-secured HLW in the
region. There will inevitably be reluctance or opposition by some states to a
multinational repository, as there is with most issues requiring collective action. This
is not necessarily a problem, as some of those states are well advanced with a
national solution. Others are not, however, and may decide to join at a later stage, or
indeed one of the states with a planned national repository could become the
voluntary host state under the right set of circumstances. It is therefore important to
create the incentive& and the opportunity for reluctant states to join at a later stage
should they choose to do so.
Economies of Scale aod the Benefits of Collaboration
Until recently the primary incentive for many of the smaller nuclear states to
collaborate to construct a multinational repository was the economic benefit of doing
m The countries that agree to join in the multinational repository from the outset.
126 Countries
with the potential to join at a later stage.
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so. In 1994 the Nuclear Energy Agency examined costs associated with the nuclear
fuel cycle and highlighted varying institutional and other factors associated with
repository implementation from country to country. 127 Those factors can differ
dramatically across cultures, making it difficult to provide even an estimated average
dollar cost for a single geological repository. As a guide, in the US the Department of
Energy had to revise their estimate for the total cost of completing the Yucca

Mountain repository upwards to $US 49.3 billion from fiscal year 2001. 128 Critics of
the project maintain that that is a consetvative estimate, and argue that it is much
more likely to be $US 60 billion or higher. Whatever the true cost, a single
geological repository will amount to billions of US dollars, and that level of required
funding would be beyond the means of many of the smaller nuclear states acting
alone. That assertion has been widely documented and utilised as a main argument
for a shared repository by proponents in states such as Belgium, Bulgaria,
Switzerland, Taiwan and the Ukraine. 129

The most recent IAEA study examining the multinational repository issue, reports
the economic benefits in the following way.
Thus, a large capacity, multinational repository could offer an economic advantage in
that the host and partners could achieve substantial economies of scale by pooling
resources and sharing the fixed capital costs and also the operating costs, as well as the
associated financial risks. Doing this could allow the host and partner countries to
achieve a lower unit cost than would otherwise be the case for a national progranune
undertaken by either the host or partner countries acting alone, 130

The IAEA report designates the economics of disposal systems as an area requiring
further study. It is envisioned that the more immediate costs of constructing the
repository, and providing the day to day operations, would be funded separately from
127
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the potential long-tenn responsibility or liability costs. It is likely that the states
would only perfonn a coordinating role in the fonner, but would be expected to
underwrite any associated costs arising from the latter. The joint issues of
responsibility and liability are discussed in the next chapter. The precise funding
arrangements required to secure a multinational repository would need to be
detennined during the negotiation phase by the participating states.
Such negotiations could benefit from an understanding of public goods theory, and
specifically from some of the literature on financing public goods. Ferroni illustrates
four methods of financing regional or global public goods, which are through public
sources, private sources, payments by users and beneficiaries, and partnerships. 131
The method chosen will largely depend on the nature of the public good provided. As
Sandler has shown, different global public goods pose different financial

challenges. 132 It is expected that once political commitment is achieved, funding for
the construction and operation of the shared facility would be attainable. Regional
public goods can be broken down into three important subclasses, which are club
goods, common pool resources, and joint products. Of those three, club goods are
most relevant to the regional multinational repository concept. Club goods are public
goods with non-rivalry consumption, but are restricted to members by way of an
institutional arrangement. 133 Club goods are closely related to a user pays system,
which has a number of advantages. It enables consumers to determine how much
value they place on the good and then a charge can be set accordingly.
A shared method of funding could be applied based on a set charge directly linked to
the percentage of the waste going into the repository. To simplify with a hypothetical

example, suppose six states including the host state, Eurovania, 134 have agreed to

share in a regional multinational repository, which is designed to take 2,000 tonnes
of HLW each year for 40 years. The six states include the host state Eurovania,
131
132
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which is the largest nuclear state, with 800 tmmes deposited in the repository each
year. This is followed by Switzerland on 400 tonnes, with Bulgaria, Belgium,
Hungary and ltaly 135 contributing 200 tonnes each year for the 40 years. A
percentage breakdown reveals that Eurovania will contribute 40 per cent,
Switzerland 20 per cent and the remaining four states contributing 10 per cent each
of the total 800,000 tonnes of HLW, over the lifetime of the repository. The
breakdown in construction and operational costs would be also a 40, 20, I 0, 10, I 0,
10 split, with the host state Eurovania gaining the additional benefits of increased
GDP rates and higher employment from repository construction and export

revenues, 136 as an incentive for accepting the repository. 137

The hypothetical example used here is similar to the add-on scenario listed as one of

the options in the IAEA-TECDOC-1413 study. 1 38 It is based on the premise that the
voluntary host state has a relatively large quantity of HLW requiring long-term
storage. And the host state either decides to complement an existing operating
repository or it decides to participate in the cooperative solution from the outset.
Many factors, including economies of scale, environmental considerations and or
regional or global security benefits, could motivate the host state in offering the

services of a carefully designed and managed repository. 139 There are many scenarios

and motivating factors for potential host states to come forward but it is not intended
to provide an in depth analysis of them here. The process of identifying the likely
incentives, the most suitable option, and the specific 'service charge' is best left to the
individual states to determine. One considerable disincentive, however, is the
unresolved issue of who should assume ownership and responsibility for the HLW
over the many decades required for the waste to decay to safe accepted levels. The
issue of long-term responsibility and potential liability or remediation costs is such a
contentious issue that the next chapter is devoted to discussing the options.
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Conclusion

The implementation of national geological repositories for HLW has been
problematic for all nuclear states and an operational facility is yet to be achieved.
The public perception of the risks and the public's reluctance to accept the technical
safety features have been the main impediments to HLW repository site selection. 140
Yet the perception of risk is subjective and it can evolve with specific events. The
terrorist attacks of recent years may have changed many people's perception of risk.
The safeguarding of all surface nuclear facilities from air attacks and sabotage is now
a high priority, and securing HLW underground in a number of global sites would
effectively remove that threat. Geological repositories appear to be the best option
for reducing the risks of terrorists targeting the ever-growing surface stockpiles of
HLW. Undergro•_•nd storage provides additional safeguards against the theft of
weapons-useable material from extracted spent-fuel rods. Geological repositories
may also be the ultimate long-tenn solution for radionuclide containment. The
benefits of isolating the HLW to protect the environment and enhance regional or
global security may now outweigh the demonstrated anxiety with potential repository
failure.
Securing the entire global inventory of HLW would provide maximum-security
benefits for all. Such a comprehensive task, however, would be difficult to achieve,
and the more feasible option may be to advance the issue on a region by region basis.
Research into the feasibility of a shared repository is already underway in Europe.
The joint project conducted by ARIUS and SAPIERR seems a logical place to apply
public goods theory to better refine the security arguments and to test a range of
funding options. That research into a potential regional repository for Europe
provides a good opportunity to contrast the public perception of risk with the
geological repository against the risks from HLW surface storage. A single
multinational repository shared by a select number of nuclear states provides
additional regional security benefits, if it receives some HLW that would otherwise
have remained on surface. This would most likely be waste arising from the smaller
nuclear states, but some of the larger nuclear states may also be motivated to utilise a
140
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shared repository, with a renewed impetus of additional security that it would
provide.
The difficulties of implementing a global network of geological repositories to
safeguard the world's spent-fuel and HLW are many. Such an undertaking, while
ambitious, is achievable but it would require the strong commitment and drive from
the world leaders in the most influential nuclear states. The issue with the potential to
achieve that commitment is enhanced world security. National and international
security requires a high degree of interstate cooperation to maintain and enhance
overall world peace. To reduce or eliminate the risk or likely impacts from terrorism
is a global public good, because the benefits of enhanced security extend across
borders to all nations and their citizens. The principal argument for advocating a
global network of multinational repositories is the clear risk reduction benefits from
terrorist attacks on existing HLW surface storage facilities, or on spent-fuel
stockpiles. Multinational repositories would also make a significant contribution in
preventing the theft or diversion ofweapons-useable material

140

CHAPTER FIVE

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR STATES FOR
THE LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT OF HLW
The 1939 Trail Smelter arbitral decision is often cited as authority to hold that every
state should conduct its activities, in such a manner that does not cause serious harm
in another state, or in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 1 The obligation on states to
prevent transboundary environmental harm has since gained increased recognition
and is now widely accepted as part of the general principles of international law.
Responsibility for environmental hann can arise from either a breach of customary
law or from a breach of treaty Jaw.2 In the field of nuclear law the civil liability
regimes were desi gned with a focus on nuclear reactors, and they also contain
notable limits in time for claims.3 Despite some improvement post Chernobyl, there
are still gaps in those regimes, and because nuclear waste management was
considered a national responsibility, the issue of long-tenn liability for HLW is as yet
unregulated. Indeed the transfer of responsibility for the 'imported' high-level waste
(HLW) to Australia, after a 40-year operating period, was a factor in increasing the
public perceptions of risk with the Pangea repository project in Australia.4 This
suggests the joint issues of long-tenn responsibility for the HLW, and liability for
potential accidents or environmental harm from repository failure need to be
resolved.
The previous chapter demonstrated the public good benefits of regional and
multinational repositories. This chapter seeks to address the 'shared' responsibility
and liability issues raised by the multinational repository concept. The chapter
examines the existing international nuclear liability regimes to detennine their
1
"Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision" [1939] Reprinted in, 33 American Journal of
International law 182. And subsequent decision in [1941] 35 AJIL 684. [hereinafler, Trail Smelter
1'941] 35 AJ/l 684].
P. Birnie, & A. Boyle. International law and the Environment. Second ed. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002 p181. [hereinafter, Birnie and Boyle, 2002].
3
The civil nuclear liabilities are discussed in more detail below.
•I.Holland, "Waste Not Want Not? Australia and the Politics of High-Level Nuclear Waste."
Australian Journal ofPolitical Science 37 (2002) p286. [hereinafter, Holland, 2000].
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suitability for dealing with the long-term management of HLW in a shared
repository. The analysis reveals significant deficiencies in nuclear liability law, and
highlights the need for a more robust international regime to moderate the risks
associated with the long-term storage of the shared HLW in a multinational
repository. Among the discovered weaknesses is reluctance on the part of the major
nuclear states to sign up to the civil nuclear liability regimes.5 A lack of commitment
from the major nuclear states does little to engender trust or encourage either the
small nuclear or the non-nuclear states to sign up to the nuclear liability regimes. In
addition, the civil nuclear liability regimes were never designed for and are
particularly unsuitable for the time-span required for the HLW to decay to safe
accepted levels in a geological repository.
Under the existing nuclear liability regimes, there is a time limit placed on the period
for potential claims to be lodged, and liability is channelled exclusively to the
operator. 6 While the time limit issue could perhaps be resolved by extending the
duration of coverage,7 the issue of liability is much more problematic. Even if one
assumes that a private operator would be prepared to commit to complete
responsibility and liability for all aspects of the repository and for many years post
closure, the company will not be trading over the required period of monitoring. This
raises the question as to who can assume responsibility for the several thousand years
necessary for the radioactive materials in the HLW to decay to safe accepted levels.8
The only feasible option is for the nation state to assume long-term responsibility for
the management of HLW. The issue is more complicated under the shared repository
arrangement. It would be most unlikely for a host state to come forward with the
offer of a site if it is required to accept full responsibility for the HL W over the long
term. It is therefore necessary to explore the option of collective nation-state
5
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responsibility under international law to facilitate shared responsibility and liability
arrangements and thus increase the likelihood of greater public acceptance for the
multinational repository option. This chapter continues with an analysis of the
international law of state responsibility, and concludes that it is the most appropriate
legal mechanism for enshrining the collective responsibility of nation states in a
multilateral treaty for the long-tenn management of HLW. Under the law of state
responsibility. the state concerned must accept responsibility in the event of a breach
of an internationally wrongful act. There must be a clear identifiable international
ol:ligation for state responsibility to be invoked. That obligation would be difficult to
establish under the existing international law framework. Hence, in order for
collective nation state responsibility to be applicable to multinational repositories, a
specifically designed multilateral treaty that covers all aspects of HL W storage over
the long-tenn is required.
An

acceptance of collective nation state responsibility involves a shift away from or

more precisely an extension of the traditional notion of state responsibility, which
was essentially a bilateral matter between the responsible and the injured states.9 In
recognising the limitations of 'State Responsibility', and in light of the proliferation
of multilateral agreements, the International Law Commission (lLC} extended the
concept to cover several states and the broader international community. To achieve
this, the ILC drew upon the obligation erga omnes 10 concept, which has gained
widespread recognition since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dictum in the
Barcelona Traction 11 case. Obligations erga omnes are those owed to the

international community as a whole. As identified in the dictum, the obligations
relate to the protection of common interests and basic moral values, including
outlawing acts of aggression, genocide and the protection of humans from slavery
and racial discrimination. 12 The obligations erga omnes concept has since evolved to
include self-detennination and environmental protection.
9

D. Shelton, "Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility." The American
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Following an analysis of the state responsibility concept, this chapter will argue for
an innovative approach whereby the nuclear states utilising the repository would
accept shared responsibility and liability for damages arising from an accident during
the long-tenn storage ofHLW in the repository. This commitment would need to be
formalised in a binding treaty, based on the latest and most relevant ILC Articles on
state responsibility. 13 A comprehensive multilateral treaty, which includes liability
provisions for damages, would ensure that adequate monitoring and compliance
measures are in place for the long-tenn management of the shared repository. Such a
treaty would provide an incentive for interstate cooperation in research and
development and it would help to instil the necessary public confidence to achieve
repository acceptance. The chapter will further demonstrate the benefit of all the
states using the repository to sign and then ratify the Treaty in order to increase the
chance of public acceptance.
Internationalisation of Nuclear Risks
Awareness of the potential impacts of transboundary environmental harm and the
perception of risk from particular teclmologies have increased in recent decades.
There are various reasons for this increased awareness, including greater access to
information and communication. In contrast, prior to and during the early industrial
age many of the hazards borne by society were deemed to be the result of external
influences, and were often labelled 'acts of nature' or 'acts of God' by those with
religious beliefs. 14 The rise of industrial capitalism has removed many of the earlier
risks, and brought many benefits such as better knowledge and access to health,
better shelter from the elements and many material and personal comforts. Such
benefits have led to lower rates of infant mortality and increased longevity. There are
also, however, new risks associated with technological advancement. These range
from fast cars and aeroplanes to chemical, genetic and the various risks associated
with nuclear power. Some of these risks are more acceptable to society because of
the belief in personal control in the management of that risk, for instance, when
13
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driving a car. Alternatively, familiarity can reduce the perception of risk as happens,
for example, with relati vely frequent air travel. 15 Others such as nuclear power,
unlike the earlier 'natural disasters 1 or the more acceptable risks, often become
politically charged. The reason for this is that industrial risks, such as those
associated with nuclear power involve choices and the ultimate decision brings with
it the problem of social accountability and responsibility. When accidents occur in
industrial risk areas, there is often a tendency to apportion blame towards the
decision-making bodies.
The feeling of a lack of control of a situation often raises anxiety and can heighten
the public's perception of risk. As expected, the reporting of the accident at Three
Mile Island in 1979 diminished confidence in the nuclear industry, but the
repercussions following the accident at Chernobyl seven years later were most
profound. The radioactive fallout from Chernobyl, on 26 April 1986, clearly
demonstrated the internationalization of risks to many states, even to some that do
not utilise nuclear technology as an energy source. 16 The immediate anxiety
concerned the radioactive fallout, which impacted not only on the USSR but also on
various states not in immediate proximity. This was a significant wake up for some
non-nuclear states, which for the first time were confronted with the transboundary
effects of a major radioactive accident. It clearly highlighted the inability of states to
effectively manage some of the risks from a modem technological industrialised
world and challenged traditional notions of state sovereignty based on autonomy
within territorial borders. 17 Ironically, it was also modern technology that enabled
the western world to penetrate the territorial sovereign borders of the USSR by
satellite to identify the source of the accident. The failure of the USSR to inform the
IAEA or its neighbouring states until 72 hours after the accident and until it was
pressured into doing so raised particular concems. 18 The accident at Chernobyl also
highlighted the inadequacies of nuclear law from both a national and an international

15 R. Rohnnann & 0. Renn, "Risk Perception Research: An Introduction," in Cross-Cutural Risk
Perception: A Survey ofEmpirical Studies, edited by 0. Renn & R. Rolumann. Dordrecht: Kluwer
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perspective. It illustrated the limited powers of the IAEA and the lack of agreement
on questions of liability or state responsibility. 19
Following the accident at Chernobyl, the USSR refused to accept any liability for
damages incurred in other nation states. From an international legal perspective, the
Soviets were not a party to either of the conventions on third party liability for
nuclear damage and were thus not governed by any international regirnes.20 The
question of state responsibility under customary international law did not arise
because transboundary health threats, and thus issues of liability, were largely
ignored by states prior to the Chernobyl accident.21 In any event, no affected nation
state brought a claim against the USSR, at least in part because of a reluctance to
create international nonns on transboundary liability for nuclear damage.22 However,
the accident did result in increased attempts to improve international cooperation on
nuclear activities. At a subsequent special review conference, IAEA member states
reaffirmed their individual responsibility for nuclear safety, while recognising that
the role of the IAEA is to encourage interstate cooperation on a range of nuclear
issues.23 Soon after, international states adopted Conventions on Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident 24 and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident,25 but
these were hastily prepared and they inadequately addressed issues of liability or the
overall risks to all states from nuclear activities. 26 At the same conference, the
member states considered mandatory international minimum safety standards for
nuclear reactors, but agreement on these could not be reached due to many factors.
These included the practical problems of differing national standards and differing
19
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types of nuclear installations, and the ongomg tensions between the benefits of
international regulation and the perceived loss of sovereignty.
Civil Nuclear Liability Regimes
Some months after the accident at Chernobyl the USSR argued for a comprehensive
international regime to cover the issue of compensation for nuclear damage. Its
preferred approach was to establish a new convention on state liability under public
international law.27 However, this was not agreed upon by the other nuclear states,
due in part to a reluctance to create fresh international norms. Thus, for the entire
range of nuclear activities, the existing civil liability conventions remain the only
means of redress for accidents involving participating states. The 1960 Paris
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy28 and the 1963
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 29 were drafted at a time
when the nuclear industry was in its infancy. Both conventions were heavily skewed
in favour of the operator, who "was protected from the full consequences of tortious
claims, in order to encourage investment and development".30 This was achieved by
placing a cap on the total liability of the operator. The Paris Convention was adopted
under the auspices of the OECD and covers nuclear accidents within Western
European states. It has a limited geographical application, when compared to the
IAEA-backed Vienna Convention which has the potential for universal membership.
While both conventions seek to improve international nuclear safety with liability
provisions against the operator, there are significant deficiencies in both liability
regimes. 31 Criticisms of the two conventions include a failure to provide in express
terms for environmental damage and a totally inadequate low ceiling of financial
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liability. 32 The two conventions also provide for the jurisdiction to remain in the state
where the accident occurs rather than where the damage falls. These shortcomings
contributed to the low number of signatory states, which was significantly below the
worldwide coverage expected in the early 1960's.33 The accident at Chernobyl did
result in an extensive review of the liability regimes, which lasted around ten years.
The concerns were addressed to some extent in September 1997, when delegates
from around 80 states adopted a Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention,34
coupled with a new Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage. 35 The definition of environmental damage was broadened under the revised
VieIU1a Convention to include costs of preventive measures, a loss of income, and
provisions to reinstate the envirorunent to its previous condition. The protocol raised
the operator's minimum liability figure to 300 million Special Drawing Rights
(SDR),36 which equates to around 400 million US dollars. 37 In addition, under the
Convention on Supplementary Compensation, the Installation State must provide a
further 300 million SDR's,38 and the State Parties are to provide additional amounts
based on an agreed formula. 39
These changes provided significant improvements to the existing civil liability
regimes for nuclear activities. Yet there remains a number of deficiencies, one of
which is the lack of global hannonisation for nuclear liability law. Firstly, there is
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not a unifonn adherence by the contracting states to the 1988 Joint Protocoi,40 which
links both liability conventions. Secondly, some of the larger nuclear states remain
outside of both liability conventions, preferring to stick with national nuclear liability
laws. These include the US, Canada, China, Pakistan, Japan, Korea and South
Africa.41 While the majority ofthese nations have national legislation mostly in line
with the conventions, the lack ofa formal link to one of the multilateral conventions
can be problematic for enforcing responsibility, which can impact directly on victims
in foreign states. It is also regrettable that a leading nuclear state, the US, does not
lead by example and commit to one of the main liability conventions, which may
encourage other reluctant nations to sign up.42 The US did break its stance on
international nuclear liability regimes by signing up to the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 29 September 1997.43 Yet the
Supplementary Convention is not yet in force and does not link the two main liability
conventions, and a much greater commitment is needed from the US, and others, if
the goal of global hannonisation of nuclear liability laws is to be achieved.
Another problem associated with the nuclear liability regimes is the limitation of
claims in time. This is a feature of many legal instruments, the rationale being that
the opportunity for victims to lay claims should not be allowed to continue
indefinitely.44 The Vienna and Paris Conventions include an extinction period often
years, although national law, if applicable, may provide additional coverage. The ten
year time period was agreed in an attempt to achieve an appropriate balance between
compensation and industry protection. The short timeframe was severely criticised,
especially since the effects of radiation exposure may not be discovered until long
after the event. Hence the 1997 Protocol to the Vienna Convention extended the
claim period to thirty years for personal injury but left in place the ten-year
extinction for all other damages.45 This inconsistency raises questions in relation to
reparation of the environment, which somewhat diminishes the broader definition of
40
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environmental damage agreed to in 1997. It is acknowledged that the longer the time
span involved, the more difficult it is for claimants to prove causal links. However,
the time limitation illustrates that the nuclear liability regimes were designed to cover
the accidents arising from nuclear reactors or perhaps during the transboundary
movement of nuclear waste. Neither convention provides the means to cover
potential liability for the HLW over the long storage period required to safeguard the
radioactive waste in geological repositories.
Under the Vienna, Paris and Supplementary Compensation Conventions, liability is
channelled exclusively to the operator and is absolute. This means that there is no
requirement for victims to prove fault or negligence against the operator following an
accident. While the conventions were designed specifically with nuclear reactors in
mind, the Vienna Convention now includes the definition of a nuclear installation as
"any facility where nuclear material is stored'1.46 It is most likely that this would
apply to an underground repository, at least while the operator47 retains responsibility
for the facility. The operator would need to satisfy the Installation State that it has the
necessary insurance or other financial security to meet the compensatory
requirements of the relevant liability regime. In the case of Australia, which has
si gned only the Supplementary Compensation Convention, it was envisaged during
the PRA project debate that the operator would be required to set aside 300 million
SDR's (worth about $US 400 million) in compensation funds.48 Yet the operating life
of the repository was planned for forty years, after which it would be petmanently
sealed. After forty years all responsibility and thus liability would transfer directly to
the host-state. This demonstrates a fundamental weakness in the nuclear liability
regimes when applied to the multinational repository concept. The daunting prospect
of assuming total responsibility, after forty years, was among the main reasons why
Australia rejected the PRA project49 and why two separate state governments passed
almost identical legislation prohibiting the storage of HLW in their regions.
46
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The issue of liability thus highlights the problematic nature of placing the onus of
responsibility solely on the host-state and raises questions of fairness and equity. It is
unlikely that agreement for a multinational repository could be achieved by relying
on the existing nuclear liability conventions. Under the current arrangements the
burden of responsibility falls on the host-state to ensure that adequate safety and
compliance measures are in place. The host-state would also be responsible for
ensuring the operator has the necessary expertise and financial liability funds, 50 and

for approving and granting the operating licence.51 It follows that the state would try

to ensure that the operator meets its liability obligations over an agreed timeframe, as
the onus would be on the state to pick up any compensatory shortfalls, should the
operator liquidate. Yet to expect a single nation to assume total responsibility and
associated liability for other nations' HLW for many decades is most ambitious, and
unlikely to prove successful. Those shortcomings raise the obvious question as to
why the nuclear states utilising the multinational repository should be exempted from
assuming some responsibility and thus exempted from liability for the waste they
have created. That question is especially pertinent when one considers that those
nuclear states would have benefited from their use of nuclear generated power. It is
widely accepted that energy production for domestic and industrial use contributes
directly to economic growth and to overall improvement in the quality of life.52
Hence, for a multinational repository to gain acceptance there must also be an
obligation on the states having enjoyed the benefits of nuclear energy to share in the
potential risks involved in the long-tenn storage of the HLW. The absence of such an
obligation was a clear failing in the PRA project for Australia, which was primarily a
commercial venture, designed to make a profit.53 Interestingly the operator and
associated companies would have profited during the forty-year operating life of the
repository, but they planned to leave the potential long-tenn costs to Australia post
so NEA Secretariat. "Problems Raised by the Applications of the Conventions on Nuclear Third Party
Liability to Radioactive Waste Repositories." Nuclear Law Bulletin 55 (1995) p20. [hereinafter, NEA
Secretariat 1995].
si Supra n 31 de La Fayette, 1992 p22.
52 J, Lang-Lenton Leon, "Radioactive Waste Management and Sustainable Development." NEA News
19 (2001) pl8.
SJ C. McCombie, G. Butler, M. Kurzeme, D. Pentz, J. Voss & P. Winter, "The Pangea International
Repository: A Technical Overview." Paper presented at the Waste Management '99 Conference,
Tuscon 1999pl.
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closure. It is acknowledged that the voluntary host-state was expected to benefit from
increased employment opportunities, export revenues54 and royalties and taxes to the
relevant governments. Yet, as the Access Economics Report conceded, part of the
estimated $90 billion payments to the Australian goverrunents "might go to establish
a long term fund for care of the facility post closure".55 Considering that the multi
barrier repository technology is unproven, it is simply impossible to predict how
much would need to be set aside to cover future costs of potential accidents or
leakage over the time frame involved in safeguarding the HLW. Hence, it is most
unlikely that any host state would accept HLW from other nation states, if they also
have to assume all responsibility and costs for potential accidents during the long
term management of the facility. In the case of the PRA project, the Australian
population through their governments completely r�jected the proposal because in
their view the benefits did not outweigh the risks.56
As argued in the previous chapter, a multinational HLW repository is an ambitious
undertaking that requires a cooperative and collaborative solution by the nation states
intending to utilise the shared facility. Coverage from the civil nuclear liability
regimes during the transportation of HLW is somewhat ambiguous, and it is non
existent for the long duration required for the radioactive isotopes to decay to safe
accepted levels in a geological repository. 57 In the interests of cooperation, fairness
and to address the public perception of risk, the onus of responsibility and liability
caIU1ot rest solely with the host-state. To overcome this problem the nuclear states
intending to utilise the repository would have to commit to some form of collective
responsibility over an extended period of time. This can be achieved only by utilising
the most relevant principle in international law, and by enshrining that principle in a
binding multilateral treaty, with the full endorsement of the nuclear states using the
shared repository. Such a principle must have the capacity and robustness to be
applicable for the long duration involved for storing the HLW. The international law
principle of state responsibility is one concept particularly suited to resolving
s4 Although t!te intent was for Australia to import the HLW, the host state would in fact be exporting a
service, and the revenue raised would be recorded on the export side of the ledger.
55
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conflicts across state borders, and it may well be the central concept to enshrine in a
multilateral treaty for HLW.
The International Law Concept of State Responsibility

'State Responsibility' can be loosely described as being similar in operation to Tort
Law as applied in the domestic sphere,58 and is the principle whereby states can be
held accountable in interstate claims for breaches of obligations under international
1aw.59 In order for state responsibility to be invoked, there must be an identifiable
international obligation, and then state responsibility assigns a duty on that state to
make amends for breaching the international obligation. The breach of an
international obligation can occur under treaty or customary international law. The
state responsibility concept is not confined to affording reparation after the event, as
is sometimes implied, but has wider applications, including an obligation not to
cause P.nvironmental harm. Initially the principle was fairly limited in scope, as it
only invoked state responsibility for injuries to aliens.60 Arguably the most cited
instance of state responsibility involving environmental damage beyond the
territorial borders of a state was the Trail Smelter arbitral decision.61 The case
involved the transboundary movement of sulphur fumes from a lead and zinc ore
smelter in Trail, British Columbia, across the border into the US, causing damage to
crops, trees and lands. Following negotiation, the US and Canada agreed that the
case should be referred to the International Joint Commission for determination. This
was a body set up by the two states under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. 62 The
Commission assessed the damage in 1931 at $US 350,000, which Canada agreed to
pay, as it had not disputed the issue of liability.
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However, since the smelter continued to operate, the United States sought the
prevention of further sulphur fume emissions and claimed around $US 2 million
compensation in damages. This time the matter was referred to arbitration, whereby
the Tribunal resolved in 1938 to award $78,000 to the US for damages between 1931
and 1937. The second question asked of the Tribunal was "whether the Trail Smelter
should be required to refrain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the
future and, if so, to what extent?"63 The Tribunal applied the domestic law of the
United States and the general principles of international law to reach its conclusions.
The final decision of the Tribunal, as issued in 1941, contained the following:
Under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United States, no
state has the right to use or pennit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the property or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.64

Hence Trail Smelter65 provided a landmark decision in international law prohibiting
transboundary pollution beyond a state's borders. Yet, as Brownlie quite accurately
contends, the decision made a "rather modest contribution to the jurisprudence", 66
because of its limited application. Among its limitations were a requirement of
tangible injury that could be given a monetary figure; the incident had to be of
"serious consequence"; and the injury had to be established by "clear and convincing
evidence 11 • 67 Moreover, the decision only dealt with damage to property and did not
take into account the broader envirorunental considerations of damage to wildlife and
ecosystems. Notwithstanding these limitations, Trail Sme/ter68 did provide an
important precedent in international environmental law on transboundary pollution.
The concept of state responsibility was strengthened by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channef9 case, where each state was deemed to have an
63
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obJigation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other states".70 In that case, the court held that Albania had a duty to warn
British warships of the existence of mines in the Corfu Channel, which was part of
Albanian waters. In the Lac Lanow:71 case, which involved a claim by Spain that
France had violated a treaty by diverting a river in its · �rritory before it entered
Spain, the Tribunal found no breach of treaty, but held that if France had polluted the
waters, Spain would have had a valid claim.72 Lac Lanoux also noted that states have
a specific obligation to consult and negotiate with any state that may be affected by
the proposed activity. Collectively, Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel and Lac Lanoux
clearly established the existence of a rule of international law prohibiting
transboundary harm, and paved the way for potential liability for a failure to , r· ,,
hannful activities against another nation state.73 These decisions in effect placeo

;..ii

onus of responsibility to coincide with state sovereignty, if actiom. withili a state
cause pollution to the environment of or impact adversely on peoples of ,:uother
state. In the absence of specific treaty obligations, states can invoke the dispute
resolution provisions available under public international law. The two or more states
involved in the dispute would have to agree to the jurisdiction of the ICJ before it can
preside over the contentious issue.
The state responsibility concept received notable recognition during the 1972 United
Nations

(UN)

Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. 74 This

conference marked the beginning of concerted global consciousness about
environmental issues and provided the catalyst for international cooperation to
resolve a number of outstanding collective problems.75 The declaration passed in
Stockholm contained seven proclamations and twenty-six principles. Principle 24
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sought to enhance nation state cooperation on environmental issues. It specifically
stated that:
International matters concerning tile protection and improvement of the environment
should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal
footing. 16

In tenns of the state responsibility concept, Principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration
provides the fundamental 'soft law' principle of international law concerning
transboundary pollution. It states the ,;ommon conviction that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits ofnationaljurisdiction. 71

Principle 21 has been embodied in a number of c onventions, including the 1982
United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, 78 the 1985 Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer79 and the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate
Change. 80
At Rio de Janerio in 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development81
reaffirmed and built upon the declarations passed twenty years earlier at Stockholm.
The participating states at the Rio Conference adopted inter alia 27 guiding
principles. Principle 2 reiterated the notion of state responsibility to prevent
environmental harm with a reproduction of the entire wording contained in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Conference. It extended the concept from specific
'e nvironmental policies' to include the important addition of 'developmenta l
policies'.82 The inclusion of the phrase 'developmental' has been criticised by some
76
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as weakening the emphasis on the need for environmental protection in favour of
development interests. Others, however, view the inclusion in a mon:: positive
manner, as an extension of the obligation to prevent environmental harm in a broader
policy framework. Under the latter interpretation 11not only national environmental
policies, but also national development policies are subject to the duty not to cause
transboundary pollution. 1183 This acknowledgment of the need for �tates to balance
resource development with their environmental obligations provides additional
confirmation to the international law principle not to cause significant transboundary
environmental damage. Although classified as non-binding soft-law, these
declarations do help shape state practice and can evolve into customary law or be
utilised in the hard Jaw Treaty format.
State responsibility was enhanced further by the stronger commitment of nation
states to develop international liability laws at the Rio Conference on Environment
and Development in 1992. Again, Principle 13 built on the earlier Principle 22 84
wording in an effort to expedite international liability laws for environmental
damage. Principle 13 reads:
States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious
and more detennined manner to develop funher intemational law regarding liability and
compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused hy activities within
their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction. 85

Those declarations increase the likelihood of invoking state responsibility under
customary international Jaw. Yet despite the obvious widespread commitment to
these general principles, there has been reluctance by some states to formalise
liability commitments in binding treaty regimes. In the absence of such regimes the
invocation of state responsibility is more difficult as states have to rely on Customary
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International Law, and the dispute settlement procedures available under general
international law.
As discussed earlier, there is a noticeable reluctance among the nuclear states to sign
up to the civil nuclear liability regimes,86 not to mention accede to the substantial
amendments required for those conventions to adequately provide liability
arrangements to cover the potential risks associated with a multinational HLW
repository. It would be more likely for a country to offer a site for a multinational
repository if there were shared responsibility and liability arrangements in place and
able to be invoked. That can be achieved only with such provisions enshrined in a
binding Treaty. The state responsibility concept appears to be particularly suited for
inclusion in the Treaty as it has the capacity to act both as a preventive and, with the
liability obligations, a restorative mechanism in the event of an accident during the
long-term storage of HLW. State responsibility, if deemed suitable, would need to be
specifically enshrined in an agreed treaty designed to cover all aspects involved in
the long-tenn storage of HLW. That treaty would provide a clearly identifiable
international obligation on the nuclear states utilising the repository, but before
discussing that it is necessary to examine the state responsibility concept in greater
detail to determine its suitability for inclusion.
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
The International Law Commission (ILC) was established in 1947 with the main
objective of codifying and enhancing the progressive development of international
law. Among the many responsibilities assigned to the ILC in the initial years was the
task of codifying the law of state responsibility, which it was invited to do in 1953
and which it completed in 2001.87 The Commission has been criticised on various
occasions, and somewhat paradoxically, for both its broad and narrow focus on the
concept during the forty years it took to complete the draft articles on state
responsibility. The long period taken by the lLC to codify the principles of state
responsibility is due in part to the Commission's heavy workload and involvement in
such an enonnous range of issues, combined with their part time role. However, it is
86
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also indicative of the complex nature of state responsibility, and d emonstrates to
some extent the ILCs awareness of the historic reluctance of sovei:-eign states to
commit to such a far-reaching principle, and the need for their completed work to
gain acceptance from the community of nation states. 88 The ILC's detailed work in
the area of codification is widely regarded as an authoritative statement of the
existing law. 89 It has attended to a vast range of topics and has contributed greatly to
numerous conventions and treaties, including the law of the sea, state succession,
international watercourses and diplomatic immunity.90 The ILC's draft convention on
what was later to become the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
often cited as its most spectacular success.91
The ILC process of codifying state responsibility began with an extremely ambitious
undertaking, when the first special rapporteur, F. V. Garcia-Amador of Cuba,
reverted to the notion of state responsibility for injury to aliens. By concentrating his
efforts on the primary rules of obligation, the task became so complex and
contentious among nation states that little progress was made. The Commission was
unable even to discuss his proposals in detail, and in 1961 it appointed a
subcommittee under the chainnanship of Roberto Ago of Italy to provide a way
forward. Subsequently, most of the earlier work by the Commission was abandoned,
and instead Ago focused on the general 'secondary' rules of state responsibility,
rather than particular primary rules of obligation.92 In other words, the ILC ceased its
attempt to codify the general substantive rules of state responsibility, and shifted its
focus to a state's specific breach of obligation. As Ago stated:
The Commission agreed oo the need to concentrate its study on the determination of the
principles which govern the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts,
maintaining a strict distinction between this task and the task of defining the rules that
place obligations on States, the violation of which may generate responsibility.
Consideration of the various kinds of obligations placed on States in international law,
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and in particular, a grading of such obligations 21ccording to their importance to the
international community, may have to be treated as a necessary element in assessing the
gravity of an internationally wrongful act and as a criterion for determining the
consequences it should have. But this must not obscure the essential fact that it is one
thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes [the primary rule), and
another to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the
consequence of the violation [the secondary rule]. Only the second aspect oftbe matter
comes within the sphere of responsibility proper; to encourage any confusion on this
point would be to raise an obstacle which might once again frustrate the hope of a
successful codification of the topic.9l

The focus on secondary rules enabled the ILC to proceed, and that conceptual
framework remained throughout the deliberations leading to the completion of the
draft articles in 2001. 94 In addition, Ago's approach gained wide acceptance by
avoiding protracted disputes driven by national self-interest. In concentrating on the
secondary rules, Ago in effect broadened the focus to cover the whole area of
international law, but left the task of setting and adopting specific obligations, most
likely by treaty, to the collective body of nation states. That deft shift allowed the
ILC to focus instead on the consequences of a breach of such obligations. Moreover,
it did not restrict the possibility that state responsibility can also be derived from
either customary or general principles of international law. Any conflict, however,
arising from the latter means of invocation can only be resolved under the existing
dispute mechanisms of public international law.
Treaty law can also be contentious and open to different interpretations but it has
evolved into the most recognised and robust source of international law. Edith
Brown-Weiss provides an assessment of the historical jurisprudential disagreements
among states regarding the invocation of obligations in international agreements,
which can be summarised in the following three questions. Do international
agreements create only bilateral obligations between pairs of individual states? Do
they also create an indivisible whole, so that the treaty obligations are to be

JLC. Yearbook ofthe International Law Commission 2 (1970) p306. Wording in italics has been
added for emphasis.
� J. Crawford, "The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A
Retrospect." The American Journal ofInternational law 96 (2002) p877. [hereinafter, Crawford,
2002].

93

160

performed in relation to every other state party to the agreement? Or do international
agreements, in some cases, reflect obligations of a state toward the international
community as a whole.95 The first question is relatively straightfmward. Since the
rights and obligations exist between indi':'idual states, the state holding the right can
invoke state responsibility against the holder of the obligation. Brown-Weiss
maintains that the second category "is more complicated, because it posits that some
agreements create rights and obiigations that are indivisible for all states party to the
treaty and that each state owes an obligation to every other state party to perform
those treaty obligations". 96 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties addressed
this problem in article 60 by defining when a state party to a multilateral agreement
may terminate or suspend the operation of a Treaty in response to a material breach
by another contracting party. The third category raises the question of obligation
erga omnes (towards all), which as stated previously gained greater acceptance
following the Barcelona Traction case. 97 The ILC considered and accommodated all
three categories in the draft articles on state responsibility and all three are discussed
below.
The completed draft articles on state responsibility were submitted to the United
Nations General Assembly in 2001, with the simple recommendation that the
Assembly take note of the articles. On 12 December 2001, the General Assembly
formally adopted Resolution 56/83, which duly noted the articles and "commended98

them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future
adoption or other appropriate action. 1199 To just 'note' the articles was somewhat
unusual, as in most instances the Assembly would pass a stronger resolution with a
more fonnal authorisation of the articles that would usually provide the basis for a
fully-fledged convention. Pierre Klein contends that merely taking note of the 2001

articles left a number of questions unanswered. 100 These include whether the articles
95
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can be invoked in bilateral interstate relations without fonnal UN approval, and
whether, in the absence of fonnal authorisation, the states and judges will be able to
resolve the more controversial aspects of the text. mi James Crawford provides a
more positive assessment and highlights the fact that governments were continually
involved in providing input to the process through the United Nations General
Assembly, Sixth Committee on Legal Affairs. He also suggests that the ILCs
willingness to act on the Committee's suggestions was among the main reasons why
the Assembly promptly passed Resolution 56/83 with practically no debate. 102
Furthennore, the resolution allows ample time for further consideration by the nation
states, and it avoided the possibility of a si gnificantly weakened t ext, if the Assembly
had attempted to fonnally sanction the articles. States can also draw on and fonnalise
aspects of the state responsibility articles into specific treaties.
The articles on state responsibility are organised into four parts, with the origins and
elements of international responsibility contained in part one. Part two deals with the
content of international responsibility, and part three with the implementation of the
international responsibility of a state. Some general provisions are listed in the
smallest section, part four. 103 It is not intended here to provide an in depth analysis of
all the disputed provisions throughout the ILC deliberations, which lasted some four
de:cades, or to indeed provide a detailed account of the 59 articles contained in the
final text. 104 However, before focusing on the final text pertaining to the collective
state obligation areas of interest most relevant to multilateral regimes, it is worth
noting a related area of contention that held up the codification process for many
years.
Perhaps the most controversial issue during the entire deliberations was Article 19 of
the 1996 drafts. The ILC initially attempted to translate the erga omnes concept into
the draft articles by reference to the notion of 11 intemational crimes" of states in
Articles 19 and 40. Article 19 (2) read as follows:
101
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An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an
international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the
international community that breach is recognised as a crime by that conununity as a
whole constitutes an international crime.

105

Article 19 (3) provided some examples of international crimes based on the rules of
international law already in force. James Crawford maintains that such attempts
"plainly strayed over the line between primary and secondary rules". Article 19 in
effect established a distinction between responsibility for international crimes and
delicts. 106 The rationale behind that distinction was that certain wrongful acts were
considered more serious, and thus thought to require separate rules of responsibility.
Yet the distinction created much debate and confusion over what constitutes specific
crimes, and what the consequences would be arising from those crimes, when
defined. 107 The connotations surrounding the use of the word 'crimes' was also
contentious.
To alleviate the controversy, the ILC decided to remove all reference to 'crime' and
the entire text of article 19. This was a compromise between those advocating a
specific category for the more serious breaches, and those who argued that state
responsibility should be contained in a single undifferentiated category of
internationally wrongful acts. 108 Following the removal of article 19, the ILC
introduced a new chapter dealing with serious breaches of obligations owed to the
international community as a whole. Article 41 specifically stated:
I. This Chapter applies to the international responsibility arising from an internationally
wrongful act that constitutes a serious breach by a State of an obligation owed to the
international community as a whole and essential for the protection of its fundamental
interests.
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r,06131.
J. Howard, "Invoking State Responsibility for Aiding Crimes - Australia, the United States and the
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2001].
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2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by
the responsible State to fulfil the obligation, risking substantial harm to the fundamental
interests protected thereby. 109

Yet Article 41 also proved contentious, and a number of governments, including
France, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States, objected to its contents, and
sought the entire deletion of Chapter III. In arguing against the wording of Article
41, one government representative wittily referred to the text as being "still haunted
by the ghost ofintemational crimes11. no There was however support for the retention
of Chapter III from nations such as Derunark, Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia,
though it was agreed that the wording needed improvement. The text was further
reviewed and, in the final draft, Article 41 appears much less controversial, outlining
in (1) that "states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious
breach within the meaning of article 40".111 Firstly the breach must concern an
obligation arising under a perempt.:,ry norm of general international law. Secondly
the intensity of the breach must be considered serious. As the commentaries reveal:
Article 40 serves to define the scope of the breaches covered by the Chapter. It
establishes two criteria in order to distinguish "serious breaches of obligations under
peremptory norms of general htemational law" from other types of breaches. The first
relates to the character of the obligation breached, which must derive from a peremptory
nonn of general international law. The second qualifies the intensity of the breach,
which must have been serious in nature. Chapter III only applies to those violations of
international law that fulfil both criteria. 112

Thus, Articles 40 and 41 are designed to complement each other, with the former
defining the scope of the breaches covered by Chapter III, and the latter setting out
the particular consequences of the breaches.
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The collective dimension of state responsibility has been significantly enhanced by
the work of the ILC and especially by the decision to retain Chapter III. The modem
integrated world of multilateralism was accommodated for, with the shift from the
traditional bilateral approach of state responsibility to an acceptance of obligations
erga omnes. That shift is clearly stated in Article 33, which reads:
The obligations of the responsible State set out in this part may be owed to another
State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in
particular on the character and content of the international obligation and on the
circumstances of the breach. 113

That clause is another recognition of the obligation on states to talce all necessary
measures to prevent hann to other nation states and to the international community as
a whole. The inclusion of the concept of erga omnes in the draft articles is an
important development in the codification of international law, and when fonnally
adopted will give far greater weight to the collective responsibility of states. It is also
worth noting that, even without fonnal ratification, the ILC articles have the potential
to be used by the ICJ, and other arbitral tribunals, to provide clarity and to assist in
judicial decisions to resolve disputes. This has led to some commentators, such as
David Caron, warning against the danger of giving too much credence to the ILC
articles, which although written in treaty fonn, should not be viewed as a source of

law without fonnal adoption.114 Caron is also critical of the ambiguity in much of the
text, and highlights the need to go beyond the 'plain meaning' rule, to consult the
commentaries and ILC reports for greater clarification of intent. He does concede,
however, that if applied correctly the state responsibility articles in conjunction with
case law and customary international law can have a significant impact on the future

development ofintemational law. 115

Despite these improvements, the beneficial aspects of the State Responsibility
Articles to the proponents of a multinational HLW repository are unclear, even when
formally adopted by the coHective body of nation states tlrrough the UN. The main
113
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reason for this is that there is as yet no international mechanism designed with
responsibility and 1iability obligations for the nation states utilising multinational
repositories. While formal adoption of the State Responsibility Articles would likely
assist the ICJ in resolving potential disputes arising from an accident during

transportation of the HLW, 116 the articles would have little effect in the absence ofa

specific treaty for the shared repository. The reason for this is that in order to invoke
state responsibility, there must be a clearly identifiable breach of a specific
obligation. Thus it would be advantageous from the outset to ensluine the relevant
sections of the draft articles on state responsibility in a specifically designed treaty
for the eventual storage ofHLW in the multinational repository.
'

So what sections of the draft articles are most suited to fit the shared responsibility
requirements of the multinational repository concept? The relevant sections
pertaining to the collective responsibility of nation states are contained in Articles 33,
42, and 48, 117 with Article 54 providing a saving clause, which leaves open the
option of countenneasures. Article 33 clarifies the scope and effect of international
obligations. It is explicit in paragraph one that the obligation of the responsible state
depends both on the primary rule which established the obligation that was breached

and on the circumstances of the breach.118 The commentaries use the example of

ocean pollution, which has the potential to affect the international community as a

whole or states ofa region or only a single neighbouring state. 119 The gravity of the

breach may have a significant impact on ihe obligations to cease certain activities
forthwith, and on the extent of reparation. The conunentaries further illustrates that
the reference to several states includes the case in which a breach affects all the

11

other parties to a treaty or to a legal regime established under customary international
law" .12° Since there is no specific legal regime for HLW disposal under customary
international law, the above quote suggests it would be prudent for an easily
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identifiable obligation to have in place a specific ratified treaty covering all aspects
ofa HLW multinational repository.
The signatories to a treaty for a multinational HLW repository would need to commit
to the relevant sections in the draft articles dealing with the collective responsibility
of nation states. Article 42 is one such article that introduces the invocation of
responsibility by an h�ured state. The article provides that:
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the

obligation breached is owed to:
(a) That State individually; or
(b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole,
and the breach of the obligation:
(i)
(ii)

Specially affects that State; or
Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other

States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the
obligation. 121

The conunentaries make clear that Article 42 provides that the implementation of
state responsibility is in the first place an entitlem�nt of the 'injured' state. It defines
the term in a relatively narrow way, drawing on the di�tinction between injury to an
individual state or potentially a small number of states, and the legal interests of
several or all states in certain obligations established in the collective interest. The
specific obligations protecting the collective interest are dealt with in Article 48. The
definition of an 'injured state' in Article 42 is closely modelled on Article 60 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, although the two provisions vary in
scope and purpose. "Article 42 is concerned with any breach of an international
obligation of whatever character, whereas article 60 is concerned with breach of
treaties" . 122 In essence Article 60 is restricted to material breaches of treaties,
whereas, in the context of state responsibility, Article 42 is concerned with any
breach of an international obligation of whatever character. Another significant
difference, with particular relevance to a potential treaty for a HLW waste repository,
is _the intent of Article 42 (a) to provide an obligation under a multilateral treaty to
121
122
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one particular state. 123 This would enable a number of states to commit responsibility
to a single state, whereas Article 60 relied on the formal criterion of bilateral
arrangements. As Brown-Weiss contends, Article 42 innovatively provides for the
invocation of responsibility under the traditional bilateral approach, as well as
providing obligations to a group of states under a multilateral treaty. 124
Article 42 provides the best means for collective 'state responsibility' to include not
only an outward responsibility from a single state to the international community as a
whole, but also an inward responsibility from a group of states to a single state.
Subject to agreement and formalisation in the Treaty, such a provision would
accommodate shared responsibility for the HLW by the nation states utilising the
repository. This would provide protection to the host state that has accepted the
HLW from the other participating states. It would most likely increase the chance of
gaining repository host acceptance, as well as provide incentives for the other states
to ensure adequate monitoring procedures are in place to reduce the potential for
incurred liability.
The capacity for a atate other than the injured state to invoke responsibility of
another state is accornodated for under Article 48, provided:
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 125

This section is particularly relevant to states pru1:icipating in the collective interest
although there has also been criticism of its extende..i scope and ambiguous text. Xue
Hanquin expresses concern that Article 48 "leaves too much room for unilateral
interpretation of what constitutes a collective interest and when an obligation erga
omnes has been breached." 126 His argument may haVe e.ome merit if the 'literal

meaning' of the text is applied to the final draft articles. However, it was never the
intent of the articles to give a free hand to any state to embark on a moral crusade
123
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and initiate legal action in the 'general' collective interest. As Caron argues, it is
always wise to consult the commentaries to ascertain the intent behind the wording
of the text. 127 Thus paragraph 2 states: "Article 48 is based on the idea that in cases
of breaches of specific 128 obligations protecting the interests of a group of states

which are not themselves injured in the sense of article 42." 129 The commentary
further contends that the specific obligations have to be 1collective obligations' such

as a regional security agreement, a regional nuclear free zone treaty, or specific
arrangements for protecting the environment or human rights. 130 Thus, it appears an
endo.rsement of this article would strengthen the collective interests of the
participating states in the shared multinational repository for HLW.
Article 48 1 (b) is also innovative. It is likely to remain controversial in some
quarters but may be particularly suited to cases concerning the transboundary
movement of the HLW on the high seas. In this section, the ILC applied the famous
dictum handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona
Traction 131 case, that there is a distinction between obligations owed to particular

states and those "owed to the international community as a whole". The relevant
paragraph of the case states:
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether
natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and
assumes obligations com:eming the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations,
however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community
as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature the fonner are the concern or all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can he held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations ergo amnes. m

Interestingly, the articles avoided the use of the tenn "obligations erga omnes"
because in the Commission's view it conveyed less information than the ICJ's
121
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reference 133 to the 'international community as a whole', and has in some instances
been confused with obligations owed to all parties to a treaty. 134 Article 48 l (b)
recognises that the international community as a whole has a legal interest in the
performance of particular obligations that are considered to be of universal
significance. In the Barcelona Traction 135 case, the ICJ outlined some such
obligations, including outlawing acts of aggression and genocide, and protection
from slavery and racial discrimination. Additional obligatiom can emerge over time
and, as the commentary revealed, the ICJ added the right of self-determination of
peoples to the list during the East Timor136 case. The prohibition of all dumping of
radioactive waste into the ocean has been widely accepted since the amendment to
the London Dumping Convention in 1993. 137 Arguably, that obligation could be
added to the list, and Article 48 would most likely cover an accident involving HLW
on the high seas, once the articles are fonnally endorsed by the UN. Moreover, the
international community as a whole has a legal interest in protecting humans·and the
broader environment from a radioactive fallout arising from a HLW accident on sea
or on land.
The collective responsibility sections in the ILC draft articles are broadly accepted
by the international community, as evidenced by the fundamental areas of interest
detailed by the ICJ and with the reiteration of Principle 21 in a number of
cooperative multilateral regimes in specific issue areas. Thus, the fonnalisation of the
collective responsibility sections in the draft articles would make a significant
contribution to the enhancement of the international law of state responsibility. Once
the ILC collective principles are endorsed, state responsibility provides the most
suitable international legal mechanism for ensuring adequate liability and restorative
provisions for the multinational HLW repository over the long-tenn. To overcome
ambiguity in the present international system, the most relevant sections, particularly
the ILC collective responsibility sections, need to be endorsed in a binding
multilateral treaty for a HLW repository. Such a commitment would likely meet
Ill During
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resistance from at least some of the nuclear states wishing to utilise the shared
repository, because of the unknown potential liability costs. However, this being the
case only highlights the unfairness in expecting the single host-state to accept all
responsibility and thus liability for the long duration involved for HLW to decay to
safe levels.
While the potential for damage from a HLW repository accident may not be
immediate or as profound as a critical reactor meltdown, there are a host of safety

concerns that must be properly managed to address the public perception of risk. 138

In the absence of a demonstrable existing repository for HLW, and to forcefully
support the technical safety arguments, the nuclear states must be willing to
demonstrate their confidence in the repository concept. A commitment to collective
responsibility and potential liability from the nuclear states utilising the repository
would be the best means of demonstrating that commitment, as well as providing an
avenue for alleviating the public perception of the risks associated with the
multinational HLW repository. That commitment can only be secured in a specific
binding regime, with the full endorsement of the state responsibility principle,
complete with the latest and most relevant ILC recommendations. In signing up to a
binding treaty which accepts shared responsibility for the repository, the collective
states would ensure that proper regular monitoring measures are in place, to avoid

associated costs with an accident or repository failure. JJ9 Another additional
incentive is the desire to maintain public confidence, which if not achieved could
significantly impede acceptance of a multinational repository.
Conclusion

The obligation on states to prevent transboundary pollution is now widely accepted
among international states. This commitment is most strongly expressed in the 'soft
law1 general principles of international law. Despite its tenn, soft law should not be
underestimated, as it can have a significant impact on the practice of states, and can
eventually lead to customary international law. The obligation on states to prevent
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environmental hann to other states and people received notable recognition with the
international law principle of state responsibility. This concept was established with
the Trail Smelter arbitration decision in 1941. It has gained stature over the years
with additional case law and has been the subject of extensive scrutiny by the ILC in
recent times. That process led to the completed draft articles on state responsibility in
200 I which the UN, as requested, duly noted. This allows time for further refinement
and also gives states the opportunity to adopt the relevant articles in ,!'.pecific treaties,
should they choose to do so.
The ILC deliberations and completed draft Articles have significantly advanced the
development of state responsibility in international law. The specific section on the
collective responsibility of states is most innovative and particularly relevant to a
host of issues in the modem globally integrated world. In terms of the transboundary
nature of a multilateral HLW repository, state responsibility is the most suitable
international legal principle to mitigate the hazardous risks associated with long term
radioactive waste. To avoid uncertainty, however, the nuclear states cannot leave the
application of the concept to the resolution of the international courts. It would be
better for them to seize the opportunity, examine the ILC draft articles and enshrine
state responsibility in a specific HLW multilateral regime. The detailed elements of
that treaty would be decided by the participating states, but would require an
expansion of the state responsibility concept to the col_lective responsibility of states.
In so doing, the treo.ty would need to include the collective responsibility sections of
the ILC draft articles, or similar wording. A comprehensive HLW multilateral treaty,
complete with detailed collective liability mechanisms, would most likely alleviate
the public perception of associated radioactive risks. The additional advantage of
such a detailed regulatory regime, especially if it contained a shared commitment for
potential liability costs, would be the increased likelihood of gaining repository host
acceptance.
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CHAPTER SIX

A SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR
MULTINATIONAL REPOSITORIES
The number of fonnal and in many cases binding mu1tilateral agreements in trade,

security, human rights and the envirorunent has increased greatly since the Second
1
World War. The primary reason for this is that nation states have been compelled to

seek solutions to a range of issues at either a regional or a global level. 2 A number of
steps need to occur, however, before such agreements become fonnalised. Firstly, the
problem to be resolved must be identified and researched. Secondly, the problem
area must have the elements of interdependence requiring interstate cooperation.
Thirdly, deliberations can occur over many years before the necessary commitment
and collaboration among states is obtained.3 The degree and depth of nation state
commitment is fundamental to the process, design and eventual structure of the
international agreement. An agreement that is weak from the outset can reflect a lack
of commitment among the state parties on how to resolve the issue in question. It can
also allow states to ignore the guiding principles of an agreement, claiming that there
are no binding strictures on their internal governing machinery. Some treaties for
example, only contain statements of intent, or what are known as guiding principles.
While such 'soft law' treaties amount to no more than declarations between states, the
principles have the potential to gain broad acceptance and be later included in
binding agreements.
The previous chapter argued the case for shared responsibility and long-tenn liability
provisions to be included in a binding treaty in order to manage HLW in a
multinational repository. It highlighted the fact that the civil nuclear liability
conventions are unsuitable for the necessary amendments required to cover the longI B. Simmons, "Compliance with International Agreements." Annual Review ofPolitical Science
(1998) p75 [hereinafter, Simmons, 1998]; S. Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of
Environmental Statecraft. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 p135.
2 N. Lavranos, "Multilateral Environmental A greements: Who Makes the Binding Decisions?"
European Environmental law Review (2002) p44.
3
0. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998 p4. [hereinafter, Young, 1998].
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tenn responsibility for the multinational repository, because of the large number of
participating states with varying interests. The 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management4 is
also unsuitable for managing the shared responsibility requirements because of its
contents. The Joint Convention would also be difficult to amend because it comprises
both participating nuclear and non-nuclear states. Thus, this ch apter argues the case
for designing a completely new and separate treaty for the long-term storage of HLW
in multinational repositories. Such a treaty would have four additional advantages. It
would have the capacity to facilitate cooperation between the states during the
negotiation phase of forming a new treaty. A carefully and specifically designed
treaty with appropriate new legal concepts 5 would have the propensity to alleviate
public perceptions of risk with geological repositories. A specific treaty could assist
with building public trust and enhance legitimacy for a multinational repository. And
a multilateral treaty would also provide the necessary framework for governing the
negotiated outcomes associated with a regional or global multinational repository.6
This chapter commences with a brief overview of the Joint Convention. It then seeks
to refute the loss of sovereignty argument, often advanced by sceptics of interstate
cooperation, by highlighting some examples where states have collaborated to
resolve collective action problems. It advocates the stepwise approach to
multinational repositories by outlining the necessary and beneficial phases of regime
fonnation.7 The process of regime fonnation can assist with negotiations and
identify and establish the fundamental requirements that should be included in a
treaty designed for the specific issue to be resolved by a collaborative approach. A
concluded agreement for a multinational repository would need to manage the shared
costs, provide ownership details of the HLW, outline the procedures for monitoring

4
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management 1997, INFCIR/546. [hereinafter, the Joint Convention].
' P. Riley, "Policy and Law Relating to Radioactive Waste: International Direction and Human
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safety, and enable the retrieval of the HLW if required. Finally, with an emphasis on
process and compliance, a case is made for a specific type of self regulating treaty.
The Need for a Specific Multilateral HLW Repository Treaty
The 1997 Joint Convention8 and the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety9 are the
prevailing international conventions on nuclear safety, with both aiming to achieve
high levels of safety worldwide with the use of incentives measures. The Convention
on Nuclear Safety primarily encourages the safe management of nuclear activities
associated with energy creation, while the Joint Convention promotes the safe
management, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The preamble
to the Joint Convention maintains that the waste should, 11 as far as is compatible with
the safety of the management of such material, be disposed of in the State in which it
was generated", but then it leaves open the option of inter-state cooperation under
certain circumstances. 10 Thus there are no measures in the Joint Convention that
prohibit a multinational repository, and it is an important instrument for guiding the
safe management ofHLW.
When the nuclear states enter into formal agreements, the obvious expectation would
be for them to endorse or uphold the non·binding IAEA safety codes with detailed
mandatory standards. However, this was not the case with these two prominent land
based conventions on nuclear safety. The Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint
Convention both lack specific safety obligations. Both conventions consist of vague
principles rather than mandatory requirements, and both rely on the Parties to talce
appropriate national measures to maintain safety. 11 Katia Boustany argues that the
two treaties 11highlight a worrying trend in nuclear regulation, whereby they retain
their legal status of hard law but are effectively transformed into soft law because of
their contf;Ot". 12 The 'soft law' option is unsuitable for a multinational HLW

repository for two main reasons. Firstly, the unproven technology for safeguarding
the long-lived radionuclides in the HLW requires the support of binding institutional
Supra n4 the Joint Convention.
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arrangements. Secondly, a multinational repository will require widespread public
acceptance in a number of nation states, and the attainment of the necessary public
confidence would be most difficult without fonnal regulatory backing. Thus it is
unclear how beneficial the Joint Convention, which covers spent-fuel and radioactive
waste, could be for a shared multinational repository, without significant
renegotiation to instil binding regulatory obligations on the state parties.
In an effort to meet the objectives of the Joint Convention, two linked articles were
adopted, which required the Contracting Parties to prepare a national report13 for
each review meeting. 14 The first review meeting for the Joint Convention occurred in
November 2003, with the Parties concluding that the Convention, the Review
Meeting and the peer review process all contributed to the enhanced safety of spent
fuel and radioactive waste management. 15 One notable benefit of the review
meetings, and of peer review, is that they enhance the capacity for infonnation
sharing, which inevitably leads to a greater understanding of particular problems and
potential solutions. Yet the peer review process only partly offsets the shortcomings
of self monitoring and reporting. Despite having agreed to specific guidelines for the
structure and content of the national reports, some states did not follow the fonnat at
all, and there was much variation amongst those that did. 16 Clearly there needs to be
a greater emphasis on reporting factual compliance, rather than merely stating
national regulations or mere objectives. 17 It would also be beneficial for there to be a
dngle uniform global waste classification inventory, combined with uniform global
safety standard criteria for geological repositories. The considerable lack of
unifonnity in both practice and procedures among the Contracting Parties to the Joint
Convention strongly suggests the need for a complete new treaty to specifically
cover shared multinational repositories.

Supra n 4 Article 32, the Joint Convention.
Ibid Article 30.
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Another drawback with the Joint Convention is that some of the state parties have no
operating nuclear power plants. While those states would have an interest in
maximising global security, it is difficult to envisage a non-nuclear state agreeing to
the hosting of a multinational repository without a binding agreement that included
shared responsibility provisions. It is also most unlikely that any state that did not
obtain direct benefits from nuclear power would contribute to any costs relating to a
multinational repository. The Joint Convention is also unsuitable for amendment
because agreement to include mandatory requirements would be virtually impossible
to achieve among the participating states with such diverse interests. When the
limitations of the current safety and other nuclear conventions are considered,
combined with the need for suitable liability requirements discussed in the previous
chapter, the argument for a specific treaty to manage a complex multinational
repository becomes clearer.
The Benefits of Shared Sovereignty
Thf.:re is however often a reluctance for states to adopt an international regulatory
framework because of a perceived 'loss of sovereignty'. Despite this reluctance, there
is a symbiotic relationship between international law and international politics that

cannot be ignored, 18 and the loss of sovereignty argument has been overcome many
times by the collaborative action of nation states. 19 While it is self-evident that
international law cannot exist without the consent of sovereign states, modem nation
states are increasingly turning to international law to help with the creation and
promotion of nonns such as peace and security, and for a range of general
environmental principles and rules.20
In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia involved the signing of a number of treaties that
ended the Thirty Years War,21 and it is often referred to as the beginning of the
modem international system of sovereign states. International relations and
international law have evolved since that time, but the central principle of the
18

M. Byers, The Role ofLaw in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
19
Supra n I.
20
P, Sands, Principles ofInternational Environmental Law. Second ed. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003 p231.
Essentially this was a religious war between European Catholics and Protestants.
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sovereign authority of the territorial state remains. The 1995 Conunission on Global
Governance documented three important norms that stem from the principle of
sovereign authority. 22 First, all soverei gn states, no matter how large or small, have
equal rights. Second, the territorial integrity and political independence of all
soverei gn states are inviolable. And third, political interference in the domestic
affairs of sovereign states is not pennissible. 23
The sovereignty of states is the main principle upon which the modern world is
ordered, but it is also a contested concept.24 The traditional understanding of state
soverei gnty, as 'supreme authority' and 'external independence,' is no longer
applicable in every situation, if it ever was. Stephen Krasner argues that the
Westphalian model has never been a completely accurate description of many of the
entities that have been called states.25 There are varying degrees of autonomy, with
even the most powerful states having to accept compromise and in some cases
outside scrutiny or 'interference'. State rulers have either chosen or have been
compelled by international nonns to accept certain principles such as democracy,
human rights, fiscal responsibility, environmental conunitrnents, and restrictions in
nuclear weapons capabilities. States and their citizens have enjoyed the benefits of
shared sovereignty by working collectively to reduce the use of ozone-depleting
gases. They have enjoyed the benefits of integrated world markets, the exchange of
information and knowledge and have benefited from collaborative efforts on disease
prevention control.
Yet one can still find trepidation about moves towards a more integrated political
society and the perception of'losing sovereignty' can be relatively easy to create and
then maintain. This is sometimes the case in Europe, with the debate on 'integration'
often revolving around the relinquishing of sovereignty. At the June 2004 elections
in the UK, some of the pro European Labour candidates lost to the Eurosceptics,
22 I. Carlsson & S. Ramphal, (Co-Chair). Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report ofthe Commission
on Global Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Pre�s, 1995.
21
lbidp68.
24
R Vll.yrynen, "Sovereignty, Globalisation and Transnational Social Movements." International
Relations ofthe Asia-Pacific 1 (2001) p23 l,
25
S. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia. (Nuclear Issues in Asia)." International Security 20 (1995)
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whose main platfonn was the predictable 'loss of sovereignty' argument that a more
integrated Europe would bring. Despite those concerns and the Labour losses, the
UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, continues his push for closer links to Europe.26 In
the aftennath of the elections, and in defence of a negotiated European constitution,
he said the proposed wording demolished the myths about Britain surrendering
sovereignty to a federal superstate. "Myths that the constitution would force Britain
to join the Euro, give up its United Nations Security Council seat and hand over
control of its armed forces, taxes, oil and foreign policy to Brussels had been
demolished".27
In reality, states voluntarily collaborate and share sovereignty on a range of issues.
John Richardson, deputy head of the delegation of the European Commission in
Washington, provides the following definition to help explain why the European
Member States share sovereignty.
The sovereignty of a nation is its ability to take the action necessary to control its own
destiny, achieve its aims, and further its interests in an independent manner.

28

There is now widespread recognition that states are unable to individually solve a
range of problems associated with a modem integrated interdependent world.29 Many
states in Europe opted for the single European currency, and adopted common
monetary and fiscal policies, because of the direct benefits to be gained by doing so.
For the smaller states, in particular, those gains could only be achieved with a more
collaborative�shared fonn of sovereignty. One of the main lessons from the European
integration experience is that effective sovereignty can sometimes best be achieved

by sharing it. 30
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Peace and security are arguably the overarching objectives that motivate states to
take collective action and are the foundation principles underpinning the Charter of
the United Nations.31 Article 1 {I} outlines the purposes of the United Nations as
being
to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the supression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in confonnity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.31

There are many examples of collective state involvement to maintain peace and
security under the auspices of the UN, with peacekeeping efforts being perhaps the
most visible.33
Another example of state collaborative efforts to maintain security is the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO was established in Washington on 4
April 1949, to help protect an alliance of the US and European states during the Cold
War.34 However, it took the unprecedented terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001,
for NATO to invoke Article 5, its collective defence article, for the first time. 35 That
transnational alliance rose to the challenge of international terrorism and did not
waver throughout the campaign in Afghanistan. Differences did emerge on the
decision to invade Iraq, with France and Germany being the two prominent
opponents.36 Nevertheless, the comments of the British Foreign Secretary, Jack
Straw, speaking in the the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, on our need to reM
think our attit,,des to concepts like 'independence' and 'sovereignty' are profound. He
contends:

31
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St. Martin's Press, 1993.
34
The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243.
35
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In today's world, by pooling sovereignty, a people may end up with more, not less,
control over their lives. This is because, in an interdependent world, our security and
prosperity depend on our ability to influence events in the rest of the world, not on our
7

ability to stop others from influencing us. 3

It does not follow, however, that an expanding globalised world requires some fonn
of universal supreme organisational authority, or overarching 'world government'.
Such a move would not only be extremely controversial and impractical, and in any
case no international organisation is equipped to provide world governance.38
Following the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations came into
existence in 1945 with 51 states committed to promoting world peace and security.39
Heavily influenced by the desire for the atrocities of World War Two never to be
repeated, the UN began with much optimism. That high level of confidence was
somewhat misguided because the UN was never intended to provide global
governance, as some have thought. Thakur maintains that observers of the UN can
largely be divided into two groups: the romantic and the cynical.40 The fonner sees a
visionary role for the UN and blames any failures on a lack of collective state will.
The cynics, on the other hand, highlight the fact that the UN takes credit for its
successes but quickly points to an absence of political will to explain away its
failures. The critics maintain that the organisation is top heavy and suffers from a
lack of direction, wasteful spending, lack of accountability and an inability or
unwillingness to implement meaningful refonn. As in many debates, the reality lies
somewhere between the extreme views. The strength of the UN resides not in any
propensity to 1govern' but in its ability to provide a universal forum to facilitate
international cooperation and to enhance negotiated outcomes between states.41
In the international arena, states collaborate to promote human rights, democracy and
trade, to enhance security, to better manage natural resources and to resolve
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environmental problems, and states often use treaties as a means of achieving their
overall aims. An effective international agreement requires the participation, and
perhaps most importantly the clear conunitment of states to resolve the collective
action problem. In a functiona! analysis of sovereignty, Franz Perrez concludes that
the understanding of sovereignty based on absolute freedom and independence is no
longer conceptually useful when dealing with some of today's interdependent
environmental, social and economic realities.42 Focusing on environmental issues, he
maintains that sovereignty involves a duty to cooperate, in order to deal effectively
with modem global challenges. Basing his argument on the existence of a range of
international regimes, Perrez further contends that international environmental law
already accepts such a duty to cooperate. However, his analysis neglects to provide
reasons why states collaborate to resolve particular issues, as international law
cannot of itself impose a duty on states to cooperate without some form of consensus.
International law, however, can and does provide a framework to facilitate
collaboration between states with shared interests and desires, and that collaboration
often culminates in a formal agreement.
Regime Formation
In the absence of world government, regimes play a central role in providing a range
of mechanisms for regulating the relationship between states. Oran Young makes a
clear distinction between government - formal centralised organisations, and
governance - social institutions, such as regimes.43 Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood
continue the theme of governance by drawing on the similarities between
international law and international relations theory.44 The authors highlight the
resemblance between definitions of regimes in international relations and
international law. They define international governance as "formal and informal
bundles of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate the social practices
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of state and non-state actors in international affairs11•45 Among the widely accepted
regimes fitting that definition is Treaty Law. The process of treaty making, from the
initial stages to achieving consensus and eventual agreement, is particularly
conducive to states resolving complex issues. States utilise treaties to facilitate
cooperation for the greater good and they rely on the legal dispute mechanisms
inherent in the treaty to resolve issues of contention. 46
It is too narrow to view formal treaties as mere restrictive documents regulating the
behaviour of states in a given issue area. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 47 for instance, enables states to have greater control over
ocean resources. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons48
facilitated the use of nuclear technology for peaceful energy creation, and has helped
to a !arge extent to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. International law has also
been used to facilitate solutions to potential risks. Under the precautionary principle,
states are encouraged to counteract threats of serious or irreversible damage, and a
lack of full scientific certainty may not be used as a reason for postponing cost
effective measures to prevent envirorunental degradation. 49 Treaties such as the
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 199?5°
and the Montreal Protocol of 198?5 1 were heavily influenced by the imperative to act
without conclusive proof. International law and various institutions actively promote
the concept of sustainable development, and they help raise world health standards
and the recognition of human rights. International regulation should therefore not be
viewed as negative and restrictive. Rather, it should be recognised for its capacity,
especially during the regime building phase, to facilitate cooperation and incorporate
innovative legal concepts.
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Agenda Forlllation
The phases leading up to the fonnation of a treaty regime are critical to securing a
comprehensive framework and in achieving ultimate success with both the intent and
objects of particular treaties. Young describes the three developmental stages in
c reating regimes as agenda fonnation, negotiation and operationalization.52 The
essential first step in the fonnation of a treaty involves the issue gaining
consideration, preferably at the highest levels of govenunent. For example, the
Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region53 was championed by
the Norwegian foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, but only really shifted to the
negotiation stage when the Russian foreign minister, Andre Kozyrev, agreed to the
concept.54 The Barents R egion consists of thirteen counties in the northenunost parts
of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Rm;sia. With joint Nonvegian and Russian
ministerial backing, the negotiations gathered momentum, and in 1993 the Barents
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) was established as a forum for inter-governmental
cooperation in the Barents Region.55 Among the main focus areas of interest were
economic cooperation, health and social issues, human trafficking, energy and the
environment. At their Sixth Session in Bodo, Norway in March 1999, BEAC
discussed issues of nuclear safety and radioactive waste. One of its objectives is to
advance safe interim HLW storage in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions in
Russia. BEAC is one example of a successful regime that benefited from the direct
involvement of senior govenunent ministers who helped drive the issue on to the
political agenda.
'Much of the credit for raising the awareness of multinational repositories, at least
among the international nuclear intelligentsia, can be attributed to Charles
McCombie and Neil Chapman.56 At the international level the IA.EA has contributed
to the advancement of of the case for multinational repositories. The Pang ea project
also raised awareness of the issue. Those efforts have progressively put the issue on
s1 Supran3 Young, 1998.
s3 Declaratio11 on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 1993, First Session of the Barents
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the international agenda. But multinational repositories have not yet gained senior
goverrunent backing in any country. Government agencies responsible for
radioactive waste, particularly those associated with ARIUS and SAPIERR, do
provide teclmical support and funding for ongoing research into the multinational
repository option. Yet thus far no political leader has championed the cause, and the
multinational repository concept cannot be viewed as a 'first order' priority issue until
it receives the direct involvement of government ministers from a significant number
of nuclear states.57
Clearly, commitment from the main nuclear states would be most beneficial for
bringing about a comprehensive multinational solution for the safe global
management of HLW. A more limited number of states could engage in the
formation of a shared repository, but to exclude any nuclear state that lacked the
means to better safeguard its HLW would weaken the overall global security
argument. The US, France and the UK are major nuclear states with a pro-active
stance on world security, and it would be desirable if they were to play a leading role
in a global multinational repository option. 58 Those states could play a leading role in
their specific regions. A clear commitment from the larger nuclear states would
encourage the small states to participate in a collaborative regional or global solution
to the HLW problem. Moreover, multilateral treaties have greater credibility when
the larger states are committed to the interdependent solution that the specific treaty
is designed to help achieve. This is clearly evident in the environmental field, with
the Montreal Protocol having greater state commitment than the Kyoto Protocol.59
Negotiation and Operational Phases

Once an issue gains consideration on the int ernational political agenda, the next step
in regime formation is the negotiation phase.60 This is a crucial stage in the process,
as it enables detailed information exchange, provides a forum for clarifying overall
s7 For factors promoting collective action in the provision of public goods, see T. Sandler, "Global and
Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action." Fiscal Studies 19 (1998): 221-47.
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''objectives and allows the state parties to highlight their particular interests and
concerns. There is obviously some overlap between the negotiation and the
operational phases. The negotiation period can take some time, as evidenced by the
case of UNCLOS, negotiations for which lasted over ten years.61 Because of the
potentially long duration of negotiations, it would be beneficial for the nuclear states
to get together as soon as practicable to discuss in detail the issue of HLW from a
regional or global perspective. Only at such a meeting could the nation-states clearly
identify and articulate their shared objectives and desires. The most likely incentive
for nuclear state cooperation is the enhancement of global security that underground
storage ofHLW would hring.62 The states could discuss cost sharing arrangements
and the benefits of finalising a formal treaty to engender trust and help alleviate the
public perception of risks with the repository proposal. The prospects of regime
formation are enhanced by common ethnic, cultural, historical or geographical
relationships. 63 The states participating in the SAPIERR project in Europe appear to
fit those criteria and the prospect of securing a repository would likely be enhanced
from attempts to formalise a treaty.
The economic cost of constructing an underground geological repository 1s
considerable and is beyond the means of the majority of the smaller nuclear states
acting alone. This assertion has been widely documented and put fonvard as a main
argument for a shared repository, by proponents in states such as Belgium, Bulgaria,
64
Switzerland, Taiwan and the Ukraine.65 One form of cost sharing arrangement is to

apply the user pays principle. Under that system an agreed fonnula could be devised
for the allocation of construction and operation costs, based on each state's
percentage of the waste destined for the repository.
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The same fonnula could also be applied to manage the potential liability burden by
linking the total cost of reparation directly to the amount of exported waste. Thus if
an accident were to occur in the future, the states utilising the repository would meet
the reparation costs based on the percentage split, as outlined in chapter four.66 If
agreed, each state utilising the repository could be required to make payments into a
centralised insurance fund to be held in trust by the host state. The individual states
would have the autonomy to raise the funds in a manner of their choosing. One
option for raising funds, which has applied in the US since fiscal year 1983, would
be to place a small fee on the nuclear utilities that generate electricity from the
nuclear reactors to help pay for radioactive waste disposal.67 This would be passed
on to the consumers and would be factored into the overall cost of nuclear power.
The benefit of a combined state reserve fund would be to provide funding
arrangements on an ongoing basis and to access monies quickly in the event of an
accident.
The objective of including shared responsibility and liability requirements is that
they would act as a preventative safety measure,68 and the international law concept
of state responsibility appears to be the best means for achieving that goal. Under a
shared responsibility and liability system, each participating state has a direct
financial incentive for the repository to remain safe, and this would increase the
likelihood of proper monitoring procedures being put in place and enforced. Regular
monitoring would help prevent accidents or radioactive leakage into the
environment. The IAEA could provide additional expertise, serving the role of
independent inspectorate, to overcome any shortcomings with a self-monitoring
system. 69 Detailed records of achieved safety standards could be regularly
maintained. The treaty could also include a return clause under the combined fund
arrangement, which would enable the states to access the money in the event that it
was under utilised. The timeframe involved would need to be negotiated, but it
66
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would have to be in the hundreds of years. There might be reluctance among some
states, at least, to make payment into an insurance fund to be managed over the long
term without such a return clause.
There may be a temptation for a financially impoverished state to consider hosting
the repository as a means of raising revenue. One state that has already expressed an
interest in importing radioactive waste is Kazakhstan.70 Yet the public perception of
the risks involved in geological repositories is one of the most difficult aspects to
overcome, and any serious proposal could not risk being perceived as offering any
form

of 'coercive inducement'. To overcome that .perception, and to gain the

necessary international community acceptance, the states involved would have to
clearly demonstrate a lasting commitment to the host community, in order to
alleviate the public perception of risk in shifting the burden of responsibility to the
voluntary host state. Finn financial assurances including long-term liability
· i ··

commitments would greatly assist with confidence building, but these assurances
would have to be endorsed in a treaty to demonstrate a clear commitment to the host
state.
Risk and Regulation
The public perception of the risks associated with all nuclear activities has been a
si gnificant constraint in implementing the nuclear indust_ry's preferred option of
geological HLW repositories at the national level.71 Thr�ughout the radioactive
waste policy literature, public opposition to repository siting has been identified as a
major problem. 72 There are vast differences, however, between the risks from nuclear
reactors and those from geological repositories. The impact of a reactor accident is
usually immediate and can be profound, whereas the fear with repositories is the
potential for the radioactive waste to leach into the ground-water systems over a
70
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period of time. It is estimated that the latter could occur only after hundreds of years,
when the canisters selected eventually corrode. Despite the nuclear industry having
focused intensely on the safety aspects of repository design, those efforts have not
transferred into alleviating the widespread negative public perception of all things
nuclear. This perception transfers into considerable apprehension at the shorter term
risks associated with the transportation of the HLW on the high seas,73 and at the
risks involved with disposal of the waste in an underground repository. The
underground repository option relies on the multi-barrier technology and on suitable
geology. One key difficulty with this option is tbat the nuclear industry is unable to
provide an existing example of success, to demonstrate the safety aspects and
alleviate the negative public perception of risk.
As demonstrated in the above case study of the PRA proposal, the public perception
of risk is quite high when it concerns the voluntary hosting of a multinational HLW
repository. The main factors that contributed to the high anxiety levels in Australia
were a perception of secrecy, mistrust of government, 74 and negative media
exposure, which when combined amplified the negative perceptions of the risks
associated with the multinational repository concept. Thoff. perceptions were
compounded by the fact that, after a 40-year operational life, the repository was to
become the responsibility of the Australian Government. There were no attempts to
share responsibility for the HLW or the associated risks over the long-term and thus
no mention of the need for a regulatory multinational agreement to manage those
risks. Consequently, PRA failed to convince the conununity and the governing
bodies of the technological safety features of the Pangea repository concept,75 or that
the economic benefits outweighed the risks.
The use of regulation has been prominent at a national and international level to
support various safety features and sound behavioural practices in a range of risk
73
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management areas. Environmental protection legislation was enacted in the early
1970s throughout Western democracies, in response to comnuinity concerns with the
risks posed by industrial pollution, environmental degradation and diminishing
natural resources. The risks fr.om nur,lear activities have long been appreciated, with
both domestic and interna'.�.cnal law used in an effort to enhance safety. Among the
main pieces of legislation covering the safety of nuclear installations in the UK are
the Health and Safety at Wodc Act 1974, 16 and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965,11
whlle the Radioactive Substances Act 199318 regulates the disposal of radioactive
wastes generated by any facility. In the US the Energy Reorganization Act 1974
established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And '.n Australia nuclear safety is
governed by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998
(Cth).79 These and many other national laws allow nuclear technology to be used,
and at the same time �ey help ensure that safety concerns remain a high priority.
At the national level, legal agreements are also recognised as an important
mechanism for building public trust and assisting with locating radioactive waste
sites. For example, the success of the Port Hope Area Initiative in southern Ontario
Canada, was due to the combination of a legal agreement with a step-by-step
community-driven approach. In the 1980's, two attempts at siting a low-level
radioactive waste facility failed because of insufficient community involvement. The
legal agreement between the Government of Canada and the Municipalities of Hope
Township, Cfo:rington and Town of Port Hope clearly lays out the terms under which
the initiative will proceed.80 It includes property value protection and host
community grants in direct response to the community wishes. The agreement
involves a commitment of $CAN 260 million by the government and commits the
parties to cooperate toward the development and implementation of the Initiative.
The legal agreement is viewed as a milestone in the long-tenn management of local
historic wastes. 81
'76 1974 c. 37.
77 1965 c. 57.
78 1993 c. 12.
79 No 133, 1998.
so P. Brown & D. McCauley, "Port Hope Area Initiative." Paper presented at the 9th International
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Similarly, Sweden used legal agreements to support its innovative model that
actively involves local communities in the siting process for a HLW repository.
Recognised internationally, the Oskarshamn model is based on complete
transparency and direct public participation in the decision-making process. Its
success lies in building innovative new methods for public participation within the
existing legal framework of the environmental impact assessment process.82 In
March 2002, the Oskarshamn municipality council decided to allow the industry to
commence deep borehole investigative drilling, subject to thirteen conditions. The
last condition in the agreement requires a clarification in law as to who will be
responsible for the waste post repository closure and that clarification must occur
during the site investigation process. Thus legal agreements have been used to
underpin negotiated outcomes for radioactive waste facilities at the national level.
Similar arrangements would be beneficial for a multinational repository in the
international arena.
The importance of international regulation for nuclear activities is already evident.
The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation was recognised soon after World War
Two, and it is unlikely that nuclear electricity generation would have gained
widespread acceptance without concerted efforts to conclude an agreement on anns
control. Those efforts culminated in the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty in 1968.83 Since that time, many international conventions and treaties have
been enacted to protect humans and the environment and to increase levels of safety
for a ·range of nuclear activities. Some treaties are prohibitive, such as the
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter 1972, 84 which bans the dumping of HLW at sea. Others such as the
Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention have codified much of the
existing state practices relating to nuclear activities. Birnie and Boyle maintain that
,':

ipe latter two treaties "represent an important stage in the evolution of international
regulation and supervision of nuclear power and its waste products". 85 Given the
82
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need for shared responsibility and liability for HLW in a multinational repository,
combined with existing state practices of enacting legislation to manage risk and the
advantages associated with treaty formation, and trust building, the arguments for a
specific multilateral treaty should overcome fears about any perceived loss of
sovereignty.

Effectiveness and Compliance with Treaty Law
�le a Treaty is an important source of law, it relies on the conse:.�t of states for its
very existence, and it is not the 'law' itself that brings about the change in state
behaviour but the desire and the political will of the participating states themselves.
International law is primarily underpinned by the concept of reciprocity, and states
obey the rules and obligations of treaties most of the time.86 The fundamental norm
underpinning International Law is pacta sunt servanda - treaties are to be obeyed.
To do otherwise would undennine the entire international legal order, upon which so
many states depend for security, trade, navigation, human rights and the protection
and regulation of natural resources. State commitment, effectiveness and compliance
are therefore necessarily interrelated intrinsic components of a successful treaty.
The foundation of any multilateral treaty is nation state commibnent, which is
demonstrated by the required number of states fonnally ratifying87 a particular treaty
to bring it into force. Because of the time scale required for HLW to decay to
accepted safe levels, responsibility for the safe management of the repository will
span many generations. 88 Consequently, the need for an effective treaty combined
with robust and lasting compliance measures are fundamental requirements in any
legal framework designed to cover multinational repositories. As an incentive based
treaty, the Joint Convention does not contain compliance measures,89 which further
strengthens the argument for a specifically designed treaty for a multinational
repository that would include compliance measures. In the event of a breach of
international law, states rely either on dispute settlement procedures, or they can
adopt the softer managerial approach to resolve cases of non-compliance.
86
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Under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice states can seek
adjudication for the resolution of various environmental and other disputes. 90 Or they
can use other arbitrational forums, as in the dispute between Ireland and the United
Kingdom in relation to the MOX plant at Sellafield. This was heard at the

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and in the UNCLOS arbitration
tribunal.91 Although widely available and increasingly used by states in the past
decade or so, these types of forums are adversarial by nature, and are usually only
accessed after an event has occurred. In other words, there is often little emphasis on
,dispute avodiance. These various dispute resolution options remain available to all
participating states, but certain issues may be more suitably resolved at a much
earlier stage under the terms of the relevant treaty.

)i

Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes highlight the fact that in many instances non
compliance of treaty requirements is unintentional, mostly occurring due to a lack of
capability, clarity or priority, and as such are problems that are more suitably
resolved by a managerial model.92 This model relies primarily on a cooperative
problem-solving approach rather than a coercive one. Thus the notion that a treaty
must have teeth, in other words strong coercive enforcement mechanisms, is
11

11

somewhat misleading. To rely solely on coercive enforcement measures to ensure
compliance with the majority of treaties suggests either a lack of commitment among
the state parties or a poorly designed legal framework in the given issue area.
The managerial model or 'soft' enforcement Of treaties should not, be confused with
'soft law' mentioned earlier. Treaties are classified as hard law, and the issue is how
to ensure treaties are complied with, once its terms are agreed to. Soft enforcement of
treaties is common and usually consists of self-regulating measures combined with
some fonn ofinherent supervisory international institutional arrangements.
Among the most innovative institutional arrangements for encouraging cooperation,
achieving consensus and meeting agreed obligations are self-contained legally
90
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binding treaties. Heavily used in Multilateral Envirorunental Agreements, these

{,' particular frameworks establish independent intergovernmental bodies with decisionmaking powers, a Secretariat, and specific budgetary provisions. The independent
body or plenary organ consists of delegates from the member states and is called
either a Meeting of Parties (MOP), as in the Montreal Protocol, or a Conference of
Parties (COP), as in the Kyoto Protocol. Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein refer to
these particular forums as "autonomous institutional arrangements" (AINs) because
of the decision-making powers and likely compliance mechanisms assigned to the
COP.93 The ceding of some sovereignty to the plenary organ is offset by the
involvement of high-level delegates from government, often ministerial,94 and by the
need to achieve consensus in fanning decisions. Another feature of AIA's is their
inherent capacity to remain flexible and innovative as research and knowledge in the
specific area progresses. The capacity to adapt is achieved by amending the annexes
attached to the protocol in response to technical or political developments. One
example of the ability to change international treaties under these flexible
arrangements occurred in 1993, when the Consultative Meeting of the Parties
amended the London Dumping Convention. That amendment effectively banned the
dumping of industrial and all radioactive wastes at sea.
Oran Young in his 1979 study suggested that:
Compliance can be said to occur when the actual behaviour of a given subject confo� \\
\\
to prescribed behaviour, and non-compliance or violation occurs when actual behaviour ',,
departs significantly from prescribed behaviour. 95

'\

Young's definition is important for a number of reasons. Firstly it distinguishes
compliance from implementation or ratification, the adoption of the particular treaty
objectives into domestic law, which of itself does not ensure the necessary required
behaviour. Secondly, it distinguishes compliance from effectiveness, as it is easy to
comply with a weak agreement without necessarily impacting much on the overall
93
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intent of the treaty. If for example pollution reduction targets are set too low, or are
not binding on a sufficient number of states, the end result may not match the objects
of the treaty.96 For example, the Kyoto Protocol is an important step in the global
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but it is weaker for not including some of
the larger developing states. With Russia's ratification, the treaty has now entered
into force, despite the absence of Australia and the US. These two states rely heavily
on fossil fuel for generating electricity and are among the largest greenhouse gas
emitters per capita. The US and Australia have thus far refused to ratify because of
the economic impacts, and because competing states such as China and India are not
required to sign ,ip because of their 'developing status1.97 Consequently, the Protocol
is now legally binding, and many of the state parties are likely to comply with agreed
targets, but overall global emission reductions may not meet the desired objectives
and may have little impact on climate change. It is therefore most important to focus
on effectiveness as well as on compliance to encourage states to change their
behaviour from the outset. The Kyoto Protocol may yet prove successful but it will
require the participation of the US and Australia as well as China, India and others in
order to maximise effectiveness and mitigate global warming.
A highly successful and effective international treaty regime that helped change
actual state behaviour was the Montreal Protocol. In 1974, Sherwood Rowland and
Mario Molina argued that a group of industrial chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) could (if production and emissions levels were allowed to continue) result in
the destruction of the ozone layer.98 Global awareness of the problem increased
throughout the 1970s and gained momentum at both the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environmental Programme. A loose framework
convention was signed in 1985, but it was the Montreal Protocol two years later that
made significant progress in terms of binding obligations and specificity.99 While
96

Supra n 1 Simmons, 1998 p78.
V. Cusack, "Opposing Paradigms or Room for Convergence: The Australian Dilemma."
Environmental Policy and Law 31 (2001) p28.
98
P. Sze11, "Negotiations on the Ozone Layer," in International Environmental Negotiation, edited by
G. Sjostedt. Newbury Park, Califonnia: SAGE Publications, 1993, pp31-47.
99
I. Wettestad, "The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on Ozone- Layer Depletion," in
Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence, edited by E. Miles, A.
Underdal, S. Andresen, J.Wettestad, I. Skjaerseth & E. Carlin. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002, p14970.
97

195

acknowledging that specific institutional frameworks cannot be universally applied,
there are many aspects of the Montreal Protocol that may be beneficial to other treaty
regimes. Importantly, a strong political commitment was evident by the US and other
leading industrial states in the European Community, and a special effort was made
to include the developing nations in the CFC reduction process. The cost of
supplying the global public good of reducing ozone-depleting substances was small
relative to the benefits. 100 Industry provided the technical solution, with the
manufacture of alternative replacement gases for use in aerosols and refrigeration.
Arguably the specific flexible characteristics of the Montreal Protocol assisted with
the negotiations, while the internal compliance mechanisms contributed to its
effectiveness. The ability of the state parties to amend the Montreal Protocol was
demonstrated early, with some important changes made during the second MOP in
London in June 1990. Following further research and reassessment, the initial fifty
per cent reduction target was viewed as inadequate, and a complete phasing out of
the 'offending gases' was agreed to. The number of controlled substances was
increased from eight to twenty, IOI and the scope of the process was expanded, with
over 80 states agreeing to the changes in London. Important initiatives were included
to encourage the participation of 1developing' states. The preamble was amended to
include a reference to the specific needs of developing states, with provisions for
access to and transfer of both relevant and alternative technologies. 102 A multilateral
fund was established to provide financial assistance to developing states to meet the
incremental costs of complying with the Protocol. The amendments passed during
the second MOP helped secure the support of China, India and Brazil, who signed up
to the Protocol. The treaty was significantly strengthened by the inclusion of the
obligatory phase-out targets, and specific incentives for developing state
participation were also contained in the 1990 amendments. As Ian Rowlands says,
the Montreal Protocol as amended in London is the legal linchpin of the international
regime to protect the ozone layer. 103
100
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In any treaty, the setting of detailed binding legal obligations requires the political
commitment of the signatories, combined with practical and effective compliance
mechanisms. The Montreal Protocol placed an emphasis on inducement rather than
on enforcement, and it used the less confronting legal tenn of 'non-compliance' in
preference to 'unlawful action'. 11Non-compliance is usually defined as a breach of
04

obligations under public international law, or an internationally wrongful act". 1 The
first MOP established an open-ended working group charged with the task of
designing procedures for ensuring compliance with the obligations under the
Protocol. It took some time before the negotiations achieved consensus, and it was
the fourth MOP that adopted the non-compliance procedures (NCP). 105 The NCP are
best understood as a fonn of dispute avoidance; the entire process focuses on
securing an amicable solution. The NCP can be invoked by any of the state parties,
by the Secretariat, or in some instances the relevant Party itself may admit to being
unable to meet its obligations. rn6 The matter is then referred, usually with some
documentary evidence, to the hnplementation Committee for consideration. This
committee applies various techniques based on non-confrontation rather than
adjudication. It investigates the non-compliance, makes recommendations to other
bodies, including the MOP, and provides a publicly available report after each
meeting.
The main features of the NCP are an emphasis on maintaining transparency,
dissemination of information, confidence building, monitoring and data reporting,
and the incentive based multilateral fund. rn7 All of these features have a role to play,
and gain in strength and effectiveness when used in an integrated way. All parties to
the Protocol are legally required to report baseline and annual production quantities,
including import and export of each controUed substance. 108 In the initial years many
104
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states failed to provide the required data. The developed states experienced limited
bureaucratic problems, but were constrained by the desire among some trading states
to protect 'con:fidential1 transactions. This was gradually overcome by increased
transparency, knowledge that similar states had complied, and growing confidence in
the process over time. The developing states had greater difficulty meeting their
reporting requirements and gains were made only when their perfom1ance was linked
to qualifying for financial assi;:.tance. An example of the soft managerial approach
was the grnnting of the 10-year delay period to phase out CFC's to the developing

states.109 Up to the middle 19901s, the hnplement,don Committee's main focus of

attention on data reporting was on missing data, rather than on suspected

inaccuracies. 110

The incentive-based multilateral fund, designed to encourage the developing states to
participate in the Protocol, was more effective following a conditionality amendment
in 1994. At MOP6, the parties sought to rectify the missing data problem, by linking
funding directly to the data reporting requirements. The amendment made the
qualification entitlement for funding under Article 5 conditional upon providing the

baseline data within one year of approval of their MLF country programme. 111 That
1994 amendment achieved significant gains in data reporting, and is one example of
the success in directly linking benefits to compliance. David Victor contends that the

NCP was more effective when the responsible institutions under the Montreal
Protoci:-! combined rewards with the threat of sanctions. 112 The sanctions of
wit'nholding funding or of restrictions to trade were never applied under the Protocol,
but even the implied threats to do so helped ensure compliance. The 1994
amendment is another example of the capacity for MOP1s to remain flexible anc!. to
achieve consensus to respond with a practical solution. The multilateral fund also
demonstrates the state Parties' ability to effectively manage complex and substantial
financial arrangements. As of December 2003, the industrial states had contributed
$US 1.7 billion to the fund.
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While every issue requires its own specific fonn of solutions, and associated
institutional mechanisms, lessons can br drawn from various responses to collective
action problems. There are similarities between the Kyoto and Montreal protocols,
but the latter is arguably a more complete, inclusive and successful treaty. It is not
intended here to resolve all possible obstacles to a multinational HLW repository
treaty, but some of the main considerations are provided. There is the 11otable
advantage that the number of states required, to make the multinational repository
option a success, is quite small compared to the large number of states required to
mitigate global warming, or as was necessary to repair the ozone layer. Thus the fine
details, as to what should be included in a multilateral treaty for the shared
repository, are best left to the participating states, but the negotiators could draw
from some of the more favourable mechanisms of the Montreal Treaty.
The main strength of the Montreal Protocol was its emphasis on inclusiveness and its
capacity to use innovative flexible methods to maximise state participation. The
states joining the multinational solution for HLW could leave open the option of
other states joining at a later stage, and could ensure that there are no additional
penalties for late entry. The states involved would most likely wish to adopt the
autonomous self-regulating mechanism of the MOP arrangements. This would
enable the participating states to take control and they could link compliance directly
to befefits. MOP also allows great flexibility for the states to amend the treaty to
adapt to new circumstances. Once the states agree to participate in the multinational
repository, it is not envisaged that there would be much of a problem with non
compliance, and therefore the soft managerial approach is more than adequate.

Conclusion
A multinational repository requires the fonnation of a specifically designed
multilateral treaty to manage a range of complex issues. There are many advantages
with fonnulating a 'new1 binding treaty regime, including the capacity for the
relatively small number of participating states to have greater control over the entire
process. The negotiating period would help achieve the necessary collaborative
response to provide the public good of enhanced security by safeguarding the under
secured HLW in the shared repository. A multilateral regulatory regime would
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provide the institutional framework for sharing both the costs of constructing the
repository and the potential future burden of risk. The treaty would enable the states
to include shared responsibility and liability arrangements for their particular
situation. A voluntary host stat-� would huve difficulty coming forward in the absence
of some form of 'state responsibility' arrangements.
In establishing the rules, norms, and procedures, the Treaty could provide an agreed
framework for the ownership of the HLW and spent-fuel. A legally binding treaty
would help reduce the potential for future accidents over the timeframe required for
storing the HLW in the chosen repository, with the use of detailed monitoring and
preventive measures. With each state required to share the costs for 'harm' and

reparation, the likelihood of neglect decreases. 113 The IAEA could provide additional
safeguards by acting as an independent inspectorate and by providing a forum for
infmmation and knowledge sharing. An agreed framework would also assist the
states involved to gain public confidence, which would increase the likelihood of
intemational community acceptance in the eventual site selection process. Thus, a
comprehensive regulatory regime would provide the necessary institutional
framework to support the technological safeguards, and thereby help to alleviate the
public perception of risk.
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CHAPfER SEVEN

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND TENTATIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has examined the merits of a multinational geological repository for
safeguarding high-level radioactive waste (HLW) for nuclear states seeking a
cooperative solution. One of the biggest challenges confronting those advocating the
multinational :repository option is public opposition from within the potential host
state. 1 That opposition stems from the public's perception of risk about the
radioactivity in the HLW, a perception which is also conunon in many countries

seeking a national repository site.2 A monitored retrievable repository removes the
finality aspect and therefore can help alleviate some of the perceived risks associated
with HLW containment or leakage. However, without adequate long-term shared
responsibility and liability arrangements, the perception of risk within the potential
host state is likely to be amplified by the media, environmental groups and perhaps
even from the political parties in opposition.3 Notwithstanding the problem of risk
perception, there are three main motives for countries to favour the multinational
repository option. These are the economic, environmental and security benefits to be
gained from utilising a shared repository.
The strongest argument for participating in multinational repositories is the security
benefits provided by safeguarding the HLW in secure underground locations. An
appreciation of the security risks from terrorist acts on nuclear facilities has increased

I
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markedly since the recent rise of extremist forms of terrorism. 4 Some of the large
nuclear states are well advanced with national HLW repository sites, but many of the
smaller nuclear states may not have suitable geology or the financial capacity to
construct an expensive repository for relatively small amounts of HLW. A failure to
adequately slfeguard all HLW raises security issues for the state in which the waste
is located, for the states in close proximity and perhaps even for states some distance
away. Safely securing the maximum amount of HLW therefore becomes a global
public goods problem solvable only by the collaborative effort of the nuclear states.5
Given this security argument, it follows that a multinational geological repository for
storing HLW is necessary in order to maximise security benefits for a large number
of nation states. At the global level there are various scenarios available. States could
participate in a large 'international' repository perhaps under the auspices of the
IAEA.6 That option is likely to be problematic and tends to reflect or be perceived as
a 'top down' approach. It also doesn't appear to have the necessary broad public or
political support. The preferred option is for the states to take control of the shared
repository. Thus the multinational repository option is likely to be pursued at either a
regional or at a broader global level. In the regional scenario a number of nuclear
states would 'club together' to solve their HLW problem. Successful implementation
at the regional level requires both the necessary political commitment and a
specifically designed multilateral treaty to provide a framework for governing many
of the complex issues involved in the shared repository. The second scenario would
involve a network of global repositories located in various parts of the world. The
second and more comprehensive global solution, although achievable, is much more
ambitious and would succeed only with the direct involvement of a number of the
leading nuclear states driving such a concept from the outset.7 Although the security
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benefits are greater with a global solution, the political realities may be such that it
becomes more practicable to secure an operating regional multinational repository
first.
The theoretical framework used in this thesis draws upon the twin disciplines of
international law and international relations in an attempt to gain a better
understanding of why nation-states collaborate to resolve collective action
problems.8 Regime theory and particularly fonnal treaty law merges well with public
goods theory. This dual approach enhances the capacity to locate integrated solutions
to various collective action prohlems.9 Essentially, public goods theory provides the
best means to uncover the main incentives for state cooperation. To achieve the
necessary political commitment,10 HLW has to be seen as an international collective
action problem. In the later chapters of this thesis I explored the mechanisms
available in international law to manage the shared responsibility and liability issues
for the long-term storage of the HLW. I have argued that the international law
principle of state responsibility is the best instrument available for regulating the
issue of collective nation state responsibility, 11 over the required timeframe, and is
therefore the best means of protecting the host state. And providing such legal
protection is an essential part of winning the required public trust in the host
community.
The thesis bega.'!l with an introduction to the problematic issue of HLW management
and provided a brief summary of the nuclear fuel cycle. I examined the policy
constraints of selecting suitable repository sites at the national level in some of the
main nuclear states. Among the themes that consistently impede the implementation
of HLW repositories, at both the national and international levels, are the public
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perception of risk concerning all things nuclear, 12 social amplification of that
perceived risk, 13 and the link between secrecy and mistrust of some nuclear
regulatory authorities. The presence of one or more of these factors increases the
likelihood of evoking the 1not in my backyard 1 (NIMBY) response from the
cornmunity. 14 Those residing in close proximity to the 'selected 1 site tend to be the
most outspoken and active in their opposition. The two largest nuclear states
reviewed, the UK and the US, have for decades struggled to achieve public trust and
thus gain acceptance for their chosen HLW repository sites. A conunon characteristic
employed by both states has been the now discredited 'decide announce defend'
(DAD) tactic, which engenders a rapid loss of public truot. 15 That loss of trust
invariably leads to a NIMBY response, which can make it difficult to gain public
acceptance for any repository site in the particular country. 16 Conversely, states such
as France and Sweden appear to have maintained public trust, and both have well
developed HLW policies. It is therefore essentia! for the proponents of the
multinational repository to have in place a two-way communicative process from the
outset that promotes trust and encourages public participation in the decision making
process.
My analysis of the attempt by Pangea Resources Australia (PRA) to secure a
multinational repository in Australia provides an opportunity to evaluate the �oncept
and to examine one public response to the shared repository option. By assessing the
PRA 'proposal' against the 'triple bottom line' policy tool of economic, environmental
and social considerations, 17 some of the inherent weaknesses with the multinational
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repository proposal, as presented in Australia, become apparent. Unfortunately for
PRA, those shortcomings created a vacuum that was quickly filled by the social
amplification of risk. 18 This led to the public perceiving the risks from the shared
repository to b�i greater than the benefits. Since the repository was set to receive only
20 per cent of the world's accumulated HLW, it was difficult to sustain the security
benefit arguments put forward by PRA. 19 Although Australia would have gained
financially in the short to medium term, the long-term costs of managing the
repository were largely unknown. Consequently, the Australian public and Australian
governments were not prepared to accept total responsibility for other countries'
HLW, or the associated risks from managing the repository after the 40-year
operating period.20 The outcome of the PRA attempt in Australia indicates that the
benefits to all states participating in the multinational repository need clarification,
and those benefits when refined will have to be effectively communicated, in order to
gain the necessary public confidence to overcome the public perceptions of risk.
In outlining the problem of securing multinational repositories, recognition was
given to the fact that some nuclear states possess suitable geology, relevant expertise
and the desire to safely dispose of all radioactive waste within their own borders.21
Other states do not have the appropriate geology, or may be unable to justify the cost
of constructing an expensive repository for small quantities of HLW. Some of the
smaller nuclear states will likely have to pool resources and engage in some fonn of
collaborative solution.22 There is concern in some quarters that attempts towards a
multinational solution might impede or delay national efforts, and the shared
repository concept is strongly resisted by the agencies ,cesponsible for HLW
18
The amplification ofri�!.: w as most prevalent in South Australia, see for example, P. Coorey & B.
Huppatz. "Coming to a Dwnp Near You." The Advertiser, Friday 19 November 1999 pi; P. Coorey &
L. Mellor. "Not in'OUi" Jla� ·.cy ard: No Nuclear Dump , Says Olsen." The Advertiser, Saturday 20
November 1999 pi; P. Barry, Media Watch: ABC Tel evision 11 September, 2000.
19
Dupont and Associates and Bergin and Associates. Advancing Australia's Security Interests-Hosting
a Common Nuclear Waste Facility for the Asia-Pacific Region. Paper prepared for P angea Resources
by Dupont and Associates and Bergin and Associates, August 1999.
20
"Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 8 September 1999
885.
�I
Sweden, Finla nd, France and perhaps the United States have the more developed high-level waste
repository policies.
22
C. McCombie & N. Chapman. "Regional and International Repositories: Not If, But How and
When." Paper presented at the World Nucl ear Association Annual Symposium, London, 5-7
September 2002.
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management in France, Finland, Sweden and the UK. To overcome opposition to a
'collective solution', proponents of the multinational repository regularly emphasise
the importance of a 1dual track1 approach whereby the nuclear states keep both
national and international options open.23 Whatever option is pursued, the benefits of
national or multinational repositories will have to outweigh the public's perception of
risk.
Applying public goods theory to the multinational repository concept allows for a
more comprehensive analysis of the benefits to both potential states participating in
the collaborative solution and to other states. The theory of public goods has recently
been applied to a range of global collective action issues, including peace and
security, financial stability, global warming and ozone depletion, in order to gain a
greater understanding of how such issues might be best resolved.24 Public goods
theory has not yet been specifically applied to the problematic issue of HLW
disposal. For a multinational repository to provide a 'public good' it must possess two
central characteristics. Firstly, it must have non-excludable benefits that extend
beyond the nuclear states using the repository, to benefit other nuclear and non
nuclear states. Secondiy, its benefits must be non-rival in consumption, meaning that
the good can be consumed by one state without detracting from the benefits availabie
to the other states using the repository. A single multinational repository requires
careful forward planning to minimise potential space limits to avoid any restrictions
on those wishing to use it in the future, but that rival component of space and usage
is essentially a technical problem that is more likely to be resolved on a region by
region basis. The benefits of usage, however, are non-rival between the accepted
users of the repository. The efficiency, security and environmental gains to user
country X are not losses to user country Y. So there is no rivalry with regard to the
benefits the participating states receive from using the repository.

23 Ibid.

I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven & R. Mendoza. "Why Do Global Public Goods Matter
Today?," in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, edited by I. Kaul, P.
Conceicao, K. Le Goulven & R. Mendoza. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
24

206

The economic incentives for participating in multinational repositories are relatively
straightforward. The construction of geological repositories involves high capital
costs that are largely independent of the amount of waste to be placed in them.25 For
every repository there are costs incurred for research, administration, licensing,
infrastructure, equipment, and security. It is difficult to provide a precise d�llar
figure for repository construction, as there are variations from state to state, but the
IAEA estimates the capital costs of a single repository to be in the billions of $US.26
Yet the cost of constructing a multinational repository will not be much higher than
the cost of constructing a single national repository. The required level of funding for
a national geological repository is beyond many of the smaller nuclear states acting
alone but not beyond their means when acting together. There is already research
into the feasibility of a regional repository for some states in Europe, and economies
of scale are a large motivating factor for the small nuclear states involved in that
project.27 The economic savings relate only to the participating states, but they are a
collective action benefit unobtainable by states acting separately.
Whi1e public goods theory is a useful tool for examining collaborative funding
arrangements,28 its main application in this study was to determine the broader
benefits for both participating and non-participating states in a multinational
repository. The main premise underpinning national and multinational geological
repositories is that they must help protect human life and health and the environment,
now and into the future. Until recently, the short-tenn benefits of geological
repositories were not considered urgent, and the focus was on the need to safeguard
the HLW in a manner that ensures no migration of radioactive substances back to the
environment. Because some of the radionuclides in the HLW have extremely long
half-lives, the public in most countries has not been willing to accept the long-tenn
risks associated with geological repositories. Paradoxically, the risk of terrorism in

25

Supra n 6 IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 2004 p23.
Ibid.
27
V. Stefula & C. Mccombie. "SAPIERR paves the way Towards European Regional Repository."
Paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Nuclear Option in Countries with Small and
Medium Electricity Grids, Dubrovnik, Croatia May 2004.
28
See T. Sandler, On Financing Global and International Public Goods. School oflntemational
Relations, University of Southern California, July 2001.
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recent years may well transcend the public's perception of the risks associated with
long-term underground storage/disposal of the HLW.
The most compelling public good benefit that a multinational repository would
provide is enhanced international security. Safeguarding the HLW in a secure
underground environment removes the potential for a terrorist strike on surface waste
storage facilities.29 Underground storage would also provide additional safeguards
against the theft of weapons-useable material from extracted spent fuel rods by
securing them directly in the repository. A multinational repository would therefore
provide the public good of enhanced security, if it enables a group of states to place
their HLW and spent fuel in a geological repository, rather than leaving the waste
under-secured on the surface.
If the objectives of multinational repositories are to maximise environmental
protection and to enhance regional or globa? security by safeguarding the HLW, then
it follows that any future proposal should ideally involve all nuclear states in
possession of under-secured waste. The distinction between regional and global
public goods is a matter of the degree of the universality of the benefits supplied. For
the shared multinational repository concept to be globally beneficial, it must provide
a comprehensive means of safeguarding the total quantity of the world's under
secured HLW. This would require the involvement of a large number of nuclear
states and perhaps three or four multinational repositories located in different parts of
the world. While this is desirable in terms of enhancing global security, the
involvement from the outset of such a large number of states would make consensus
more difficult to achieve. One of the factors Sandler identifies for the optimal
promotion of collective action is the involvement of a limited number of
participating states.30 Thus on practical grounds the case for regional cooperation
seems stronger than that for a global solution.

29 R. Oxburgh. (Chair). Managing Radioactive Waste: the Government's Consultation. House of Lords
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 23 November 2001; R. Stone, "Deep Repositories: Out
of Sight, Out of Terrorists' Reach." Science 303 (2004): 161-64.
30
T. Sandler, "Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action." Fiscal Studies
19 (1998) p221.
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For nation states to embark on a multinational repository raises questions of
responsibility and liability for the shared inventory of HLW to be located in the host
state. The absence of any commitment to share responsibility for the HLW and its
long-term management during the PRA debate contributed to Australia rejecting the
proposat.31 The most recent IAEA report on multinational repositories identified the
twin issues of responsibility for the HLW and associated long-term liability as areas
requiring future study.32 My discussion of the state responsibility concept should
assist with that research, and as a starting point I provide an overview of the existing
civil nuclear liability �egimes. While likely to cover liability during the
transboundary shipmen'. of the HLW,33 the civil liability regimes are unsuitable for
the long-term shared responsibility and liability requirements of multinational
repositories. The m<'.in areas of deficiency are a lack of adherence to the liability
regimes; a limitati1)n of claims in time;34 and the fact that liability is channelled
exclusively to the operator. 35 In addition, both nuclear and non-nuclear member
states are signatories to the liability conventions, and the presence of such a large
nUi-n.ber of stat�s with varying interests makes potential liability amendments difficult
to achieve.
The 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management comprises nuclear and non-nuclear
member states. 36 It is the main international legal instrument guiding the safe
management of HLW and is applicable to all geological repositories. The Joint
Convention is an ihcentive based treaty and it would need significant amendments to
provide the necessary legal framework to adequately cover all aspects of a
multinational repository. The question of shared responsibility and liability for the

31

See N. Minchin, "Questions without Notice: Nuclear Waste Storage." Australian Parliamentary

Debates, Senate, 18 October 1999, p9813.
n Supra n 6 IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 2004 p41.

33 At least among the signatory members. As stated previously a detailed study of the transboundary
liability arrangements, during the shipment of the HLW, was beyond the scope of this thesis.
3-4 M. Lee, "Civil Liability of the Nuclear Industry." Jounial ofEnvironmental Law 12 (2000): 317-32.
35 N. Pelzer, "Focus on the Future ofNuclear Liability Law." Journal ofEnergy and Natural
Resources Law 17 (1999): 332-53.
l6 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management 1997 INFCIR/546.
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HLW pertains only to the participating states in the multinational repository, and as
such the Joint Convention is also considered too difficult to amend. A more desirable
way forward is to identify the best means available under international law that the
participating states could use to accommodate shared responsibility and liability for
the HLW over the necessary long timeframe. The only mechanism with the capacity
to achieve that objective is the international law concept of state responsibility. State
responsibility is the principle whereby states can be held accountable for breaches of
obligations under international law.37 There must however be a clear identifiable
international obligation for state responsibility to be invoked. State responsibility has
been essentially a bilateral matter between the responsible and the injured states.38
The concept is widely accepted under customary international law, but to rely on that
source of law only would provide limited opportunities for state responsibility to be
effective for multinational repositories. To ensure that state responsibility can be
invoked, it is necessary to establish a clear identifiable international obligation. The
most direct way of providing clear obligations on states is to fonnalise those
obligations in a binding treaty. Based on my review of the liability regimes and the
1997 Joint Convention, it becomes apparent that there is a need for a specific binding
treaty pertaining only to the participating states in the multinational repository.
The finalisation of the draft articles on state responsibility by the International Law
Commission (ILC) in 2001 39 was timely and potentially advantageous for the shared
repository concept. The shift away from a bilateral notion of responsibility, to
obligations to the international community as a whole, is a significant
advancement. 40 By drawing upon the obligations erga omnes concept, the ILC
provided innovative ways of extending the possibility of providing specific
obligations to the international community'as a whole, to a group of states, and even
to a single state. The states negotiating for a multinational repository have at their
disposal the ILC Draft Articles to draw from, if they so desire. The choice of
37

I. Brownlie, The Rule ofLaw in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary
o[the United Nations. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998 p79.
3
D. Shelton, "Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility." The Amen'can
Journal ofInternational Law 96 (2002) p839.
39
See J, Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introductfon
Text ond Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
40
E. Brown-Weiss, "Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century." The American
Journal ofInternational Law 96 (2002): 798-816.
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including relevant sections or modified versions of the ILC am(:;�C�\\ in a specific
�.,,:,

treaty is the prerogative of the s�ates concerned. Clearly much of the work has been
done by the Special Rap porteurs, and the capacity i s now available for the
participating states to accept long-tenn obligations for managing the HLW, and then
agreeing to invoking liability provisions in the event that those obligations are
breached. Such a commitment would demonstrate confidence in the repository
design;
it would help alleviate the public's perception of the associated risks and may
"
even help achieve broad community acceptance for the multinational repository
concept.

;

',,

'

11
<.) '

'.'.;.

'•

211

BIBLIOGRAPHY

·.,.

Abbott, K. nModem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers." Yale Journal ofInternational Law 14 (1989): 335-41L
,· \

Abraham, S. 11Nuclear Nonproliferation: New C hallenges and New Solutions." Paper
presented at the 47th General IAEA Conference, Vienna, Austria, September
2003.
Access Economics. The Economic Impact ofthe Nuclear Waste Repository Project.
Draft Report, prepared for Pangea Resources by Access Economics, 24
November 1998,
Adams, M. 11More Wins Than Losses: War on Terror." Time 159 (2002): 26.
Albrecht, S. "Nuclear Gridlock." Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 14
(1999): 96-102,
Albright, D. Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window ofSeized
Documents. Special Forum 47, The Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA, 2002.
Allen, G. 11Qualitative Research," in Handbookfor Research Students in the Social
Sciences, edited by G. Allen & C. Skinner. New York: Falmer, 1991.
Allison, G. Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York:
Herny Holt, 2004.
Alvarez, R. 11What About the Spent Fuel?11 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists SB
(2002): 45-47,
Alvarez, R., J. Beyea, K. Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson
& F. von Rippel. "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor
Fuel in the United States." Science and Global Sf!curity 11 (2003): 1-51.
Anderson, I. "Britain's Dirty Deeds at Maralinga." New Scientist 138 (12 June i993):
12.
ARIUS. "Arius Newsletter." May 2002, 1-9.
ARIUS. "Arius Newsletter." May 2004, 1-8.
"Australia Deemed to Have Suitable Sites for Permanent Nuclear Waste DisposaV'
Engineers Australia 71 (1999): 26-28.
"Australian Senate." Federal Parliamentary Debates, Thursday 10 December 1998.
Baer, A. "Issues and Answers: Towards hnproved Management of Radioactive
Waste," IAEA Bulletin 42 (2000): 19.

212

Baldwin, N. "Remediating Sellafield: A New Focus For the Site." Paper presented at
the 9th International Conference on Environmental Remediation and
Radioactive Waste Management, Oxford, 21-25 September 2003.
Ballard, K. & R. Kulm. "Developing and Testing a Facility Location Model for
Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste." Risk Analysis 16 (1996): 821-32.
Barkenbus, J. "Nuclear Power Safety and the Role of International Organization.11
International Organization 41 (1987): 475-90.
Barnaby, F. How To Build A Nuclear Bomb and Other Weapons ofMass
Destruction. New York: Nation Books, 2004.
Barnaby, F. 11The Management of Radioactive Wastes and the Disposal of
Plutonium." Paper presented at the MAPW 2000, Canberra, 4-6 August 2000.
Barnaby, F. Nuclear Terrorism: The Risks and Realities in Britain. Oxford Research
Group, Oxford, February 2003.
Barrett, L. (Acting Director). Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost of the
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program. U.S. Department of
Energy, 2001.
Barrett, S. 11Montreal versus Kyoto: International Cooperation and the Global
Environment," in Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st
Century, edited by!. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M. Stern. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999, pp. 192-219.
Barrett, S. Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy ofEnvironmental Statecraft.
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Barry, P. Media Watch: ABC Television 11 September, 2000.
Bechhoefer, B. "Historical Evolution of International Safeguards," in International
Safeguards and Nuclear Industry, edited by M. Willrich. Baltimore,
Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1973, pp. 21-44.
Beck, U. "From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social
Structure and Ecological Enlightenment. 11 Theory Culture and Society 9
(1992): 97-123.
Beck, U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications, 1992.
Bederman, D. "Counterintuiting Countenneasures." The American Journal of
International Law 96 (2002): 817-32.
Bengelsdorf, H. & F. McGoldrick. "International Custody of Excess Plutonium."
Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 58 (2002): 31-35.
Berkhout, F. Radioactive Waste: Politics and Technology. New York: Routledge,
1991.

213

Berns, D. "Las Vegas Operators Fight Nuclear Waste Dwnp Pian. 11 Hotel and Motel
Management 217 (2002): 41-42.
Bertel, E. Energy Policies of/EA Countries, Switzerland 1999 Review. International
Energy Agency, 1999.
Beveridge, G. nThe Work ofa Radioactive Waste Management Watchdog: The
Work of the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee.11
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 23 (1998): 209.
Beveridge,
G. (Chair). The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's
.,
Report on Radioactive Waste Management'practices in Switzerland. London:
Department of the Environment, TraIJsport and the Regions, 1998.
Birnie, P. & A. Boyle. International Law and the Environment. Second ed. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Bjurstrom, S. 1�uclear Waste Can Be Managed: An Infonned Public is the Best
Partner." Industry Week 245 (1996): 17.
Black, D. & H. Phillips. "Issues of the Western Australian Political Chronicles."
Australian Journal ofPolitics and History 45 (1999): 580-88.
Black, J. & N. Chapman. Siting a High-Isolation Radioactive Waste Repository:
Technical Approach to Identification ofPotentially Suitable Regions
·r·
Worldwide. Pangea Technical Report Series 01-01, 2001.
Blanchard,
P. "Responsibility for Environmental Damage Under Nuclear and
·
Environmental Benchmarking." Journal ofEnergy and Natural Resources
Law 18 (2000): 233-53.
Blankinship, S. "Senate Approves Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Site." Power
Engineering I 06 (2002): 12.
Blay, S. "The Nature of International Law," in Public International Law: An
Australian Perspective, edited by S. Blay, R. Pietrowicz & B. Tsamenyi.
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 1-21.
Bleek, P. "Administrat ion May Abandon Plutoniwn Disposition Project." Arms
Control Today 31 (200 I): 31.
Bleek, P. "U.S. to Continue Plutonium Disposition Pact with Russia.11 Anns Control
Today 32 (2002): 27.
Blowers, A. "IfYou Know a Better Hole..." New Scientist 154 (10 May 1997): 55 .
. Blowers, A. "Nuclear Waste and Landscapes of Risk." Landscape Research 24
(1999): 241-65.

214

'1\

)' )

,i

Blowers, A. & P. Leroy. "Power, Politics and Environmental Inequality: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Process of 1Peripheralisation1•11
Environmental Politics 3 (1994): 197-228.
Blowers, A., D. Lowry & B. Solomon. The International Politics ofNuclear Waste.
London: Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1991.
BNFL. Annual Review: Reaching New Horizons, 2003.
BNFL. Written Response to questions by Vincent Cusack, 30 May 2002.
Board on Radioactive Waste Management. One Step at a Time: The Staged
Development o/Geo/ogical Repositoriesfor High-Level Radioactive Waste.
Washington: The National Academies Press, 2003.
Bodansky, D. & J. Crook. "Symposium: The ILC's State Responsibility Articles:
Introduction and Overview.11 The American Journal ofInternational Law 96
(2002): 773-91.
Boer, B., R. Ramsay & D. Rothwell. International Environmental Law in the Asia
Pacific. London: Kluwer Law International, 1998.
Bonnett, S. "Plan to Make Britain World's Nuclear Dustbin." Daily Mirror, 21
October 1975.
Bourn, J, Risk Management: The Nuclear Liabilities ofBritish Energy pie, 2004.
Boustany, K. 11The Development of Nuclear Law-Making or the Art of Legal
Evasion." Nuclear Law Bulletin 61 (1998): 39-53.
Brown, P. & D. McCauley. 11Port Hope Area Initiative." Paper presented at the 9th
International Conference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive
Waste Management, Oxford, 21-25 September 2003.
Brownlie, I. The Rule ofLaw in International Affairs: International Law at the
Fiftieth Anniversary ofthe United Nations. The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1998.
Brownlie, I. "A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental
Protection. 11 Natural Resources Journal 13 (1973): 179.
Brown-Weiss, E. Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges
and Dimensions. Tokyo: United Nations, 1992.
Brown-Weiss, E. 0Inv�king State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century. 11 The
American Journal ofInternotional Law 96 (2002): 798-816.
Bull, H. The Anarchical Society: A Study ofOrder in World Politics. London:
Macmillan Press, 1977.

215

Bunn, M. 11Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Progress Update." Project on Managing
the Atom: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 2003, 1-17.
Burns, A. "State Buries N-Dump Plans.11 The West Australian, Wednesday 8
September 1999.
Burton, B. "NIREX: Where Now?" Nuclear Engineering International 42 (1997):
40.
Byers, M. The Role ofLaw in International Politics: Essays in International
Relations and International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Caldicott, H. "lfNossal is Concerned, Let1 Him Show It." The Australian, Thursday
17 December 1998.
/
Camilleri, J. "Globalization of Insecurity: The Democrative hnperative."
International Journal on World Peace 18 (2001): �-36.
Campbell, C. & W. Heck. 11An Ecological Perspective on Sustainable Development,11
in Principles ofSustainable Development, edited by F. Muschett. Florida: St
Lucie Press, 1997, pp. 47-68.'
Carbone, M. 1'Global Public Goods: A New Frontier in Development Policy?" The
Courier ACP-EU (March-April 2002): 38-40.
Carley, M. & I. Christie. Managing Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan,
2000.

,,

Carlsson, I. & S. Ramphal (Co-Chair). Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of
the Commission on Global Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995.
Caron, D. "The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship
Between Form and Authority. 11 The American Journal ofInternational Law
96 (2002): 857-73.
Carter, L. Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust. Washington: Resources For The
Future, 1987.
Carter, L. "A Sweeter Deal at Yucca Mountain.11 Issues in Science and Technology
18 (2002): 45-48.
Carter, L. & T. Pigford. "Confronting the Paradox in Plutonium Policies.11 Issues in
Science and Technology 16 (1999): 29-36.
Carter, L. & T. Pigford. "The World's Growing Inventory of Civil Spent Fuel." Arms
Control Today 29 (1999): 8-14.
Chace, J. "After Hiroshima: Sharing the Atom Bomb." Foreign Affairs 75 (1996):
129-44.'

216

Chapman,
N. & I. McKinley. The Geological Disposal ofNuclear Waste. New York:
·
John Wiley & Sons, 1987.
Charles, D. "Will America1s Nuclear W aste be Laid to Rest?" New Scientist (14
December 1999).
Chayes, A. & A. Chayes. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with Intemational
Regulatory Agreements. Camhridge1 Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1995.
Churchill, R. & G. Ulfstein. 11 Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International
Law. 11 The American Journal ofInternational Law 94 (2000): 623-59.
Clements, T. "NCI Releases DOE Plutonium Disposal Cost Study Withheld From
Congress." Nuclear Control Institute, Press Release, Washington, 9 August
2001.
Clery, D. 11Greens Still Fear WA Waste Dwnp. 1' The West Australian, Saturday 26
January 2002.
Commonwealth of Australia. National Radioactive Waste Repository Site Selection
Study Phase 2: A Report on Public Comment, 1995.
Commonwealth of Australia. National Radioactive Waste Repository Site Selection
Study, Phase 3: A Report on Public Comment, 1999.
Commonwealth of Australia. Official Committee Hansard: Joint Committee on
Public Works. Replacement Nuclear Research Reactor, Lucas Heights,
Sydney. Friday 14 May, 1999.
Conceicao, P. "Assessing The Provision Status of Global Public Goods," in
Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, edited by I. Kaul,
P. Conceicao, K. leGoulven & R. Mendoza. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003, pp. 152-61.
Cook, P. "The Geology ofNuclear Waste." Australian Financial Review, Friday 17
December 1998.
Cook, P. "Science is Best Guide to N-Waste." The West Australian, Tuesday 27 July
1999.
Cook, P. (Chair). Annual Report: Pangea Scientific Review Group. Pangea
Resources Australia Pty. Ltd. Pangea Scientific Review Group, Perth, 19992000.
Coorey, P. "Minchin Again Tells South Australia It Cannot Ovenide Canberra: We
will put the Nuclear Dump where we like." The Advertiser, 7 June 2000.
Coorey, P. "Radioactive Waste to Stay at Woomera." The Advertiser, Tuesday 26
December 2002.

217

Coorey, P. & B. Huppatz. "Coming to a Dump NearYou.11 The Advertiser, Friday 19
November 1999.
Coorey, P. & L. Mellor. 11 Not in Our Backyard: No Nuclear Dump, Says Olsen." The
Advertiser, Saturday 20 November 1999.
Coorey, P. & J. Wakelin. "More Will Follow, Warns Garrett." The Advertiser, Friday
19 November 1999.
Comes, R. & T. Sandler. The Theory ofExternalities, Public Goods, and Club
Goods. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Cragg, C. 'The UK's Nuclear Back End." Energy Economist (1998): 1-7.
Cravens, G. "Terrorism and Nuclear Energy: Understanding the Risks." The
Brookings Review 20 (2002): 40-44.
Crawford, J. Fourth Report on State Responsibility. International Law Commission,
53rd Session, A/CN.4/517, 2001.
Crawford, J. "The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect.11 The American Journal ofInternational Law
96 (2002): 874-90.
Crawford, J. The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility:
Introduction Text and Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002.
Currie, D. & J. Van Dyke. "The Shipment ofUltrahazardous Nuclear Materials in
International Law." Review ofEuropean Community and International
Environmental Law 8 (1999): 113-24.
Cusack, V. 110pposing Paradigms or Room for Convergence: the Australian
Dilemma." Environmental Policy and Law 31 (2001): 27-33.
Danker, W. "Current Status of IAEA Activities in Spent Fuel Management. 11 Paper
presented at the 7th International Conference on Nucleai Criticality Safety,
Tokai-mura, Japan, 20-24 October 2003.
Davenport, J. "The Federal Structure: Can Congress Commandeer Nevada to
Participate in its Federal High-Level Waste Program?" Virginia
Environmental Law Journal 12 (1993): 540-71.
de Kageneck, A. & C. Pinel. 11The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste management."
International and Comparative Low Quarterly 47 (1998): 409-25.
de La Fayette, L. "International Environmental Law and the Problem of Nuclear
Safety." Journal ofEnvironmental Law 5 (1993): 31-69.

218

de La Fayette, L. "Towards a New Regime of State Responsibility for Nuclear
Activities." Nuclear Law Bulletin 50 (1992): 7-35.
DEFRA. Managing Radioactive Wastes Safely: Proposals for Developing a Policy
for Managing Solid Radioactive Waste in the UK, September 2001.
DEFRA. The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's Advice to

Ministers on the Processfor Formulation ofFuture Policyfor the Long Term
Management of UK Solid Radioactive Waste, September 2001.

DEFRA. Re BNFL's MOXplant at its Site in Sellafield, Cumbria: Justification for

the Manufacture ofMOXFuel. Decision ofthe Secretary of State for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Secretary of State for Health,

October 2001.

Dickman, S. "Power to the Relucant People." Nature 336 (1988): 329.
Dietze, W. "Overview on Legal Issues Involved in the International Disposal of
High-Level Radioactive Waste - With Special Consideration to the Regional
Disposal in the European Union." Paper presented at the SAPIERR Working
Group Meeting, Piestany, Slovakia, 19-20 February 2004.
"Dig deep." The Economist (US) (3 December 1994): 99.
DiGirolamo, R. "Parkland Ploy for Dump Site.11 The Australian, Tuesday 3 June
2003.
Dolley, S. "G-8 Nations to waste Billions on Dangerous Russian Fuel. 11 Nuclear
Control Institute, Press Release 2002.
Dunlap, R., M. Kraft & E. Rosa. Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste: Citizens Views
ofRepository Siting. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993.
Dupont and Associates and Bergin and Associates. Advancing Australia S Security

Interests-Hosting a Common Nuclear Waste Facility for the Asia-Pacific
Region. Paper prepared for Pangea Resources by Dupont and Associates and

Bergin and Associates, August 1999.
Durch, W. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative
Analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
Easterling, D. & H. Kunreuther. The Dilemma of Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste
Repository. Boston: Kluwer, 1995.
Eccleston, R. 11Terror Threat Grounds Six Flights from Europe to US." The
Australian, 2 February 2004.
Editorial. 11Dismay Leads to Nuclear Dump Distrust." The Advertiser, Tuesday 26
December 2000.

219

Editorial. "N�Waste Debate is Here to Stay.11 The West Australian, Monday 30
August 1999.
Editorial. "Once Again, it is Our Right to Know." The Advertiser, Saturday 20
November 1999.
Edwards, R. "End of the line? Liquid Waste Could Finally KiU off Britain's Aging
Nuclear Plants." New Scientist 164 (4 December 1999): 5.
Edwards, R. "The Nightmare Scenario: What Would Happen if a Passenger Jet
Ploughed Into a Nuclear Plant?" New Scientist 172 (2001): 10-12.
Edwards, R. "Radioactive Waste Policy a 'Farce'." New Scientist 143 (17 September
1994): 8.
ElBaradei, M. "Towards A Safer World." The Economist (US) (2003): 48.
Elliott, L. The Global Politics of the Environment. London: Macmillan Press Ltd,
1998.
Ferguson, C. & J. Lubenau. "Securing US Radioactive Sources." Issues in Science
and Technology 20 (2003): 67-73.
Ferguson, C. & W. Potter. The Four Faces ofNuclear Terrorism. Monterey,
California: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004.
Ferroni, M. "Regional Public Goods: The Comparative Edge of Regional
Development Banks." Paper presented at the Financing for Development:
Regional Challenges and the Key Role of Regional Development Banks,
Washington, 19 February 2002.
Fischhoff, B., P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, S. Read & B. Combs. "How Safe is Safe
Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks
and Benefits." Policy Sciences 9 (1978): 127-52.
Flowers, B. Nuclear Power and the Environment: Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution, Sixth Rep ort. London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1976.
Flileler, T. "Options in Radioactive Waste Management Revisited: A Proposed
Framework for Robust Decision Making." Risk Analysis 21 (2001): 787-99.
Flynn, J. "Nuclear Stigma," in The Social Amplification ofRisk, edited by N.
Pidgeon, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003, pp. 326-52.
Flynn, J., J. Chalmers, D. Easterling, R. Kasperson, H. Kunreuther, C. Mertz, A.
Mushkatel, D. Pijawka & P. Slovic. One Hundred Centuries ofSolitude:
Redirecting America's High-Level Nuclear Waste Policy. Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995.

220

Flynn, J., R. Kasperson, H. Kunreuther & P. Slovic. "Overcoming Tunnel Vision:
Redirecting the US High-Level Nuclear Waste Program." Environment 39
(1997): 6.
Freehill Hollingdale and Page. Briefing Paper- Application of Treaties to
Importation ofNuclear Waste to Australia. Prepared for Pangea Resources
Australia Pty. Ltd., October 1998.
Gaffney, J. "Highly Emotional States: French-US Relations and the Iraq War."
European Security 13 (2004): 247-72.
Galbraith, J. The Affluent Society. Fourth ed. London: Andre Deutsch, 1985.
Galizzi, P. "Questions of Jurisdiction in the Event of a Nuclear Accident in a
Member State of the European Union." Journal ofEnvironmental Law 8
(1996): 71-97.
Gardner, F. "Is US Winning its War on Terror." BBC News 9 September 2002.
Gehring, T. "International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal
Systems." Yearbook ofInternational Environmental Law 1 (1990): 35-56.
Goldschmidt, B. The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History ofNuclear
Energy. Illinois: American Nuclear Society, 1982.
Gonzalez, A. "The Safety of Radioactive Waste Management: Achieving
Internationally Accepted solutions." IAEA Bulletin 42 (2000): 5-18.
Goot, M. "In Politicians We Trust?" Australian Quarterly (1999): 16-24.
Gourevitch, P. "Robert O Keohane: The Study of International Relations." Political
Science and Politics (September 1999): 623-28.
Gowing, M. Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945.
Vol. 1. London: Macmillan, 1974.
Gowing, M. Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952.
Vol. 2. London: Macmillan, 1974.
Gowing, M. Reflections on Atomic Energy History: The Rede Lecture. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Green; J. Survey Reveals Strong Anti-Nuclear Sentiment 1999 [cited on line, 15
September 2002].
Gregory, A. "Gallop Calls on N-Dump Sites List." The West Australian, Wednesday
1 January 2003.
Greig, D. "Sources of International Law," in Public International Law: An
Australian Perspective, edited by S. Blay, R. Piotrowicz & B. Tsamenyi.
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 58-94.

221

Grimston, M. 11The International Legal Position on Transboundary Shipments of
Radioactive Waste. 11 International Journal ofRadioactive Materials
Transport 8 (1997): 315-22.
Guinn, K. (Nevada Governor). "Nevada Files Challenge to Revised Yucca Mountain
Guidelines." Press Release, 17 December 2001.
Gunderson, W. & B. Rabe. "Voluntarism and its Limits: Canada's Search for
Radioactive Waste-Siting Candidates." Canadian Public Administration 42
(1999): 193-214.
Haase, L. 11Securing US Nuclear Power Plants and Radioactive Materials against
Terrorism." The Century Foundation Homeland Security Project: Issue in
Brief(2002): 1-13.
Haggard, S. & B. Simmons. "Theories ofInternational Regimes.11 International
Organization 41 (1987): 491-517.
Harris, D. Cases and Materials on International Law. Fourth ed. London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1991.
Harris,). 11Editorial: Nuclear Waste.11 Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 23 (1998):
187.
Harris, S. 11The Reality of Our Nuclear Dump is That We Can't Ensure its Safety."
The Advertiser, 20 August 2000.
Henkin, L. How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. London: Pall Mall Press,
1968.
Heywood, A. Political Ideologies: An Introduction. London: Macmillan, 1992.
Hirsch, D. "The NRC: What Me Worry?11 Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists
January/February (2002): 39-44.
Hogarth, M. "Nuclear Powerhouse. 11 Sydney Morning Hearald, 16 March 1999.
Hogarth, M. "US Finn Wants to Send Nuclear Waste to Us.11 The Sydney Morning
Herald, Wednesday2December 1998.
Holdren, J. "Radioactive-Waste Management in the United States: Evolving Policy
Prospects and Dilemmas." Annual Review ofEnergy and the Environment 17
(1992): 235-59.
Holdren, J., J. Ahearne, R. Gaiwin, W. Panofsky, J. Taylor & M. Bunn. "Excess
Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a Clear and PresentDanger." Arms
Control Today 26 (1996): 3-9.
Holland, I. "Waste Not Want Not? Australia and the Politics of High-Level Nuclear
Waste.11 Australian Journal ofPolitical Science 37 (2002): 282-301.

222

Horbach, N. "1997 Nuclear Liability Treaties: Confonnities and Deficiencies in
some EU Applicant States." Journal ofEnergy and Natural Resources Law
18 (2000): 378-403.
Howard, J. "Invoking State Responsibility for Aiding Crimes - Australia, The United
States and the Question of East Timor." Melbourne Journal of International
Law2 (2001): 1-47.
Hoy, A. "Quake in Fright." The Bulletin, 10 August 1999, 36-38.
Hunter, S. & K. Leyden. 11Beyond NIMBY: Explaining Opposition to Hazardous
Waste Facilities." Policy Studies Journal 23 (1995): 601-19.
Hurrell, A. & B. Kingsbury. 11The International Politics of the Environment: Actors,
Interests and Institutions," edited by A. Hurrell & B. Kingsbury. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992.
Hurrell, B. "A 'Great Place' for Nuclear Waste: State Promoted as Dump Site." The
Advertiser, Wednesday 2 December 1998.
IAEA. "Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terrorism Threat.11 International
Atomic Energency Agency Press Release, 1 November 2001.
IAEA. Code ofPractice on the International Transboundary Movement of
Radioactive Waste, November 1990, INFCIR.C/386.
IAEA. Developing Multinational Radioactive Waste Repositories: Infrastuctural
Framework and Scenarios of Cooperation. IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 2004.
IAEA. "How Real?" Newsbriefs (2002): 1-16.
IAEA. "International Datafile." IAEA Bulletin 44 (2002).
IAEA. Joint Convention on the Safety ofSpent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management: Guidelines Regarding the Fonn and
Structure o[National Reports, INFCIRC/604, 2002.
· IAEA. The Management of Radioactive Wastes. Austria: IAEA:, 1981.
IAEA. Power Reactor Infonnation System. online edition, Vienna, 2004.
IA.EA. Safety Series: Classification of Radioactive Waste, a Safety Guide. Vienna:
International Atomic Energy Agency, No 111-G-1.1, 1994.
IAEA. Technical, Institutional and Economic Factors Important for Developing a
Multinational Radioactive Waste Repository. IAEA-TECDOC-1021, 1998.
ILC. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2 (1970): 306.
ILC. Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. N56/10 2001.

223

ILC. Report ofthe International Law Commission on the Work ofits Forty-Eight
Session. General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-First Session Supplement
No.10/A/51/10. 6 May-26 July, 1996.
ILC. State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Receivedfrom Governments,
UN Doc A/CN.4/492, 1999.
lnhaber, H. Slaying the NIMBYDragon. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1998.
Isherwood, D. 11Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust: Dealing with Radioactive
Waste, Book Reviews." Science 239 (11 March 1988): 1321.
Jaensch, D. 11Poll on Nuclear Dump Could Backfire." The Advertiser, 12 December
2002.
Jones, G. "Brown Puts Ambition on Hold as Blair Leads EU Fight. 11 The Daily
Telegraph, Thursday 22 June 2004.
Jurgielewicz, L. Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospectsfor
Progress in the Legal Order. London: University Press of America, 1996.
K.aldor, M. Perspectives on Global Governance: Why the Security Framework
Matters. United Kingdom, London School of Economics, 2003.
Kane, M. "Sustainability Concepts: Fr.om Theory to Practice," in Sustainability in
Question: the Search for a Conceptual Framework, edited by J. Kolm, J.
Gowdy, F. Hinterberger & J. van der Straaten. Northamptor:, Massachusetts:
Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 15-31.
Kasperson, R. "The Social Amplification of Risk: Progress in Developing An
httegrative Framework," in Social Theories of risk, edited by S. Krimsky &
D. Golding. London: Praeger, 1992, pp. 153-78.
Kasperson, R., 0. Renn, P. Slovic, H. Brown, J. Emel, R. Goble, J. Kasperson & S.
Ratick. "The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework,11 in The
Perception ofRisk, edited by P. Slovic. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd,
2000, pp. 232-45.
Kaul, I., P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven & R. Mendoza. 11Why Do Global Public
Goods Matter Today?,11 in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing
Globalization, edited by I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven & R.
Mendoza. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 2-20.
K.au], I., I. Grunberg & M. Stem. 11Defining global public goods," in Global Public
Goods: International Cooperation in the 2Jst Century, edited by I. Kaul, I.
Grunberg & M. Stem. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 2-19.
Kaul, I., I. Grunberg & M. Stem. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in
the list Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

224

Keeny, S. Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report ofthe Nuclear Energy Policy
Study Group. Cambridge Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1977.
Kegley, C. "The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An
Introduction," in Controversies in International Relations Theory, edited by
C. Kegley. New York: St Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 1-24.
Kelton, G. 11Dump Decision on Hold Missing MPs Mean Legislation is Put Back. 11
The Advertiser, 15 July 2000.
Kemp, R. The Politics ofRadioactive Waste Disposal. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1992.
Keohane, R. "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American
Research Programme,11 in Regime Theory and International Relations, edited
by V. Rittberger & P. Mayer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.
2-45.
Keohane, R. "The Demand for International Regimes," in International Regimes,
edited by S. Krasner. London: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 141-71.
Keohane, R. "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics:
Sovereignty in International Society, 11 in Whose World Order? Uneven
Globalization and the end ofthe Cold War, edited by H. Holm & G.
Sorensen. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 165-86.
Keohane, R. & J. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.
Keohane, R. & J. Nye. "Transgovemmental Relations and International
Organizations." World Politics 27 (1974): 39-62.
Kindleberger, C. "International Public Goods Without International Government."
The American Economic Review 76 (1986): 1-13.
King, G. & C. Murray. "Rethinking Human Security." Political Science Quarterly
116 (2001/02): 585-610.
Kiss, A. & D. Shelton. International Environmental Law. New York: Transnational
Publishers, 2000.
Klein, E. "International Regimes," in Encyclopedia ofPublic International Law,
editf'tl hy R. B�mhard. Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1986, pp.
202-07.
Klein, P., L. Boisson de Chazournes, X. Hanquin & D. Caron. 11The State of State
Responsibility. 11 American Society ofInternational Law. Procedings ofthe
Annual Meeting (2002): 168-80.

225

Kraft, M. "Policy Design and the Acceptability of Envirorunental Risks." Policy
Studies Journal 28 (2000): 206-18.
Kraft, W" "Public and State Responses to High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal. 11
Policy Studies Review 10 (Winter, 1991/92): 152.
Krasner, S. "Compromising Westphalia. (Nuclear Issues in Asia).n International
Security 20 (1995): 115-51.
Krasner, S. International Regimes. London: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Krasner, S. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables/' in International Regimes, edited by S. Krasner. London: Cornell
University Press, 1983, pp. 1-21.
Kucia, C. "Conference Pledges to Curb Dirty Bomb Danger." Arms Control Today
33 (2003): 33.
Kucia, C. "Russia Agrees to Use U.S. MOX Facility Design." Arms Control Today
33 (2003): 24.
Kummer, K. International Management ofHazardous Wastes. Oxford: University
Press, 1995.
Kummer, K. International Management ofHazardous Wastes: The Basel Convention
and Related Legal Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Kunreuther, H., W. Desvousges & P. Slavic. "Nevada's Predicament." Environment
30 (1988): 16-33.
Lamm, V. The Utilization ofNuclear Energy and International Law. Budapest:
Akademiai Kiado, 1984.
Lang, W. Sustainable Development and International Law. London: Graham &
Trotman Ltd, 1995.
Lang-Lenton Leon, J. "Radioactive Waste Management and Sustainable
Development." NEA News 19 (2001): 18-20.
Lavranos, N. "Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Who Makes the Binding
Decisions?" European Environmental Law Review (2002): 44-50.
Lee, M. "Civil Liability of the Nuclear Industry." Journal ofEnvironmental Law 12
(2000): 317-32.
"Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 8
Se ptember 1999.
"Legislative Council. 11 Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 21
April 1999.

226

Lenssen, N. Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away. Washington:
Worldwatch Institute1 1991.
Leventhal, P. "Past, Present and Future." Nuclear Engineering International (2001):
39-40.
Lindstrom, S. 11The Brave Music of a Distant Drum: Sweden's Nuclear Phase Out."
Energy Policy 20 (1992): 623-31.
Lober, D. "Why Protest? Public Behavioural and Attitudinal Response to Siting a
Waste Disposal Facility." Policy Studies Journal 23 (1995): 499-518.
Lochbaum, D. Nuclear Waste Disposal Crisis. Oklahoma: Pennwell Publishing,
1996.
Longstaff. M. Unlocking the Atom: A Hundred Years ofNuclear Energy. London:
Frederick Muller, 1980.
Louka, E. Overcoming National Barriers lo International Waste Trade. Norwell
USA: Kluwer, 1994.
Lowenthal, M. Radioactive Waste Classification in the United States: History and
Current Predicaments. Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory Report.
University of California, Berkeley: California, 1997.
Lydenherg, S. "Trust Building and Trust Busting: Corporations, Government and
Responsibilities." Journal ofCorporate Citizenship 11 (2003): 23-27.
Mabry, W. "Can you say 'N1?: NIMBY, NWPA and Nuclear Preemption." Natural
Resources Journal 33 (1993): 493-506.
Macfarlane, A. & A. Bernstein. "Canning Plutonium: Cheaper and Faster. 11 The
Bulletin ofthe Atamic Scientists 55 (1999): 66-69.
Mfu{inda, S. "Global Governance and Terrorism. 11 Global Change, Peace and
Security 15 (2003): 43-58.
Malakoff, D. "Spending 'triples on Terrorism R & D. 11 Science 295 (11 January
2002): 254.
Manley, C. 11NuclearDump 'Will Be Safe'." The Sunday Times, 22 August 1999.
Manning, H. "Issues of the South Australian Political Chronicles." Australian
Journal ofPolitics and History 47 (2001): 281-88.
Markey, E. Security Gap: A Hard Look at the Soft Spots in our Civilian Nuclear
Reactor Security. Staff Summary of Responses by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to Correspondence from Rep. Edward Markey, 2002.

227

Marshall, E. "Nevada Wins the Nuclear Waste Lottery: Congress Ends the Long
Running Controversy Over a Reactor Fuel Dump by Sticking a Pin in the
Map at Yucca Mountain." Science 239 (1 January 1988): 15.
Marshall, V. "Issues of the South Australian Political Chronicles." Australian
Journal ofPolitics and History 46 (2000): 588-95.
MARTAC. Rehabilitation ofFonner Nuclear Test Sites at Emu and Mara/inga
(Australia): Report by the Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory
Committee, 2002.
Martin, R. "N-Waste Dump in Terminal Decline. 11 The Australian, Wednesday 23
January 2002.
Maser, C. Sustainable Community Development: Principles and Concepts. Florida:
St. Lucie Press, 1997.
Masood, E. "Nuclear Waste Store Could be Built Within 25 Years, Say Lords."
Nature 398 (25 March 1999): 271.
Masood, E. "Planning Rejection Leaves British Nuclear Waste Plans in Disarray."
Nature 386 (3 April 1997): 423.
Massey, A. Technocrats and Nuclear Politics. Aldershot: Gower, 1988.
Mather, J., D. Greenwood & P. Greenwood. "Burying Britain's Radioactive Waste.11
Nature 281 (1979): 332-34.
McCombie, C. "Developments in the Disposal of High Level W astes.11 Paper
presented at the Third Australian Uranium Summit, Darwin Australia, 30
March 1999.
McCombie, C. "Overview of Development ofRegional/Multin8.tional Concepts. 11
Paper presented at the SAPIERR Working Group Meeting, Piestany,
Slovakia, 19-20 February 2004.
McCombie, C. 11Proposed Global Solution for the Disposal ofUnwanted Nuclear
Materials.1 1 Paper presented at the ICEM Conference on Radioactive Waste
Management and Environmental Remediation, Nagoya, Japan 1999.
Mccombie, C., G. Butler, M. Kurzeme, D. Pentz, J. Voss & P. Winter. "The P angea
International Repository: A Technical Overview . 11 Paper presented at the
Waste Management '99 Conference, Tuscon March 1999.
Mccombie, C. & N. Chapman. "Regional and International Repositories: Not If, But
How and When." Paper presented at the World Nuclear At>f:ociation Annual
Symposium, London, 5-7 September 2002.
McCombie, C. & N. Chapman. "SAPIERR Proposal for a Pilot Study on European
Regional Repositories." ARJUS News/etter4 (May 2003): 1-9.

228

McCombie, C., D. Pentz, M. Kurzeme & I. Miller. "Deep Geological Repositories: A
Safe and Secure Solution to Disposal of Nuclear Wastes." Paper presented at
the GeoEng 2000 - International Geotechnical Engineering Conference,
Melbourne, November 2000.
McGregor, L. Critical Mass: Four Corners: Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
1999.
McGregor, R. "Black Stump Nuke Dump." The Australian, Wednesday 2 December
1998.
McGregor, R. "Clinton Adviser N-dumps on us." The Australian, Wednesday 12
August 1998.
McGregor, R. "Dumper Sells What No One's Buying." The Australian, 12 December
1998.
McKinley, I. & C. McCombie. "High Level Radioactive Waste Management in
Switzerland: Background and Status 1995," in Geological Problems in
Radioactive Waste Isolation: Second Worldwide Review, edited by P.
Witherspoon. California: University of California, 1996, pp. 223-31.
McKinley, I. & C. McCombie. 11The Place of International Collaboration in Nagra's
R & D Programme." Nagra Bulletin 29 (1997): 5.
McKinley, I. & C. McCombie. 11 Switzerland Plans to Bury Nuclear-Waste Problem.11
Forum for Applied Research ond Public Policy 9 (1994): 116-18.
McL Michie, U. "Deep Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: A Historical
Review of the UK Experience. 11 Interdisciplin ary Science Reviews 23 (1998):
242.
McMillan, K. 11 Strengthening the International Legal Framework for Nuclear
Energy." The Georgetown International Enviro;imental Law Review 13
(2001): 983-1012.
Mellor, J. "Radioactive Waste and Russia's Northern Fleet: Sinking the Principles of
International Environmental Law." Denver Journal ofInternational Law and
Policy28 (1999): 51-72.
Miller, I., J. Black, C. Mccombie, D. Pentz & P. Zuidema. "High-Isolation Sites for
Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Fresh Look at the Challenge of Locating Safe
Sites for Radioactive Repositories." Paper presented at the Waste
Management '99 Conference, Tucson, 3 March 1999.
Miller, M. "Sovereignty Reconfigured: Environmental Regimes and Third World
States," in The Greening ofSovereignty in World Politics, edited by K. Litfin.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,
1998.
::
'

,,
229

Miller, N. 11N-Waste 'As Good As Gold'." The West Australian, Wednesday 9
December 1998.
Miller, S. "Russia, Nuclear Leak.age and the Non-Proliferation Regime."
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 24 (1999): 216-24.
Minchin, N. Discussion Paper Released on Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste
Store. Media Release 01/32916 July, 2001.
Minchin, N. "No Weakening of Government's Stand Against Accepting other
Countries Radioactive Waste." Media Release, 00/352, 16 August 2000.
Minchin, N. "Questions Without Notice: Nuclear Waste Storage." Australian
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 October1999, 9813.
Minchin, N. Two Radioactive Repository Sites Withdrawn Following Community
Consultation. Media Release, 99/379, 18 November, 1999.
Molodstova, E. "Nuclear Energy and Environmental Protection: Responses of
International Law." Pace Environ mental Law Review 12 (1994): 185-267.
Morgan, H. "Police Step in at NoisyRally by 1500 Opposed to Nuclear Waste
Dump: Protesters Try to Attack Minchin." The Advertiser, 17 August 2000.
Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations: The Strngglefor Power an d Peace. New
York: Knopf, 1967.
Monis, R. & M. Folger. "Radioactive Wastes -Responsible Management."
Management Today (April 1995): 8-9.
Monissey, 0., D. teVelde & A. Hewitt. "Defining International Public Goods:
Conceptual Issues," in International Public Goods: Incentives Measurement
and Financing, edited by A. Mody & M. Ferroni. Boston: Kluwer Academic
in Conjunction with the World Bank, 2002.
Moss, Z. The Vulnerability of the UK's Nuclear Facilities to Terrorism. Bellona
Position Paper, 2002.
NAGRA. P roject Opalinus Clay: Safety Report. Demonstration ofDisposal
Feasibilityfor Spent F uel, Vitrified High-Level Waste and Long-Lived
Intermediate-Leve/ Waste. Nagra Technical Report NTB 02-05. Wettingen,
Switzerland, 2002.
Nab.an, M. "OpportunityToo Good to Waste." The West Australian, Wednesday 9
December 1998.
National Research Council. The Disposal ofRadioactive Waste on Land. National
AcademyofSciences-National Research Council, September 1957.

230

NEA Secretariat. "Problems Raised by the Applications of the Conventions on
Nuclear Third Party Liability to Radioactive Waste Repositories." Nuclear
Law Bulletin 55 (1995): 17-22.
Nee, V. & K. Sewall. 11 Can Kazakhstan Profit from Radioactive Waste? Domestic
and Legal Perspectives on a Proposal to Import Radioactive Waste." The
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 15 (2003): 429-56.
Newland, C. "Fanatical Terrorism versus Disciplines of Constitutional Democracy."
Public Administration Review 61 (2001): 643-50.
Norman, C. "Three Sites Short-Listed for Nuclear Waste Dump." Science 227 (4
January 1985): 37.
Norris, S. "Managing Radioactive Waste." Chemistry and Industry (1999): 876.
North, D. "A Perspective on Nuclear Waste.'1 Risk Analysis 19 (1999): 751-58.
Nossal, G. "N-Dumps: Why Waste a Chance? An Australian Solution for a Global
Problem." The Australian, Friday 11 December 1998.
Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD). "The Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste."
NEA Issue Brief3 (1989): 1-8.
Nucl ear Energy Agency :oECD). Disposal ofRadioactive Waste: Can Long-Term
Safety be Evaluated? A Collective Opinion. OECD Publications, Paris, 1991.
Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD). The Economics ofthe Nuclear Fuel Cycle. OECD
Publications, Paris, 1994.
Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD). Safety of Disposal ofSpent Fuel, HLW and Long
lived IL Win Switzerland: An International Peer Review of the Post-Closure
Radiological Safety Assessment for Disposal in the Opalinus Clay of the
Ziircher Weinland. OECD Publications, Paris, 2004.
Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD) in Cooperation with the European Commission.
Engineered Barrier Systems and the Safety ofDeep Geological Repositories:
State of the Art Report, 2003.
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. The Storage ofLiquid High Level Waste at BNFL,
Sellafield: An Updated Review ofSafety. Health and Safety Executive (HSE),
2000.
Nuttall, B. "Nuclear Waste Management.11 Science and Public Affairs (2003): 18-19.
0' Sullivan, K. "Call to End Nuclear Repror.:essing.11 The Irish Times, online version,
30 Ju.�e 2000.
Ohmae, K. "Putting Global Logic First," in The Evolving Global Economy: Making
Sense of The New World Order, edited by K. Ohmae. Boston: Harvard
Business Review, 1995.

231

Openshaw, S., S. Carver & J. Femie. Britain's Nuclear Waste: Safety and Siting.
London: Belhaven Press, 1989.
O'Riordan, T. "The Prodigal Technology: Nuclear Power and Political Controversy."
The Political Quarterly 59 (1988): 164.
Osherenko, G. & 0. Young. 11The Fonnation of International Regimes: Hypotheses
and Cases," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental
Regimes, edited by O. Young & G. Osherenko. London: Cornell University
Press, 1993, pp. 1-21.
Oxburgh, R. "Making a Meal of our Nuclear Waste." Geoscientist 12 (2002): 4-13.
Oxburgh, R. (Chair). Managing Radioactive Waste: the Government's Consultation.
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 23 November
2001.
Pangea Resources. 11Elements of Repository Safety: Engineered and Natural
Barriers." Pangea Booklet, High Isolation Sites for Radioactive Waste
Disposal (1998): 1-15.
Pangea Resources. 11 Pangea's Fresh Look at the Challenge." Pangea Booklet, High
Isolation Sites for Radioactive Waste Disposal (1998): 1-15.

Pangea Resources, "Project Background." Pangea Booklet, Leading a Global
Solution for the Disposal ofNuclear Materials (1998): 1-19.
Papadopoalos, Y. 11How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum
Votes on Politics and Policy Making." West European Politics 24 (2001): 3558.
Paradell-Trius, L. "Principles of International Environmental Law: An Overview."
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 9
(2000): 93-99.
Parer, W. "SA Region Selected for National Radioactive Waste Repository." Media
Release, DPIE 98/267P, 18 February 1998.
Pelzer, N. "Concepts of Nuclear Liability Revisited: A Post Chernobyl Assessment
of the Paris and the Vienna Conventions," in Nuclear Energy Law After
Chernobyl, edited by P. Cameron, L. Hancher & W. Kuhn. London: Graham
and Trotman, 1988.
Pelzer, N. "Focus on the Future of Nuclear Liability Law." Journal ofEnergy and
Natural Resources Law 17 (1999): 332-53.
Pentz, D. 11Pangea - An International Repository. 11 Paper presented at the Waste
Management '99 Conference, Tuscon March 1999.

232

Perrez, F. Cooperative Sovereignty: From Indep endence to Interdependence in the
Structure ofInternational E11vironmental Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law
htternational, 2000.
Perrez, F. "The Relationship Between Permanent Sovereignty and the Obligation not
to Cause Transboundary Envirorunental Damage. 11 Environmental Law 26
(1996): 1187-212.
Pidgeon, N., R. K.asperson & P. Slovic. The Social Amplification ofRisk. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Pidgeon, R. "Your Say." The Sunday Times, 9 May 1999.
Plane, T. "Maralinga Doubts help Premier lay N-Dump to Waste." The Australian,
17 March 2003.
Politi, M. 11 The hnpact of the Chernobyl Accident on the States' Perception of
International Responsibility for Nuclear Damage," in International
Responsibility for Environmental Harm: International Environmental Law
and Policy Series, edited by F. Francioni & T. Scovazzi. London: Graham &
Trotman, 1991.
Porte, T. & D. Metlay. "Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit
of Trust." Public Administration Review 56 (1996): 341-47.
Powell, S. & P. Walters. "Terror at our Door: 11 Indonesians Die in Embassy
Attack." The Australian, 10 September 2004.
Priest, M. "Court Adviser Linked to Nuke Dump.11 The Sunday Times, 4 April 1999.
Priest, M. 11:MP Dumps on N-site." The Sunday Times, 28 March 1999.
Progressive Policy Institute. America at Risk: A Homeland Security Report Card.
Progressive Foundation, Washington, 2003.
Rabe, B., J. Becker & R. Levine. 11Beyond Siting: hnplementing Voluntary
Hazardous Waste Siting Agreements in Canada." American Review of
Canadian Studies 30 (2000): 455-78.
Radetzki, M. & M. Radetzki. 11Liability of Nuclear and other Industrial Corporations
for Large Scale Accident Damage." Journal ofEnergy and Natural
Resources Law 15 (1997): 366-85.
Rayfuse, R. 11 Jnternational Environmental Law," in Public International Law: An
Australian Perspective, edited by S. Blay, R. Piotrowicz & B. Tsamenyi.
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Raynal, M. "Status of Research on Geological Disposal," in Geological Problems in
Radioactive Waste Isolation: Second Worldwide Review, edited by P.
Witherspoon. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1996, pp.
95-104.

233

Reid, E. Rock Solid: The Geology ofNuclear Waste Disposal. Glasgow: The
Tarragon Press, 1990.
Renn, O. "Concepts of Risk: A Classification," in Social Theories ofRisk, edited by
S. Krimsky & D. Golding. London: Praeger, 1992.
Renn, 0., W. Bums, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson & P. Slavic. 11The Social
Amplification of Risk: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Applications."
Journal ofSocial Issues 48 (1992): 137-60.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Second
Session. State Responsibility: Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting
Committee on Second Reading. UN NCN.4/L.600, 21 August 2000.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session.
Draft Articles on Responsibility ofStates for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
UN GAOR, 56th Session, N56/IO, 2001.

"Repository Deep, Mountain High." New Scientist 119 (11 August 1998): 26.
Reyners, P. & E. Lellouche. 11Regulation and Control by International Organisations
in the Context of a Nuclear Accident: The International Atomic Energy
Agency and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency," in Nuclear Energy Law
After Chernobyl, edited by P. Cameron, L. Hancher & W. Kuhn. London:
Graham and Trotman, 1988.
Reynolds, W. Australia's Bid/or the Atomic Bomb. Melbourne: Melbourne
University Press, 2000.
Richardson, J. "Sovereignty: EU Experience and EU Policy. 11 Chicago Journal of
/' International Law 1 (2000): 323-25.
Riley, P. Nuclear Waste: Law, Policy and Pragmatism. Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing, 2004.
Riley, P. "Policy and Law Relating to Radioactive Waste: International Direction and
Human Rights." Paper presented at the 9th International Conference on
Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management, Oxford,
21-25 September 2003.
''

Ringwood, A. Nuclear Waste Immobilisation in Synroc. Canberra: Australian
National University, 1985.
Rippon, S. "Don't Even Talk About Multilateral Approaches. 11 Nuclear News 42
(1999): 35-36.
Rohnnann, R. & 0. Renn. "Risk Perception Research: An Introduction," in Cross
Cutural Risk Perception: A Survey ofEmpirical Studies, edited by 0. Renn &
R. Rohnnann. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, pp. 11-53.

234

Rondinelli, D. "Partnering For Development: Government-Private Sector
Cooperation In Setvice Provision." Paper presented at the Fourth Global
Forum on Reinventing Government - Citizens, Businesses, and Governments:
Partnerships for Development and Democracy, Marrakech, Morocco, 11-13
December 2002.
Rosa, E. & W. Freudenburg. "The Historical Development of Public Reactions to
Nuclear Power: Implications for Nuclear Waste Policy," in Public Reactions
to Nuclear Waste: Citizens Views ofRepository Siting, edited by R. Dunlap,
M. Kraft & E. Rosa. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 291-324.
Rose, R. "N-Waste Ban Fails in Senate." The West Australian, Friday 11 December
1998.
Rose, R. "Poll Backs Nuclear Dump Ban." The West Australian, Wednesday 27
October 1999.
Rose, R. "Tuckey in Gaffe on Nuclear Durnp.11 The West Australian, Thursday 25
March 1999.
Rose, R. "WA Had N-Dump Talks." The West Australian, Thursday 3 December
1998.
Rose, R. & J. Grove. "Senator Backs N-Waste Plan." The West Australian, Friday 26
March 1999.
Rosenstock, R. 11The ILC and State Responsibility." The American Journal of
International Law 96 (2002): 792-97.
Rosenstock, R. & M. Kaplan. "The Fifty-Third Session of the International Law
Commission." The American Journal ofInternational Law 96 (2002): 41219.
Rowlands, I. 11The Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol: Report
and Reflections." Environment 6 (1993): 25-34.
Sagasti, F. & K. Bezanson. Financing and Providing Global Public Goods:
Expectations and Prospects: Executive Summary. Institute of Development
Studies Sussex, 2001.
Samuelson, P. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." The Review ofEconomics
and Statistics 36 (1954): 387-89.
Sandler, T. "Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism.11 The World Economy 26
(2003): 779-802.
Sandler, T. Collective Global Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Sandler, T. 11Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action."
Fiscal Studies 19 (1998): 221-47.

235

Sandler, T. Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and
Economic Problems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Sandler, T. On Financing Global and International Public Goods. School of
International Relations, University of Southern California, July 2001.
Sandler, T. "Understanding Global Public Goods." OECD Observer 3 (2001): 15.
;,'

Sands, P. Chernobyl: Law and Communication. Cambridge: Grotius Publications '·'
Limited, 1988.
Sands, P. Greening International Law. London: Earthscan Publications Limited,
1993.
Sands, P. "International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging
Legal Principles," in Sustainable Development and International Law, edited ,,
by W. Lang. London: Graham & Trotman, 1995, pp. 53-66.
Sands, P. "Observations on International Nuclear Law Ten Years a.fter Chernobyl. 11
Review ofEuropean Community and International Environmental Law 5

(1996): 199-210.

Sands, P. Principles ofInternational Environmental Law. Second ed. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Sandvik, B. & S. Suikkari. "Harm and Reparation in International Treaty Regimes:
An Overview," in Harm to the Environment: The Right to Compensation and
the Assessment ofDamages, edited by P. Wetterstein. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997, pp. 57-71.
Schrijver, N. Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997.
Shanahan, D. & R. DiGirolamo. "PM Caves in over N-Dump: Political Backlash
Kills National Waste Site in South Australia." The Ausfralian, Wednesday 14
July 2004.
Shaw, M. International Law. Third ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991.
Shelton, D. "Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Re::i'Ponsibility."
The American Journal ofInternational Law 96 (2002): 833-56.
Shetterly, C. 11Scientists Find Two Volcanoes at Yucca." Las Vegas Review-Jo14rnal
(1988): Sb.
Short, F. & E. Rosa. "Some Principles for Siting Controversy Decisions: Lessons
from the US Experience with High Level Nuclear Waste." Journal ofRisk
Research 2 (2004): 135-52.

236

Shrader-Frechette, K. Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case Against Geological
Disposal ofNuclear Waste. Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1993.
Shrader-Frechette, K. Nuclear Power and Public Policy: The Social and Ethical
Problems ofFission Technology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.
Shrader-Frechette, K. Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist
Refonns. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991.
Siegel, D. "Legal Aspects of the Th1F/WTO: The Fund's Articles of Agreement and
the WTO Agreements." The American Journal of International Law 96
(2002): 561-99.
Simmons, B. "Compliance With International Agreements." Annual Review of
Political Science I (1998): 75-93.
Sinclair, I. The International Law Commission. Cambridge: Grotius, 1987.
SKB. "Research Well Advanced As Decision Phase Approaches. 11 SKB Press
Release, 30 September 2004.
Slaughter, A-M. 11International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda." The American Journal ofInternational Law 87 (1993): 205-39.
Slaughter, A-M., A. Tulumello & S. Wood. 11lntemational Law and International
Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship." The
American Journal ofInternational Law 92 (1998): 367-97.
Slovic, P. The Perception ofRisk. Edited by R. Lofstedt, Risk, Society and Policy
Series. London: Earthscan, 2000.
Slovic, P. "Going Beyond the Red Book: The Sociopolitics ofRisk." Human and
Ecological Risk Assessment 9 (2003): 1181-90.
Slovic, P., J. Flynn, C. Mertz, M. Poumadere & C. Mays. ''Nuclear Power and the
Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in France and the United
States," in Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies,
edited by B. Rohrmann & 0. Renn. Dordrecth: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2000, pp. 55-102.
Slovic, P., M. Layman & J. Flynn. 11Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear
Waste." Science 254 (13 December 1991): 1603-07.
Slovic, P. & E. Weber. "Perception of Risk Posed by Extreme Events." Paper
presented at the Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World,
Palisades, New York, 12-13 April 2002.
Smith, A. The Wealth ofNations. Hannondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1982.

237

Smitlt, L. "The Role of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in the Cleanup of the US
Nuclear Weapons Complex." Paper presented at the 9th International
Conference on Environmental Remediation a.11d Radioactive Waste
Management, Oxford, 21-25 September 2003.
Stalgren, P. Regional Public Goods and the Future ofInternational Development Co
operation. Expert Group on Development Issues, Stockholm, Sweden, 2000.
Stanley, R. & M. Kraig. "The NPT: Can this Treaty be Saved?" Bulletin ofthe
Atomic Scientists 59 (2003): 59-65.
Stefula, V. & C. Mccombie. "SAPIERR Paves the Way Towards European Regional
Repository." Paper pre.�ented at the 5th International Conference on Nuclear
Option in Countries with Small and Medium Electricity Grids, Dubrovnik,
Croatia, May 2004.
Stein, A. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,11 in
International Regimes, edited by S. Krasner. London: Cornell University
Press, 1983, pp. 115-40.
Stokke, 0. "Regimes as Governance Systems," in Global Governance: Drawing
Insightsfrom the Environmental Experience, edited by 0. Young.
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, pp. 27-63.
Stone, R. "Deep Repositories: Out of Sight, Out of Terrorists' Reach." Science 303
(2004): 161-64.
Strange, S. "Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,11 in International
Regimes, edited by S. Krasner. London: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp.
337-54.
Straw, J. "Speech by the Foreign Secretary." Paper presented at the Launch of the
Centre for European Refonn Pamphlet, Royal United Services Institute,
London, 11 December 2001.
Stretton, H. & L. Orchard. Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice:
Theoretical Foundations ofthe Contemporary Attack on Government. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
Swazo, S. "The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and
the Tenth Amendment: Nevada v Watkins." Natural Resources .Journal 36
(1996): 127-44.
Synroc Study Group. Progress Report. Symoc Study Group, August 1991.
Szell, P. "Negotiations on the Ozone Layer,'' in International Environmental
Negotiation, edited by G. Sjostedt. Newbury Park, Califonnia: SAGE
Publications, 1993, pp. 31-47.
Taylor, P. An Ecological Approach to International Law: Responding to Challenges
of Climate Change. London: Routledge, 1998.

238

Thakur, R. "Introduction," in Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain: The United Nations,
edited by R. Thakur. London: Macmillan Press, 1998, pp. 1-14.
The Future Foundation. Public Attitudes To the Future Management of Radioactive
Waste in the UK. Report for United Kingdom Nirex Limited, February 2002.
The Secretary of Energy. "Letter to the President of:he United States." 14 February
2002, Washington, D.C. 20585.
The Secretary of Energy. "Secretary Abraham Announces Administration Plan to
Proceed with Plutonium Disposition and Reduce Proliferation Concems.11 US
Department of Energy, Press Release, 23 January 2002.
The UK Centre for the Environment and Economic Development. "Final Report."
Paper presented at the UK Natioual Consensus Conference on Radioactive
Waste Management, Westminster Central Hall, London, 21-24 May 1999.
Thompson, C. "In My Backyard Please." Nuclear Engineering International 49
(2004): 44-46.
Thompson, G. Civilian Nuclear Facilities as Weapons for an Enemy: A Submission
to the House of Commons Defence Committee. Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Institute For Resource and Security Studies, 3 January, 2002.
Thompson, J. "Legends, Myths, and Heroes: Decontaminating the Rocky Flats
Advanced Size Reduction Facility." Radwaste Solutions 10 (2003): 42-50.
Tickner, L. "Tourism Warning on N-dump. 11 The West Australian, Thursday 22 July
1999.
Tombs, L (Chair). Management ofNuclear Waste. London: House of Lords Select
Committee on Science and Technology: Third Report, 10 March 1999.
UK Government White Paper. Review of Radioactive Waste Management Policy.
London: HMSO Cm 2919, 1995.
UNEP. Report ofthe 2nd Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, 1990.
UNEP. Report ofthe 4th Meeting ofthe Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, 1992.
UNEP. Report of the 6th Meeting ofthe Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7, 1994.
United Nations. General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 2001.
United Nations. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, NCONF.151/26 (Vol. I) 3-14 June 1992.

239

United Nations. UNEP's New Way Fonvard: Environmental Law and Sustainable
Development. Nairobi: United Nations, 1995.
United States General Accounting Office. Nuclear No11proliferation: US and
International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need
Strengthening. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subconunittee on
Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Conunittee on
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, 2003.
US Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty." BBC World News, 14 October 1996.

11

Vayrynen, R. "Sovereignty, Globalisation and Transnational Social Movements.11
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 1 (2001): 227-46.
Veevers, J. "N-Waste Disposal Isn't Our Problem." The West Australian, Saturday 10
July 1999.
Veevers, J. "Risking Nuclear Diaster." The Advertiser, Friday 9 July 1999.
Victor, D. "The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Non
Compliance Procedure," in The Implementation and Effectiveness of
International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice, edited by
D. Victor, K. Raustiala & E. Skolnikoff. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press, 1998, pp. 137-76.
Vicuna, F. "State Responsibility, Liability and Remedial Measures Under
International Law: New Criteria for Environmental Protection," in
Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and
Dimensions, edited by Edith Brown-Weiss. Tokoyo: United Nations
University, 1992, pp. 124-58.
von Hippel, F. "Plutonium and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel." Science 293
(2001): 2397-98.
Wald, M. "Officials Fear Reactors are Vulnerable to Attacks by Terrorists.11 The New
York Times, 4 November 2001, lB.8.
Walker, C., L. Gould & E. Woodhouse. Too hot to handle?: Social and Policy Issues
in the Management ofRadioactive Wastes. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1983.
Walker, J. "Nuclear Industry in Meltdown." The Weekend Australia, 11-12 March
2000.
Walker, W. "Europe Backs America NATO Invokes Article 5 in Wake of Attacks.11
Europe October (2001).
Ward, I. Politics of the Media. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995.

240

Warner, R. "The Australian Uranium Industry," in Nuclear Papers, edited by The
State Energy Commission of Western Australia. Perth: State Energy
Commission, 1976.
Warren, L. "Public Perception of Radioactive Waste. 11 Interdisciplinary Science
Reviews 23 (1998): 204.
Webster, P. 11Minatom: The Grab for Trash." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58
(2002): 33-66.
Weiss, L. 11Atoms for Peace. 11 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (2003): 34-44.
Werksman, J. Greening International Institutions. London: Earthscru:1 Publications
Limited, 1996.
Wettestad, J. "The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on Ozone-Layer
Depletion, 11 in Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory With
Evidence, edited by E. Miles, A. Underdal, S. Andresen, J. Wettestad, J.
Skjaerseth & E. Carlin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002, pp.
149-70.
Wilks, N. 11Vit for the Duration. 11 Professional Engineering (13 February 2002): 4748.
Wilks, N. 11Winding Up to Winding Down." Professional Engineering 15 (2002): 2829.
Williams, J. "Nuclear Solutions." Fornmfor Applied Research and Public Policy
(1999): 103-07.
Williams, L. (Chair). First Review ofthe Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention
on the Safety ofSpent Fuel Management and on the Safety ofRadioactive
Waste Management. JC/RM.1/06/Final Version, 2003.
Witherspoon, P. "Introduction to Second World Wide Review of Geological
Problems in Radioactive Waste Isolation," in Geological Problems in
Radioactive Waste Isolation: Second Worldwide Review, edited by P.
Witherspoon. Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkley National U,.boratory,
1996, pp. 1-4.
Yoshida, 0. "Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol's Noncompliance
Procedure and the Functions of Internal International Institutions. 11 Co lorado
Journal ofInternational Environmental Law and Policy 10 (1999): 95-141.
Young, 0. 11Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fail oflntemational Regimes," in
International Regimes, edited by S. Krasner. London: Cornell University
Press, 1983, pp. 93-113.
Young, 0. "Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs," in Global Governance:
Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience, edited by 0. Young.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 1-23.

241

Young, 0. Compliance and Public Authority. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979.
Young, 0. Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998.

242

